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41 INTRODUCTION
The research project tackles the complex problem of understanding learning capacities and
their similarities and differences in modern public-funded research systems (PFRS). This is
done in order to better explain variations in the adaptation of these systems when confronted
with the numerous challenges of research and technological innovation nowadays.
These objectives need two clarifications: first, what do we mean when we speak of a public-
funded research system and, second, how do we define learning capacities?
1.1 Public-funded research system
In the report of the European research project TSER “Changing Structure, Organisation and
Nature of European PSR Systems”, directed by Jacqueline Senker from SPRU, public sector
research is defined as covering “those institutions for which the major source of funds is pub-
lic; and which are in public ownership or control (or have converted to private ownership
since 1980); and which aim to disseminate their research. It also covers the organisations of
officially recognised charities or foundations which raise the majority of their funds from the
general public, and whose main activity is research” (Senker 1999). While this definition is
largely inspired by OECD definitions and remains very empirical oriented, we would like to
develop a more theoretical point of view concerning the public-funded research systems.
In general, research funding is conceptualised in terms of a confrontation of two functionally
differentiated systems, the political and the scientific system. Policy-makers have an interest
in making scientists do something they think could be useful for society or for their own pur-
poses. The literature has also revealed that in order to influence scientists, often intermediary
agencies (funding agencies, research councils, etc.) have been set up that are delegated the task
of public research funding (Braun 1993; Rip 1994). We believe that these different layers
(policy-making, intermediary agencies, scientific research) are not layers apart but can be con-
sidered as a “hybrid system” that develops by its own logic and by its own structures and
interrelated actions.
All actors in the system are united by the common logic of producing new knowledge in di-
verse research fields (fundamental/applied) as well as by the structure of public financing. This
structure links all (corporate) actors in the system to the political business cycle and to the
political logic of revenue allocation. Opportunities and constraints in the development of re-
search activities are largely defined by political considerations. Privately funded research sys-
tems, by contrast, are bound to the logic of economic considerations though the production of
new knowledge is also a common logic of institutions in this system with a stronger emphasis
on the application of knowledge.
We speak of a “hybrid” system because actors within this system are often part of broader
functional differentiated systems (in case the scientific and the political system) and are car-
rying with them the inherent “scripts”, “norms and values” and interests of these systems.
The unity of the public-funded research systems is guaranteed by the common interest in the
production of (new) knowledge.
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way exactly because different functionally differentiated systems are working in unison. This
can only be done if there is “boundary work”(Gieryn 1995) or intermediation. The coordina-
tion of functionally differentiated systems needs “objects” (idem) and “organisations” that can
function as intermediaries and stabilisers between often conflicting demands. Boundary objects
“allow members of different communities to work together around them, and yet maintain
their disparate identities” (Guston 1998: 29). More important for our purposes are “boundary
organisations” (Guston 1998). Guston sees boundary organisations in a similar way as “one
route to stabilization. Boundary organizations are institutions that straddle the apparent poli-
tics/science boundary and, in doing so, internalize the provisional and ambiguous character of
that boundary” (ibid.: 30). Successful boundary organizations will “succeed in pleasing two
sets of principals and remain stable to external forces astride the internal instability at the
boundary” (ibid.). According to Braun, funding agencies can fulfil the role of a boundary or-
ganisation because they are able to stabilise both the claims of science and politics by devel-
oping a certain autonomy though taking care of the communication of demands from both
sides (Braun 1997).
We will not elaborate in more detail the concept of boundary organisations. It suffices to no-
tice that the hybrid public-funded research systems need a boundary that couples in a struc-
tural way the “operational level”, scientific research and its organisations to the political level.
All organisations on the boundary must in one way or other link the scientific and the political
system though their tasks, functions, and interests may differ in doing so. A fundamental dis-
tinction in this respect is the one between the “productive side of the boundary” and the “re-
flexive side of the boundary”.
On the productive side of the boundary, we find all organisations that engage themselves in the
production of new knowledge, either by distributing funds or by managing or representing
research organisations and institutions. In this way, , the Swiss National Science Foundation
(SNSF) and the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (MPG) or the CNRS (Centre National de la Recher-
che Scientifique) belong to the productive side of the boundary. On the reflexive side – we will
come back to the role of this aspect below – there are organisations dedicated to the task of
analysing and evaluating the functioning of the public-funded research systems and to propose
changes to the existing structures, procedures, and routines. Here we may find diverse organi-
sations as the German Wissenschaftsrat, the Dutch Adviesraad voor Wetenschapsbeleid
(AWS) or the Swiss Council for Science and Technology (SCST).
In sum, the boundary has the function of coupling differentiated systems that are united in the
common purpose of financing the production of new knowledge and of stabilising conflicting
perceptions, interests, and demands. If one adds the diverse structure of organising the re-
search policy at the political and the operational level in OECD countries, the diversity and
complexity of public-funded research systems is easily comprehensible. Learning does, there-
fore, take place in a complex system, at several levels with different functional tasks.
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1.2 Learning capacities
This brings us to our second clarification: What do we understand by learning capacities?
If we take three of the most influential definitions in public policy literature, the one by Hugh
Heclo1, by Peter Hall2 and by Johan Olsen and B. Guy Peters3, some common sense features
of policy learning and some differences emerge:
- Learning is linked to experience. Olsen and Peters speak explicitly of “experiential
learning” (1996: 5-6). Learning cannot take place if there is no lesson drawn from past
experiences in the light of new information.
- There is change or at least there are attempts to change. For Heclo, learning is the result
of a change, i.e. an enduring alteration in behaviour. Hall and Olsen/Peters are more pru-
dent. For Hall learning is both a “deliberate attempt” to improve the policy process and
finally the policy change that occurs because of such an attempt. The outcome is there-
fore directly linked to a process of dealing with experiences and improving the organisa-
tion. This demonstrates that learning is not equal to policy change but is only indicated,
as Hall says, when one can demonstrate that the change is directly linked to deliberate
attempts of improvement. Olsen and Peters differentiate very clearly between two un-
derstandings of learning (1996: 6): first, learning is an outcome and an accomplishment
(“in terms of improved knowledge, skills, performance, and preparedness for the fu-
ture”). Learning has taken place and it can be observed by changes that have taken place
in knowledge, skills and performance. Second, learning is the process “through which
experience is consulted and acted upon”. In fact, both points of view cannot – according
to us – be dissociated from one another: By saying that learning is the outcome or an ac-
complishment one has difficulties to distinguish learning from policy change in general.
Policy change may be based on other factors like, for example, power and force, a new
government with a different party ideology etc. Only if policy change can be reduced to
a learning process, i.e. a process based on an evaluation of past experiences in the light
of new information, can we say that learning has occurred.
- Both Hall and Olsen/Peters see learning as an instrument to improve the functioning of
an organisation or of policy-making, Heclo does not. His definition is neutral in this
sense and equals change in behaviour caused by a stimulus and learning. He does not say
why actors should react and how they would react. The other authors clearly define the
                                                
1 “Learning can be taken to mean a relatively enduring alteration in behaviour that results from experience; usu-
ally this alteration is conceptualised as a change in response made in reaction to some perceived stimulus”
(Heclo 1974)
2 Learning is a “deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in the light of the consequences of
past policy and new information so as to better attain the ultimate objects of governance. Learning is indicated
when policy changes as the result of such a process” (Hall 1993: 278).
3 “Learning may be defined as the ability to detect and correct errors and thereby to improve the functioning of
an organization” (Olsen and Peters 1996: 4).
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spectively. We will follow in this report this last interpretation of learning. Learning has
always had the connotation of improving something, of changing something (see also
(Etheredge 1985)). At least, the actors must take action because they think that they
will improve the situation by changing institutions or instruments. Learning is not
equivalent, however, to successful problem-solving. Actors want, of course, solve a
problem when they are involved in a learning process but the result may be inadequate
to solve the problem, because wrong theories have been used or wrong lessons have been
drawn from the past. And it is quite imaginable that problems are solved while no
learning has taken place.
So for us, learning is experiential, it aims at improving the functioning of policies and organi-
sations respectively by changing skills, performance and knowledge.
Howlett and Ramesh (Howlett and Ramesh 1995: 176) introduce on the base of Peter Hall
another important analytical dimension addressing different types of learning. In his definition
Hall speaks of the adjustment of “goals and techniques”. It is exactly this difference between
goals and techniques, which distinguishes two very different types of learning processes.
Changing the goals of policy-making needs a changing environment of policy-making (e.g. radi-
cal governmental policy change; economic crisis) and usually is accompanied by a redefinition
of concepts, the introduction of a new paradigm and a different preference ordering of actors.
“This is the most fundamental type of learning, which is accompanied by change in the think-
ing underlying the policy” (idem). Howlett and Ramesh designate this type of learning as “so-
cial learning” finding its origins outside the policy process and implying usually a far-reaching
discourse among a large number of different policy communities. According to Hall, this is “3rd
order learning” leaving behind “normal policy-making” and revolutionising existing policy-
making. It will be clear that this type of learning is difficult to achieve. Sabatier has, by dis-
cussing advocacy coalitions, given an illustration of what kind of factors and processes must
be available to implement a paradigmatic learning process (see for example (Sabatier and Jen-
kin-Smith 1993). We will see below that research policy-making has been confronted by this
type of radical change in the thinking underlying the policy. Hence, we deal in our study ex-
actly with social learning and not normal policy-making.
First order and second order learning processes in “normal policy-making”, on the other side,
concern “techniques” of policy-making, i.e. the “settings” and the “kind” of instruments used.
Changes concerning techniques are the result of “endogenous learning”, of reflections on the
effectiveness and efficiency of policy instruments, of “lesson-drawing”. “This type of learn-
ing originates within the formal policy process and affects the choice of means or technique
employed by policy-makers in their efforts to achieve their goals” (Howlett and Ramesh 1995:
176). The origins of this type of learning are seldom found outside the policy process. Learn-
ing occurs by assessing goal-means relationships and the principal aim is improvement of the
policy process by changing the settings or the kind of instruments.
So, when we speak of learning capacities, we mean more in particular all formal rules and
regulations on the one hand (the “hardware”) and norms, scripts, causal stories and structures
8of consensus-building on the other hand (the “software”) that allow social learning in public
research funding.4
1.3 What is a policy-regime?
Our research is thus on social learning capacities in public-funded research systems. This im-
plies a fundamental revision of existing arrangements in public-funded research systems. We
will speak henceforth of a fundamental revision of the existing “policy-regime” in public-
funded research systems. The notion of a regime allows more in particular to grasp at the dif-
ferent analytical dimensions that are entailed in the processes of social learning.
A policy-regime consists of three elements: the “policy-design”, “regulatory structures” and
“operational” or “performance structures” and a forth element that we will add to the tradi-
tional definition of a policy-regime, that is the reflexive institutions.
1.3.1 Policy-design
The policy-design has been discussed by (Dryzek 1993), (Linder and Peters 1991), (Ingram
1990), (Varone 1998), (Narath 2002) and others. It represents the analytical dimension of in-
tended and purposeful action in policy-making, albeit not of rational processes. As most of
the time a multitude of actors on different levels of the system are involved, the design may be
the sum of a number of purposeful acting organisations with, however, unintended conse-
quences. Dryzek defines policy design as “the process of inventing, developing and fine-
tuning a course of action with the amelioration of some problem or the achievement of some
target in mind” (Dryzek 1983: 346; quoted in Varone 1998:14). The reader will notice the af-
finity with the concept of learning: Policy-design aims at the solutions and of achieving some
goals as learning is addressing problems on the base of past experiences with the goal of im-
proving the functioning of organisations.
In order to avoid confusion in notions, we would rather like to follow (Knoepfel 2001); see
also Nahrath, (2002: 13-4) who consider the policy-design as a set of different dimensions of
governance in a certain policy field, i.e. the “software” that underpins regulatory actions and
other forms of political intervention. In particular, these dimensions are the:
- problem-definition and the objectives of the government;
- causal hypotheses and stories underlying political intervention in the field;
- instruments used;
- rules and regulations as well as the designation of institutions of implementation;
- designation of social groups that should change their behaviour as a reaction to the interven-
tion;
- designation of other groups affected in a positive or negative way by political intervention.
                                                
4 Healy is using the notions of hardware and software in the context of his concept of “collaborative planning” in
a similar but not identical way (Healey 1993: 200).
9The policy-design structures the way, how government is acting and intervening a given policy
field. It is the software because it entails the ideas, the causal stories, the perceptions, the as-
sumptions etc. that form the base of political action.
At a given period, the policy-design has characteristic features, which make up the coherence
of the regime. Usually, there is a paradigmatic view in a policy-regime concerning two dimen-
sions of the regime, i.e. policy ideas how the resource in question (the land, roads, labour mar-
ket or, in our case, knowledge) should be treated in order to realise certain objectives (like the
production of new knowledge; innovation). Usually, studies on research and technology pol-
icy are only referring to this dimension. However, there is a second dimension, that is policy
ideas how government should intervene in a given policy field. Most of the time, these policy
ideas are not restricted to one policy field but comprise most policy fields. In this they are
the, as Jobert and Muller (1987) state, “référentiel global” of state action while the more con-
crete belief about how to influence the resource in question is the “référentiel sectoriel”. A
policy-design is always made up of these two causal belief systems that have immediate im-
plications for the other dimensions like the use of instruments and the designation of groups or
the setting up of implementation arrangements. The change of a policy-regime can entail either
the change in the belief system on one of the two dimensions (simple policy-design change) or
a simultaneous change of both belief systems (complex policy-design change). In our case, we
are confronted with such a complex policy-design change that takes place in all OECD-
countries and which has a universal character.
Social learning can only be set in motion if there is a change in the policy-design. This is, how-
ever, not the end of the story. The change in the policy-design is not yet a change in the pol-
icy-regime. Policy-regimes entail at least two other analytical dimensions and structures re-
spectively, which have to be changed: the regulatory and operational structures.
1.3.2 Regulatory structures
In the concept of the “actor-centred institutionalism” (Mayntz 1995), (Scharpf 1997), regula-
tory structures and governance structures respectively are conceived as all institutions and
organisations that take part in the regulation, management and intervention of resources in a
given policy field. Operational or performance structures entail all institutions and organisa-
tions that are directly engaged in the production of the resource in question. We regard both
levels as the “hardware” of a policy-regime, while the policy-design is the “software” under-
lying governance and performance structures.
In our conception of social learning, we can expect a divide between changing policy-design on
the one hand and regulatory and operational structures on the other hand. The “hardware”
usually is difficult to change given the path dependency of its developments and the interests
involved in the maintenance of the organisations linked to these structures.
This concept is not very different from the one adopted by Senker et al. where a converging
trend of “policy-makers’ belief systems” (i.e. the paradigm change in the policy-design) is
confronted with path dependent arrangements in each country that differ from one another.
Differences in adopting the new policy design, i.e. differences in learning capacities, are there-
fore to be attributed to this kind of path-dependent structures (see Senker et al. 1999: 52). We
will go one step further and ask if there are different ways and different points in time be-
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tween countries in adopting a new policy design. Social learning is not only the realisation of a
policy design given rather rigid regulatory and operational structures, it is also the capacity to
change the policy design in the first place.
Two further considerations should be added at this point: first, we believe that regulatory
structures have a decisive influence on social learning capacities but we find in theory and
practice different types of regulatory structures, which should be explained. Second, in theo-
ries on governance one rarely discusses a fourth analytical dimension of importance, i.e. the
reflexive capacities of policy-regimes.
In their actor-centred institutionalism, Mayntz and Scharpf proposed “variants” of “sectoral
regulatory structures” that are the outcome of the strength of societal and political actors.
They differentiate between corporatism, colonialisation, etatism, market and networks as gov-
ernance models. We are convinced that the relationship based on power between the state and
the scientific community in our countries under scrutiny (France, Netherlands, Germany, and
Switzerland) can explain some of the variations we find in learning capacities. Our four coun-
tries fit well into a typology of four different models:
Table 1 Strength of the State and Strength of the Scientific Community
Strong State Weak State
Strong Scien-
tific Commu-
nity
Germany
Balance of Power
Fragmentarisation
France
Delegation
Weak Scientific
Community
Netherlands
Etatist - Consociational Model
Switzerland
Liberal - Consociational Model
There are two dimensions: the strength of the state in terms of its capacity of intervention into
society and the strength of the scientific community expressed in terms of reputation and rec-
ognition in society. As we have not developed clear operational standards, we treat the classi-
fication as a heuristic device the utility of which must be proved in explaining the learning ca-
pacities between countries. At first sight, it seems odd to place France under the class “weak
state” but our investigations has clearly demonstrated that, at least in research, France has not
a state with a high intervention capacity or a large room for manoeuvre manifested in a high
institutionalisation of political agencies of research (see for this already (Krauss 1996); (Braun
1997)). This is different for Germany and the Netherlands.
Unlike the Mayntz/Scharpf model (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995: 25), we will not use general
labels yet for the different types but only indicate some general differences in the relationship
of the state and science in the diverse countries. The strong position of both sides in Germany
give way to “corporatism” in the Mayntz/Scharpf model, which does not confirm our view of
the working of relationships in Germany in the scientific context. We consider the relations in
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terms of a balance of power and a fragmentarisation of the system, where we find some coop-
erative devices that do, however, seldom function as a corporate device. In France, delegation
to the scientific community of research policies has been most of the time the predominant
structure exactly because of the low degree of institutionalisation of research in the state appa-
ratus. Both the Netherlands and Switzerland are characterised as small countries by their con-
sociational political culture though in different ways. We will see how the difference between a
strong and a weak state has manifested itself in this respect.
We contend – but this has to be verified – that these different regulatory structures influence
the learning process or more precisely, how a new policy design is developed and imple-
mented.
1.3.3  Reflexivity and reflexive institutions
Regimes have policy-design, regulatory and operational structures. However, all systems also
have in general developed mechanisms of reflexive behaviour. This is the cognitive dimension
of governance. By reflexivity, we mean the capacity of systems to “reflect” on their own be-
haviour, their structures, and problems and the attempt to find solutions to problems. Reflex-
ivity is therefore an integral and important part of learning. Most studies of governance have
not paid attention to the fact that usually systems have set up some institutions and/or proce-
dures that have the explicit function to “reflect” on the functioning of the system. In research
these are, as shown above, for example the scientific councils that advise government. In the
context of policy-regimes, reflexivity is an essential fourth element, in close interaction with
the policy design and certainly a decisive part for learning capacities of system. It is important
to know, then, what kind of reflexive institutions countries have set up, what degree of “den-
sity” of these kind of institutions we find, how they are connected to the policy-design and to
the regulatory and operational structures. Moreover, we need information about how public-
funded research systems have used their reflexive capacities in order to adapt themselves to
new challenges and to implement policy-design change and ultimately policy-regime change. In
order to learn to know this, we have investigated more in particular into the reflexive institu-
tions in each country. We contend that reflexive institutions and capacities may have an im-
portant role to overcome resistance among policy-makers, regulatory agencies and scientific
institutions with regard to change by the building of a consensus based on argumentation and
persuasion. Reflexive institutions are essential for “rational” learning processes.
Policy-regimes are, therefore characterised by four analytical elements and not three.
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We regard policy-regime change as a learning process and not as an evolutionary and unin-
tended result. Regime change means, first, to actively re-design the existing policy-design, of-
ten by using the reflexive capacities available in the public-funded research systems. The re-
design occurs after major contestations of basic causal beliefs about either state intervention or
the management of knowledge or both. The re-design strives for the introduction of new objec-
tives and problem definitions, new instruments to realise the new objectives and a redefinition
of the groups in question the behaviour of which have to be changed to realise the new objec-
tives. It may also entail a redefinition of beneficiaries of policy action.
After the re-design of the policy design – more or less contested – regulatory structures and
operational structures have to be modified. This engenders resistance by actors who are the
losers of such a process and the support of those actors who can profit from the new policy-
design. The type of regulatory structures is decisive, how the new policy-design can be made
accepted among regulatory agencies and scientific institutions. Only after the regulatory struc-
tures and operational structures have been changed more or less conform to the new policy-
design, can we speak of a policy-regime change.
In our study we want to know, therefore, who has taken up new ideas in the policy discourse on
research funding and how these new ideas have been put on the agenda and finally how they
have been translated in the development of a new policy-design. We want to know what kind of
resistance the new policy-design has found on the level of regulatory and operational agencies
and how this resistance has been overcome or how it has contorted the original intentions of
government. These data should give us sufficient information to judge on the learning capaci-
ties of the four countries in questions.
Figure 1 Components of a Policy-Regime
 POLICY REGIME 
 
Policy Design  
 
Reflexive Institutions Regulatory Structures 
 
Operational Structures  
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1.4 Some preliminary hypotheses on learning processes
One should mention our expectations at the start of the research project concerning likely
variations in learning capacities between the four countries we had chosen. In fact, the choice
itself was inspired by such expectations. Our expectations were based on the hypothesis that
the institutional embeddedness (regulatory and operational structures) and the political culture
(consensual – adversarial) should make a difference.
(1) In fact, we opted for two federal and two unitary countries because it seemed obvious that
divided political power in federal systems could block the necessary coordination in research
policies or, in any case, would make it more difficult than in unitary systems to develop a
common policy design. Unitary states (especially under the Westminster regime or in terms of
Lijphart “majoritarian democracies”) seem to have the advantage of quick top-down decisions.
Besides the “concentration” or “dispersion” of (political) power in a country, the degree of
“institutional complexity” seems to influence the coordination capacity and, hence, the learn-
ing capacities. A large number of institutions with different competencies both at the regula-
tory and operational level engender higher transaction costs than institutional flat structures
with a low number of institutions. Higher transaction costs are detrimental to coordination
efforts and learning capacities. A country with concentrated regulatory powers, flat regulatory
and operational structures would be the most likely to quickly learn and change the system.
By contrast, dispersed powers and complex regulatory and operational structures seem to
reduce learning capacities. If we take a quick glance at our countries, the classification could be
the following:
Table 2 Characteristics of Policy-Regimes in Four Countries
Regulatory Powers Regulatory Institu-
tions
Operational Structures
Germany Dispersed Complex Complex
Netherlands Concentrated Complex Complex
France Concentrated Flat Complex
Switzerland Dispersed Complex Flat
There are no equal cases on these three variables. It seems that Germany is a case with nega-
tive foreboding for learning capacities while France seems to have at least at the regulatory
level some advantages. The Netherlands must face high transaction costs, while Switzerland
might find it difficult to change its policy design given the dispersed and complex regulatory
structures.
(2) The second dimension we have chosen was the size of the country. The rationale behind
this choice is political culture. We contend that the smaller a country, the more close-knit net-
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works between the different players are and the easier it becomes to find a consensus on con-
flicting policy strategies. The two small countries we have chosen (Switzerland and the Neth-
erlands) have, moreover, a long tradition of a consociational political culture that underlines
this point. By contrast, in France and Germany we find a stronger adversarial culture between
actors, which should it make more difficult to build up a consensus and to realise a new policy
design on short notice.
If we add this dimension to point 1 we see that Germany is confirmed as a particular case
where it seems unlikely to find quick learning processes while Switzerland might be helped by
its consociational features to find a consensus despite the dispersion of powers and complex
regulatory features. France might find considerable difficulties in implementing the policy de-
sign. The Netherlands might overcome their complex structures by consensus-building with-
out, however, reducing transaction costs. The worst, immobility, can, however, probably be
overcome.
The following table summarises for each country our suppositions:
Table 3 Expectation about Learning Capacities in Four Countries
EXPECTATIONS
Germany Immobilism expected both on the regulatory and implementation level.
Low learning capacities
Netherlands Quick changes in policy design possible, though transaction costs in
building up a consensus on the regulatory and implementation level.
Immobilism, however, is not to be expected.
France Policy-makers should be able to react quickly on challenges, but might
have considerable difficulties in realising the policy design on the op-
erational level.
Switzerland Switzerland needs time to change a policy design but will, eventually,
find a consensus. The operational structure is very favourable to im-
plement the new policy design.
1.5 Frameworks of discussion
Our study can be situated within three frameworks of discussion:
First, the study takes up the discussion originating in the early book of Hugh Heclo on the
two dimensions of political action: puzzling and power (Heclo 1974). While power has been
at the centre of most studies, “puzzling” or the role of policy ideas is only gradually gaining
ground (see: (Braun and Busch 1999); (Fischer 1993)). It is our intention to use both dimen-
sions in this study and ask for their explanatory value.
Second, one sees a trend in governance theory to treat learning as a central notion. Instead of
hierarchical top-down models of state action, the new idea becomes to “enable” actors to learn
and adapt themselves by self-government to challenges. The role of the state becomes alike to
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a facilitator and monitor. Our study takes up these “soft dimensions” of governance and at-
tempts to demonstrate its usefulness.
Finally, we intend to learn to know, by way of comparison, how the Swiss public-funded
research systems can ameliorate its adaptation capacities or if it can be – quite on the contrary
– a learning model for other nations.
1.6 Structure of the report
Our analysis attempts to understand how “responsiveness” as the notion best expressing the
paradigm change that is taking place, is gradually introduced in public-funded research sys-
tems.5 This will be done in several steps:  
We will present in chapter 2 a general overview of the paradigmatic changes occurring since the
1970s.
In chapter 3, we will demonstrate the pressures having led to a change in the causal belief sys-
tems of research policy-makers during the 1970s. It will become clear that the new ideas cir-
culating in policy research discourses need a new policy-design conflicting with the existing
one. In addition, one sees that these pressures have been universal though countries have re-
acted differently in time and content to these pressures. Countries start to build up their re-
search policies and to develop new institutions or instruments that can promote a stronger
“social responsibility of research”.
Chapter 4 is dedicated to an analysis of transformations taking place on the performance level
of research, i.e. in the project funding of technological innovation and in the institutional
funding of research institutions.
The introduction of a stronger responsiveness to economic and societal demands in funding
agencies on the intermediary level is the subject of the chapter 5.
Chapter 6 is dealing with the special role of “reflexive institution” for the learning processes
taking place in the countries.
Chapter 7 summarises the main finding with regard to the paradigm change and the role of
learning capacities in this process.
2 CHANGING PARADIGMS
Our research has corroborated what is largely developed in the literature on science and tech-
nology policy during the 1990s: There is a fundamental shift in the scientific and political dis-
course on how scientific knowledge can contribute to technological innovation. Less stressed,
though, is the concomitant change in causal beliefs on state intervention. In the terminology of
Bruno Jobert and Pierre Muller these changes can be seen as a change in the “référentiel secto-
riel”, which characterises the beliefs about how to deal with the resource in a given policy
field, i.e. in the research sector on the one hand and a change in the “référentiel global” on the
                                                
5 When we speak of responsiveness we always mean responsiveness to social, economic, or political demands.
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other hand (Jobert and Muller 1987). The “référentiel global” expresses general beliefs about
the role of the state in society and, hence, about how the state should intervene into society. It
is clear that different policy sectors must adapt to these general changes in the philosophy of
state intervention. We can therefore expect that the paradigm change with regard to state inter-
vention will manifest itself in the policy design of research policies. We will describe in this
chapter the general features of these paradigm changes and their consequences for the policy
design in research policies.
One should see these features as a general change in policy discourses influencing the discus-
sion in all OECD-countries, without pretending that each country was taking up the changes
at the same point of time or in the same way. However, we have found evidence that no coun-
try could escape the radiance of the new star and has reacted in one way or other by revising
its existing policy design.  
2.1 Changing the “référentiel sectoriel”
The profane background of the changing paradigm on knowledge creation and innovation has
been economic.
The “new growth theory” as well as “evolutionary economics” has very much influenced po-
litical decision-making on technology policies in the 90s (Lipsey and Carlaw 1998);(Romer
1994).
This means, first, that technology is now seen as a substantial factor of economic growth and
international competition. More concretely, it is not just technology, but the innovation of
processes and products which counts. The “innovation paradigm” (Borrás 2000)becomes the
background of state action in research policy.
Linked to this change in the view of the creation of economic growth is the rise of generic
technologies, which gives rise to a more immediate linkage between technological research and
basic/applied research (see also (Braun 2002)). Generic technologies need basic knowledge and
they cannot as such be immediately applied, but application is very near at hand. This is why
it becomes increasingly important that research on generic technologies brings together basic
scientists, probable users, technicians, applied scientists etc. The time between invention and
application is much shorter than before. Biotechnology, for example, is the direct fusion of
science and techniques. The “mode 2” approach has described this development already in
1994 and stated that we see a move from a “knowledge generated in disciplinary cognitive
context to knowledge created in broader transdisciplinary social and economic contexts”. The
“interaction mode” replaces the traditional “government- science compound” as well as the
linear model of innovation. This has profound implications for the institutions that are built on
the “old order”. Vested interests must be overcome and institutions must be opened up. One
important element Metcalfe and Georghiou stress (Metcalfe and Georghiou 1998: 93), is that
generic technologies and innovation in general today need more and more collaboration and
cannot be restricted anymore to one enterprise.
At the same time, there is no need to install new and permanent institutions at the interface of
science and technology. Generic technologies are constantly moving and changing. Applica-
tions can be found in one area and after that in another. This explains the need for flexible ar-
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rangements in research, which are created at one time and can be dissolved at another. There-
fore, the “institutional funding” as a research policy instrument becomes outdated. One finds
less eager to create new research laboratories than to organise medium-term and long-term col-
laborative “centres” which will disappear once they have fulfilled their functions. Such centres
can also be created within the contexts of universities, which is important, because universities
now have the chance to also become a player in the technological game.
Another important consequence, raised by Martinsen (Martinsen 1995), is that the role of the
state in organising the process of innovation begins to change. While the state could just take
into account the “high risk area” of basic research in the “linear model” of innovation, he is
now invariably drawn towards the market by also organising and financing the interlinkage. At
the same time, the state cannot any longer just invest in individual enterprises. The “collabora-
tive mode” (see above) necessitates a broader orientation and the need to organise (temporary)
collaboration between some enterprises, specialising on some aspect of applying generic tech-
nologies.
The way, however, the state is involved, changes. First of all, one must see that research and
technology policy is still the policy field where state intervention is accepted and even wished
for by most participants. Especially at times of globalisation and harsh competition, the liberal
state cannot be an option. However, while before the state protected industries from interna-
tional competition, he now is actively encouraging technological innovation to make domestic
enterprises more competitive. In a period of globalisation, protection is not feasible. The key
point is that economic (evolutionary) theory now recognises the influence of context condi-
tions for technological innovation. This brings the state back in. As the influential OECD Sun-
quist Report from 1988 wrote (quoted in Martinsen 1995: 18-9):
“The new technologies are not a force originating from outside the economic system –
they are created, developed and diffused in response to economic demands and con-
straints. Similarly, the impact of technical change is inseparable from other societal de-
velopments; its economic dimensions cannot be isolated from its social dimensions. What
is involved is a set of interacting influences, in which history, culture, outlook and values
carry just as much weight as economic factors”
If social and political context matters, the state can do a lot to influence these conditions in a
favourable direction.
Encouraging innovation means, however, not, as in the classical linear model of innovation, to
invest into promising enterprises, “pick the winners” etc. but to create favourable conditions
of innovation. This is the major turn of state action in research and technology policies. A
“rationalisation” of policy action takes place in which evaluation, control, the creation of in-
frastructure conditions, and the facilitation of self-organisation plays a major role. New Public
Management is an integral part of this development and exemplifies this strife for rationalisa-
tion and the increase of efficiency in the administration and in the management of affairs. The
“new management philosophy” is instructing the state how to create amenable conditions for
innovation. A model of selfregulation with accompanying security measures helps to optimise
and rationalise technological innovation (Martinsen 1995: 20).
The model behind the new mode of state intervention is the idea that self-regulation, (limited)
autonomy, and motivation guarantee the flexibility and capacity to act. The state should not
intervene but to make actors in the research system “fit” for globalisation. He is facilitating.
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The following variables are supposed to demonstrate main causal factors that have influenced
research policies in the 90s:
• Globalisation is the main factor explaining these changes in policies. The intensified
competition and the necessity for advanced countries to find comparative cost ad-
vantages by technological innovation plus the impossibility to protect domestic in-
dustries (GATT, etc.), force states to develop new strategies for successful compe-
tition. Moreover, there is a rising possibility for domestic enterprises to use other
places abroad for research depending on the conditions countries are offering. This
reinforces the need to create a favourable context for research investments, an attrac-
tive infrastructure, and a flexible and highly educated labour force. The state must
take into account a large number of context conditions for technological innovation,
including the education system, in order to foster favourable conditions for eco-
nomic growth. Often enterprises have reacted by closing down research laboratories
and concentrated on short-term investments in research to solve short-term prob-
lems (Metcalfe and Georghiou 1998: 87). This gives the state again the task to take
care of establishing also long-term research. International collaboration is another
aspect of globalisation, among scientists, among funding organisations and among
enterprises.
• The end of the Cold War was of importance because it reduced the investments into
defence research, above all in the major countries like USA, France and Great-Britain
with more room for policy-makers to invest into civil research. On the other hand,
new strategies had to be found to integrate military technology research into civil
technology research. At the same time, environmental and health issues come to the
foreground of policy attention and most countries are focusing research programmes
on these issues (next to generic technologies).
• The economic crisis is the major factor that explains, above all in Europe, the turn-
around in policies. Increasingly it was believed that welfare has become a question
of economic growth and competitiveness. This “predominance of the economic” has
contributed to the decline of the redistributing welfare state into an “innovation-
facilitating” state. The answer to the economic crisis is, of course “science, technol-
ogy and innovation”.
• The third phase of industrial revolution (see Martinsen 1995: 13) means that we are
entering a new age, the knowledge society, with a different mode of production.
Again, science and technological innovation become the main focus of policy makers
to survive in international competition.
• Budget deficits become a main problem since the 1980s until the mid-1990s. This
period is characterised by an austerity regime and a new conservative way of keep-
ing the balance of public finances. At the same time, costs in research are rising con-
siderably. In the overall run, one can see that the government share in research ex-
penditures has declined on average from 50% in 1975 to 33% in 1995 (OECD
1998a). In the 1980s, business investments declined as well, but rose again in the
1990s, while government investments were on average stagnating in OECD coun-
tries. This also holds for basic research. Universities had to suffer most of less
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funding from governments with in due consequence a re-orientation in research to
more short term and market research (triple helix). The OECD (OECD 2001: 7)
fears nevertheless that austerity will have consequences above all for traditional dis-
ciplines and those researchers not contributing to economic growth.
• Budget deficits have certainly influenced the new reference point of state action –
efficiency – but again, rationalisation and other ideas like clientele orientation have
certainly also contributed to the overall stance of governments to distribute money
according to efficiency (and effectiveness) criteria. Two key words are used here:
accountability and responsiveness: Scientists and research organisations are required
to make clear for what they will use their resources and if it meets societal or eco-
nomic demands, if they use the resources in an efficient way, and what the results
will be measured by performance criteria.
• Concerns and needs of society have become more prominent in research pro-
grammes, next to generic technologies. Technology assessment is one outcome of
this preoccupation. Increasingly, it is demanded that scientists open up their black
box to the public and choose their programs in order to respond to the needs of so-
ciety.
• Human resources have become a central concern for organising the knowledge soci-
ety
• Evaluation is the most prominent instrument in order to meet efficiency criteria and
legitimate research funding.
Research in public-funded research systems has undergone significant changes due to these
causal factors:
In universities one finds clearly a tendency to do research with more economic relevance, es-
pecially after public funds have often been cut down substantially. This seems to change to-
day (Senker et al. 1999: 54), but the general tendency, to find resources from other sources,
remains. The linkage with industry becomes important; most universities are creating own
enterprises nowadays; they establish technology transfer offices etc. Metcalfe and Gheorghiou
(1998: 88) clearly state that universities in the 90s become a component of national innovation
policies “and research funding is increasingly expected to yield exploitable benefits”. At the
same time we see everywhere that “centres of excellence” are installed, above all in technologi-
cal research. The OECD describes the advantages (OECD 2001: 8): a concentration of financial
means; priority-setting is possible; interdisciplinarity; industry can cooperate; knowledge
from abroad can be integrated, it is a much more flexible structure (often outside faculties and
disciplines).  They are also flexible in the sense that they can be dissolved after a time.
Public research laboratories see their role decreasing, while at the same time they often must
change their research topics in order to survive. The TSER project and our own research dem-
onstrate that public research laboratories must today compete for resources, which were be-
fore guaranteed by one ministry. Today other competitors may apply for the same resources.
This increases uncertainty for public research laboratories. Finding other resources, contract
research, a stronger cooperation with universities and a much more flexible structure have be-
come the hallmarks of change. New public management ideas have been widely introduced (see
also Metcalfe and Gheorghiou 1998: 87). Institutional funding has been substantially reduced.
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In sum, this overview demonstrates that research funding is changing everywhere. Above all
institutional funding is considerably reduced (OECD 1999: 36), a fixed-term contract funding
is preferred; interdisciplinary research is “in”, and above all, specific networking research pro-
grammes are established. Public-funded research systems are therefore under extreme pres-
sures to adapt. It is not just causal theories on how research and innovation functions (the
“référentiel sectoriel”; the change from “mode 1” to “mode 2”) but also how the state should
intervene in society (“référentiel global”), which changes. Both changes of causal ideas reverse
the “policy-design” at hand and, hence, the “policy-regime” as such.
We want to understand how the public-funded research systems have dealt with this pressure
and the need to re-arrange their policy-regime. The way in which regime change is taking place
(or not) will reveal the specific learning processes in these countries.
3 CHANGING THE POLICY-DESIGN: PROGRAMMING RESEARCH
IN THE 1970S
Without any doubt, the “référentiel sectoriel” is already changing in the four countries since
about the mid-1960s. The background was an increasing concern of policy-makers with regard
to the social and – increasingly so in the 1970s – of the technological relevance of science.
Since then, the debate on how to make scientific research (both basic and applied) responsive
to concerns of the “environment” is never-ending though the stakes are different. In the 1980s,
one sees a growing concern for technological innovation with a stronger emphasis on the link
between the public-funded research system and industry. The 1990s are characterized by a
more profound and paradigmatic change as described in the previous chapter. The linear model
of innovation gives way to the interactive model with profound implications for the organisa-
tion of the link between industry and the public-funded research system. Horizontal coordina-
tion becomes the main issue.
Our research demonstrates that no country can finally escape from these ideational changes.
All countries are starting to revise their policy design in the 1970s. This does not mean that
each country changed its causal, beliefs, its instruments, its regulatory and operational struc-
tures in the same way. These differences interest us here in order to evaluate the learning ca-
pacities of countries. Let us start with the transformation of the policy-design taking place in
the 1970s.
The development of science policy was characterised until the 1970s by the creation of re-
search institutions on the regulatory and operational level and, since the 1960s, in a number of
OECD-countries by the creation of research policy institutions at the political level. The
1970s have two general characteristics: first, there is a general tendency to demand more “rele-
vance” (above all for the environment, in energy research, general social and political prob-
lems) and, second, the instrument to do so is, first, a strengthening of project funding in the
form of programme grants and, second, a stronger emphasis on social relevance in institutional
funding. The new “philosophy” is well reflected in several volumes of the OECD (OECD
1968);(OECD 1971); (OECD 1972); (OECD 1973); (OECD 1974). The publication of these
volumes does not as such proof the diffusion of ideas but it is clear that similar ideas are in the
“air”, discussed in the fora of the OECD and “available” for integration into policy concepts
and for implementation in the policies of the countries.
21
The starting position of our countries in terms of institutional governance has been quite dif-
ferent: Germany and France had already created political entities to develop a science policy in
the early 1960s while Switzerland and the Netherlands had not. France failed – though there
were efforts of programming – to implement the new policy while Germany succeeded in part.
Both the Netherlands and Switzerland were able to develop new priority programs but the
Netherlands decided to create new governing bodies and to reorganise completely its opera-
tional and governing structures while Switzerland simply added priority programs to the tasks
of its main intermediary funding body, the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF). How
can these differences be explained and what does it tell us about learning capacities?
3.1 A new policy-design emerges
If one looks more closely, one can confirm that everywhere five topics of a new “active re-
search policy” appear since the 1960s leading to a new policy design and institution-building.
These are:
- the demand for a closer connection of scientific research and societal problems;
- the causal belief that technological innovation can promote economic growth;
- priority-setting and steering by a professionalisation of science policy and the set-up
of “reflexive” advisory bodies;
- “programming” research by defining thematic priorities;
- intergovernmental coordination to concentrate forces.
 In principle, this list of general objectives remains on the political agenda for a long time but
accents are shifting and above all the role of government in this process has been modified fre-
quently.
 In each country one finds, above all on the political level, actors who take up these ideas of an
active research policy. The publications of the OECD are read and discussed. In addition, one
finds everywhere “scientific entrepreneurs” with an interest in the strengthening of research
and an interest in more applied-oriented research. They are actively collaborating with the
political administration in order to prepare the turn in policy design and the necessary changes
in the “hardware” of the research regime.
 It seems to us that “party-control” as a variable has played an important part in the develop-
ment of the active research policy. More in particular, this refers to the role of social-
democracy in the process. The whole period between 1965 and 1975 can be seen as a social-
democratic “conjoncture” (Braun 1986); where Keynesian economic policy, planning ideals,
equality, democratic participation, and transparency became guiding ideas in the “policy core”
(cf. (Sabatier 1988) of policy-makers. The “référentiel global” of state intervention was a so-
cial-democratic one and integrated not only social-democratic parties themselves but also other
parties. One has to understand this “ideational embeddedness” of public policy action in order
to see how research policy was in particular influenced by these ideas. Countries governed by
social-democratic parties in this period were, of course, particularly sensible to these objec-
tives. Three of our countries were ruled by social-democratic parties though in coalition with
other parties: Germany from 1969 to 1982 (with a social-democratic minister of research); the
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Netherlands from 1973 to 1977 and from 1981 to 1982 (with a social-democratic minister of
education and a minister without portefeuille); Switzerland has a permanent coalition and a
“consensus-government”. Nevertheless, during this period (1960-1973) a socialist minister
was responsible for education and research. Conservative parties ruled only in France until
1981. We will see that a major turn into the direction of an active research policy took place
only then, 10 years after the other countries.
 Our first finding would thus state that party-control could matter in research policy, above all
when it concerns a new policy design. It needs, however, a “conjoncture”, i.e. a more general
and encompassing ideational framework to translate party programmes into sectoral policies.
This will happen once again in the 1980s when a “neo-liberal” “conjuncture” becomes preva-
lent with again consequences for research policy. The transition in the 1970s to the program-
ming of research has, in any case, been inspired by “political ideas” and not by a change in
the “référentiel sectoriel”.
 A second point to mention here is the problem-pressure forcing countries to re-think their
policy designs:
 The four countries we have chosen all considered their economic position in terms of economic
competitiveness and technological innovation as inferior to the United States while they were
gradually entering the most serious recession after the Second World War. Especially France
and the Netherlands described their situation as serious in this respect. Three other problem
pressures were added:
- The pressure from “democratisation” articulated by new protest movements asking for
more transparency and participation with effects on the management of the scientific
system;
- Pressure stemming from the oil crisis in 1973, already articulated by the “Club of
Rome” in 1969 concerning energy and environmental problems with ensuing discus-
sions on the “technocracy” and “risk-character” of scientific research
- Financial pressure: the economic crisis led to an increase in the state deficits to levels of
unknown extent, which raised the sensibility of policy-makers to more efficiency in
public policy sectors.
These pressures were felt in all countries and challenged the existing policy regimes in public
policy fields.
Social-democratic “conjoncture”, social-democratic party-control and a considerable problem
pressure contributed together to the re-design in policy-making, trickling down in due conse-
quence to the different public policy sectors. A new policy design in research policy-making –
comprising the elements sketched above – emerged but this does not yet mean learning capaci-
ties and reforms. It is decisive how the new “software” could be made compatible with the
existing “hardware” by either strengthening certain parts, changing parts of the system, or by
replacing the whole machinery of government.
3.2 Adapting regulatory structures to the new policy-design
In this section we want to show two things:
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(1) Demonstrate the difference between countries with established regulatory structures on the
political level (Germany and France) and countries starting more or less from the scratch
(Netherlands, Switzerland). The “institutional legacy” created at this point of time determines
the future paths in research policy.
(2) Discuss how exactly the programming of research has taken place under these institutional
conditions.
3.2.1 Institutional legacy and institution-building
When the period of programming research started – let us say about the beginning of the 1970s
– our four case studies were differently equipped to match the new demands: France and
Germany already had structures amenable to take up the active policy while the Netherlands
and Switzerland had not. This resulted in a profound difference in the process of regime
change: France and Germany could – in principle - do with existing institutions while the
Netherlands and Switzerland had to engage themselves in “institution-building”. In both
groups we find, however, differences in outcomes: France failed to implement the new “pro-
gramming activities” because the existing institutions where not functioning while Germany
developed an active policy without, however, much success. The Netherlands were changing
their hardware completely, while Switzerland strengthened parts of its hardware.
The following table proofs the difference between the two groups by showing the institution-
building activities. We regard 1965 as a breaking point. On the left we find the regulatory insti-
tutions already existing and on the right hand side the institutions created after 1965:
Table 4 Research Institutions before and after 1965
Institutions before 1965 Institutions 1965-1975
Netherlands ZWO RAWB; new research division; minister
without portefeuille; Interdepartmental
coordination committee
France DGRST; CNRS, CCRST -
Germany BMBF, German Science
Council ; DFG; MPG
BMBF > BMFT; Project Funding
Agencies
Switzerland SNSF, CRUS, CERS/CTI SSC;  OFES; CUS
Acronyms: see overview table
When the discourse on science policy began to change – the creation of the OECD and the first
report Piganiol in 1963 might be a good indicator of the changing discourse and the turn to a
more programmatic research policy (Piganiol 1963) – neither in the Netherlands nor in Swit-
zerland do we find political regulatory institutions or reflexive institutions. The main pillars in
science policy were on the “boundary”, i.e. the funding agencies ZWO (Netherlands) and
SNSF (Switzerland), which were both deeply anchored in the scientific community. This
meant that these two countries had to develop political strategies on how to either use these
institutions within the framework of an active policy or how to set up new bodies. In fact,
both countries decided to do both but in a different way.
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A major difference between both countries was the territorial structure: Switzerland being a
federal country while Netherlands belongs to the class of unitary countries.  Ministry of edu-
cation, culture and science (OCW) in the Netherlands was in principle responsible both for
universities and research organisations, the federal government in Switzerland had no compe-
tence at all until 1968 to interfere in education and research except for its own polytechnics.
The education ministry in the Netherlands had certainly to find an understanding with the
different ministries active in research but without any doubt, it was the heavy weight in the
political system. The federal government in Switzerland needed a compromise with the can-
tons. Most of the discussion on research policy since the 1960s until 1983 – the adoption of
the research law defining the tasks of the federal government in research – are on these at-
tempts to “get the federal government in”, something even the cantons wanted given their lack
of money in financing the universities.
This highlights another important dimension, i.e. the differentiation of the operational struc-
ture: Countries usually have internally differentiated their public-funded research system by
using universities and extra-university research institutions as a base for funding. The mix,
however, differs with consequences for research policy-making.
Table 5 Operating structures in four countries
Universities Extra-university research institu-
tions
Netherlands X X
France X
Germany X X
Switzerland X
The table above demonstrates in a stylised fashion where research is overwhelmingly taking
place. Switzerland and France are antipodes as France has – especially in the 1960s and 1970s
– its research base in extra-university research institutions while Switzerland is overwhelm-
ingly relying on universities. The Netherlands and Germany have a relatively equilibrated mix
of both kinds of institutions.
Coming back to the case of Switzerland, this demonstrates that the territorial question be-
tween the federal government and the cantons had to be resolved: if universities were – and
still are – the predominant place for research and if they are administered by the cantons, the
federal government cannot rely on the construction of alternative institutions in order to de-
velop its own research base – as in Germany for example – but must find access to the regula-
tion of universities. Here, however, the territorial division of power made it particularly diffi-
cult to do so. Gradually, the federal government succeeded in obtaining the rights to finance
the infrastructure of universities and to create its own research institutions. The first option
meant to only participate while the cantons retained the main prerogatives and competences in
matters of universities. This created the necessity to set up an coordinating institution that
was supposed to develop a consensus in university policy questions. The second option was
seldom used by the federal government. The implications of this was that federalism structured
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in many ways the options of an active research policy-making: first, research policy is – until
today – a joint object of decision-making between federal government and the cantons; regula-
tory structures must contain cooperative institutions (in case the CUS) to develop a common
policy, and the power of the central government in research policy-making is seriously re-
stricted. Not only because of federalism (industrial interests and economic liberalism also
played a role) but above all because of federalism, the federal government could not develop
powerful political agencies or even a ministry to manage the new policy design. The territorial
division of power strengthened the role of the intermediary body, the SNSF, and, therefore,
most of the efforts were directed to how the federal government could influence policy-making
within the SNSF.
Federalism also promoted the creation of the “reflexive institution”, the SSC (Swiss science
Council). A “reflexive institution” was considered as essential in the framework of an active
research policy and one sees everywhere the rise of such institutions. Particular to Switzerland
is the decision to integrate most political and other forces within the institution. While the
RAWB (Advisory council for science policy) in the Netherlands, created at about the same
time, was purely an affair of scientists that could advice government, the SSC was an arena
which should develop a vision on the problems and solutions in research policy and at the
same time create a consensus among the different forces in the public-funded research sys-
tems. Such a reflexive institution becomes a boundary institution with the double task of in-
forming policy-makers and finding a consensus on the policies to be adopted. Once this is
done, decisions by the SSC can have a high authority because everyone knows the recommen-
dations are what the majority of actors think.
It is interesting to mention that in the other federal country of our study the German Science
Council was constructed in a similar way which supports the hypothesis that it is “divided
government” and cleavages that favour the creation of reflexive institutions as political arena.
The Swiss federal government succeeded in creating in the end a small “Office for Education
and Science” within the Department of the Interior without, however, being able to strengthen
its position in such a way that it could firmly represent and set through the interests of the
confederation. Institution-building in Switzerland meant therefore during this period very
much the development of cooperative institutions and the active influencing of the main regu-
latory body, the SNSF in research.
The Netherlands did not have this problem of a territorial division of power. Here, institution-
building meant to create for the first time a unity responsible for research. That unity was
situated within OCW. In order to strengthen the position of this unit a minister without porte-
feuille was nominated in 1972 who stayed until 1982 when the Ministry of Economic Affairs
became a key actor for technology policy. The decision to create such a unity was simply a
decision of the Cabinet and needed no further approval. The only problem was the powerful
position of OCW. It was not envisaged – and never was – to create an autonomous research
ministry as in Germany. OCW succeeded in maintaining its prerogatives in matters of educa-
tion and in the organisation of research, which had the advantage – as already mentioned – that
the responsibility for universities and extra-university research institutions were under the
same roof. This enhanced without any doubt the coherence of policy-making.
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Institution-building on the political level was therefore much easier in the Netherlands than in
Switzerland. For both countries it was, however, essential to also change the existing regula-
tory institutions, i.e. the funding agencies.
In Switzerland, we see a gradual process of strengthening somewhat the position of govern-
ment in the SNSF by obliging the organisation to accept political representatives in decision-
making bodies of the SNSF. In this way, the SNSF became very much a similar corporatist
body as the SSC. In addition, the SNSF was obliged to publish regular reports on its policies,
which strengthened the information base for a more active policy. Finally – and this we will
discuss in the next chapter – the SNSF became the main agency for programming research as
early as 1974. While the federal government therefore failed to establish a strong political cen-
tre for implementing the new policy design, it succeeded in instrumentalising the main reflexive
and funding institution in the system.
The Netherlands had the same intentions: In order to program research, priority-setting and
programming within ministries did not suffice. A transformation of both the operational and
regulatory structure, i.e. the ZWO, was discussed in the first “White Paper on Science Policy”
in 1974. The difference with Switzerland is that it took quite some time before ZWO became
an “intermediary agency” with “responsiveness” as an explicit task and it needed a re-
foundation of the organisation (which became the NWO (Netherlands organisation for scien-
tific research) in 1988) before the formal structures were built to do so. Despite a much
stronger authority – the ZWO was a quasi-public organisation created by law; the Swiss SNSF
is a private foundation – the Dutch government did not succeed for a long time to reform the
institution. The first major reform was the reorganisation of extra-university technological
institutions (TNO (Netherlands organisation for applied scientific research)) in 1985 as well as
of the universities (1985). And this despite of similar procedures of consensus-building: Swit-
zerland used the “corporatist structure” of the SSC to build up a consensus among a majority
of actors concerning the programming of research. This task was simply added to the existing
tasks of the SNSF by creating an additional division. In the Netherlands, the demand for more
responsiveness met much more resistance and it seemed necessary to re-build the organisation
completely before such a task could be performed. This does not mean that the ZWO did not
also undertake some responsive mode funding. Since the beginning, intentions of policy-
makers were more far-going and this needed a more fundamental reorganisation of the institu-
tion. The proposals were developed in the “White Paper” after an extensive consultation of all
levels of the public-funded research systems. The final formulation of the policy happened, of
course, in the political system, here other political institutions like the General Accounting
Office, and the Finance minister had their say. Nevertheless, the attempt to construct a con-
sensus on the new policy was there. Evidently, this did not suffice to immediately reform
existing institutions.
One further explanation could be that Dutch policy-makers had alternatives because ministries
could themselves embark on priority-setting and funding programs, something that was not
possible for the federal government in Switzerland. This explains the stronger problem pres-
sure for the Swiss government while the Dutch government could wait to reconstruct the
whole system.
One lesson about learning which follows from this process of institution-building in the two
countries is that the change of a policy-regime is not only structured by existing regulatory and
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operational structures but also by its embeddedness in more encompassing political features
like the territorial distribution of power or the organisation of democracy. The Swiss example
is a case in point. The solution found – the creation of the SSC and the reorganisation of the
SNSF – can only be explained by these structural features. Another lesson is that – certainly
under circumstances of multiple veto-points and veto-actors – a consensus culture is an asset
though it is not a sufficient condition to install new institutions as the Netherlands have
shown. Despite of their efforts to construct the new science policy on the base of an extensive
bottom-up mediation process, the Netherlands had difficulties to reform their structures, while
Switzerland succeeded at least in developing a functioning structure for programming research.
Deliberation failed, however, when it came to institution-building in favour of the federal gov-
ernment.
France and Germany differ from the Netherlands and Switzerland because they already had
political agencies when the new policy design began to emerge. Nevertheless, the situation in
both countries differed considerably, when the 1970s came. The public-funded research sys-
tem in France had and still has a peculiar structure because of a weak university structure in
research and a strong extra-university structure (see table 6 above) with the CNRS as the
“heavy weight” on the boundary between the scientific system and the political system. The
story of the CNRS started already in the 1920s (see (Braun 1997). When the CNRS was cre-
ated in 1939, it had become a “corporatist institution” where the “Haut Comité“ within the
CNRS was supposed to define research policies. On the political level, genuine political insti-
tutions – except for the different ministries promoting research by way of specialised extra-
university research institutions – were not created before the rise of the V. République, at the
end of the 1950s. It is the stronger executive-oriented “référentiel” of the new republic which
introduced both an advisory body in research for the government (the CCRST) as well as a
small division, the DGRST, which was supposed to coordinate the research policies of differ-
ent ministries but which developed quite early – in comparison with their European counter-
parts – program funds by imitating the American model. This division was reduced in impor-
tance by integrating it into the industry ministry in 1960, exactly at the moment when other
countries were attempting to create their independent political institutions. France did not –
until 1981 – think about creating an independent research ministry. The reasons for this were
probably quite strong individual ministries opposing the creation of a new competitor, the still
strong intermediary role of the CNRS and, finally yet importantly, the organisation of high
technological research in a number of specialised and important research agencies like the CEA
(Commissariat à l’énérgie atomique) and ONERA (Office national d’étude et de recherche
aéronautique) (see also (Krauss 1996). France had therefore a special and deviating develop-
ment from the three other countries: It had a small and innovative coordinating agency even
somewhat before the creation of the German research ministry, which – it must be admitted –
could never really fulfil the task of coordinating the different ministries but which developed
nevertheless some interesting research initiatives, above all in the field of industrial research.
This demonstrates that France was relatively quick in changing its institutional structure when
the new policy design started to emerge but – and this makes the difference – it stopped this
experiment at the very moment when the new policy design became intense and most other
countries were developing new regulatory structures. At this moment, France had to do more
or less with a fragmented landscape of ministries, not too much interested in research, and
strong and relatively autonomous agencies on the boundary like the CNRS and the CEA,
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which were delegated scientific and technological research. The primordial role of these
“grands organismes” is very well recapitulated in 1986 by Arvanitis, this is after the social-
democratic transformation which envisaged to integrate these institutions more closely into the
political design:
“Dans ce secteur d’activités, plus que dans tout autre, l’Administration est confrontée à
une multitude de grands appareils, organismes de recherche …ou agences …qui jouissent
dans la réalité d’une très grande autonomie et disposent d’une influence considérable.
Face à une Administration à laquelle les moyens organisationnels et intellectuels font dé-
faut et qui est bien souvent déchirée entre une multitude de services aux logiques et aux
intérêts différents, les Grands Organismes disposent d’un monopole quasi absolu de
l’expertise et d’une continuité qui leur permet de faire aboutir leurs projets à long terme »
(Arvanitis 1986).
This should cause difficulties for setting up the programming of research. Probably, if a social-
democratic government had been in office in the 1970s, the active role of the DGRST would
have been continued. As it is, the conservative government opted for a different strategy.
Germany was almost as quick as the French with regard to the setting up of a genuine political
institution of research. In 1962, the first research ministry was set up. In 1969, the new social-
democratic/liberal government merged this unit with education but in 1973 the research part of
the ministry became independent. In installing an autonomous research ministry, Germany has
been unique. The creation had far-reaching consequences for research policy-making, as there
was a corporate actor with “standard interests” in defining and extending its domain, with a
“natural” propensity to foster its own research institutions and to develop the programming
of research. At the same time the creation prepared a profound “division of labour” between
the scientific organisations and intermediary institutions already there – like the DFG and the
MPG -, responsible for the promotion of basic research on the one hand and a ministry that
was supposed to engage itself in technological and industrial research but which saw it also as
its task to guarantee the basic infrastructures for basic research. This inherent conflict – inten-
sified by the blurring of boundaries between basic and applied research – became a constant
tension in the public-funded research systems. Of course, the ministry was confronted with
opportunistic interests of different other ministries also engaged in research and in the concert
of these ministries it was not a very strong one. Nevertheless, the advantage was to have one
corporate actor that could defend the interests of research in the budget appropriation each
year.
The strong position of a number of extra-university research institutions – above all the Big
science institutes (GFE), the Fraunhofer Institutes, and the institutes from the “Blue List” –
must be attributed to the existence of such a ministry that needed a research base in order to
strengthen its domain competence in the public-funded research systems. At the same time, it
contributed to a strengthening of the differentiation on the operational level by opting above
all for the promotion of these extra-university research institutions while the universities were
mostly an affair of the Länder.
Germany had therefore already a corporate actor – though in changing organisational contexts
but finally autonomous in 1973 – when the new policy-design came up. It had, moreover a
“reflexive” institution, the German Science Council (“Wissenschaftsrat”), since 1957, organ-
ised – as shown above – in a similar way as the Swiss Science Council. Only, the internal or-
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ganisation is – until today – much more formalised and corporatist: there is a scientific cham-
ber and a political chamber that both must approve the propositions made by the secretariat
and the different advisory committees.
In addition, Germany was setting up a coordinating device between federal government and the
Länder in 1969, the so-called “Bund-Länder-Kommission” (BLK), which – among others –
should discuss the promotion of research and more in particular the financing of extra-
university research institutions. In contrast, in Switzerland there exists no institution that co-
ordinates both territorial actors regarding the funding of extra-university research institutes.
Given the important status of these organisations and the importance as a power base for the
research ministry, this means a permanent need for cooperation between the federal govern-
ment and the Länder in matters at least of institutional funding. Given the difficulties to find a
consensus on reforms in most matters of extra-university research institutions until today, the
federal structure in Germany is responsible for structural conservatism in the organisation of
the public-funded research systems (Braun 1997); (Winnes and Schimank 1999); (Stucke
1993). The CUS in Switzerland – as the coordinating body between the territorial entities –
deals with university questions and has certainly also considerable difficulties to find a con-
sensus on research policy matters. Given the predominant position of the cantons in the fi-
nancing of universities, the federal government is, however, much weaker in this institution
than the BMFT in the BLK.
So, when the new policy-design was emerging, Germany had on the one hand a territorial divi-
sion of competencies that were supposed to be coordinated in the newly created BLK and a
dual structure of competence in basic and applied research organised by intermediary  organi-
sations on the one hand and the ministry on the other. Already in the 1960s, these distinctions
became more a restriction than an asset: The creation of the “Sonderforschungsbereiche” (SFB;
special research areas) in 1967 is a case in point: The problem was that the research ministry
considered the university base as insufficient for the kind of programs it wanted to launch in
research. The response was weak mostly because of strong disciplinary thinking at the level of
the universities. As the federal government had no direct possibilities to change this, it had to
refer to the main funding organisation of the universities, i.e. the DFG. With considerable diffi-
culties, it succeeded to convince the DFG – as formal hierarchical mechanisms do not exist – to
accept a new program managed by the DFG but decided upon in special boards together with
representatives from the federal government and the Länder. This was the first time, the minis-
try succeeded in obliging the DFG to accept “directed funds”. Usually, the DFG refused to
accept such money out of fear to be instrumentalised. This example demonstrates that the
cleavages in Germany caused considerable transaction costs and a lot of consensus-building to
set up a new policy in universities. Any new policy for extra-university research institutions
met usually the resistance of the Länder. These cleavages on two dimensions – territorial and
scientific – explains the structural conservatism of Germany in the public-funded research
systems. This does not at all say that programming has been impossible. We will come back to
this question in the next chapter.
To conclude this section we may summarise the findings as follows:
In the Netherlands and Switzerland, we see a process of institution-building in reaction to the
new policy-design given the “flat”, rudimentary and science-prone regulatory structures.
Switzerland succeeded relatively quickly to adapt by reforming its main funding organisation
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while the position of the federal government in research failed to be strengthened despite of
the creation of some new institutions. The Netherlands used a reform of its political institu-
tions without endangering the prerogatives of existing ministries to make institutions condu-
cive to the new paradigm. The reform of regulatory and operational structures took however
quite some time before it was institutionalised. Germany and France already had conducive
structure for the setting up of research programs but France ended its institutional innovation
at the moment the new paradigm became relevant and lacked therefore the necessary institu-
tional features. It did not, in addition, attempt to create other new institutions. Germany, by
contrast, strengthened its research ministry in this period and had the institutional means to
realise the aims of the new policy-design. In suffered, however, from a double clivage, that
hampered the implementation of an active research policy.
One can conclude that, nevertheless, Germany had a conducive structure to learn quickly to
adapt the new objectives, while the situation in France was unfavourable. In principle, the
possibilities of a learning process were cut off. Switzerland used in part existing structures
which should allow for quick learning while Netherlands embarked on a longer process of
“learning by doing”, of a constant institutional reform.
What did these institutional prerequisites mean for the programming of research?
3.2.2 The programming of research
Let us start with the case that had the most unfavourable conditions for implementing the pro-
gramming of research, France.
France
As we have already stated, the DGRST had already implemented since the early 1960s some
“actions concertées” financed out of its own (small) budget (Braun 1997). These programs
were mostly directed to industrial research and were initiated most of the time by scientifical
entrepreneurs dissatisfied with the disciplinary conservatism within the CNRS. The sum of
money was not important but the measures were regarded as a success. It was even possible
to obtain the cooperation of the CNRS in one new research field (molecular biology) and to
build up this research field in France (Gaudillière 1992). These programmes went well as long
as there were sufficient resources to distribute. When a fiscal crisis set in, resources for the
DGRST were cut down and it was finally integrated into the industry ministry. With this, it
lost its function as a coordinator of research and its reputation as an innovative and relatively
independent institution. This explains perhaps why the new ATP (actions thématiques pro-
grammées) set up in 1971 were more or less a failure, in particular in getting the CNRS in-
volved.
The ATP were program funds – based on the experience of the former “action concertées” –
that envisaged to orient scientists, in particular also in the CNRS, towards the general objec-
tives of research. It was no problem, given the experience of the former DGRST, to launch
such a programme. The problem was to make scientists cooperate and here the particular op-
erational structure of France comes in. It would not have been sufficient to address the pro-
grammes to the universities, which were perhaps easier to govern given the direct influence of
the education ministry, but universities did not have the same quality of scientists as the
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CNRS and also some other of the “grands organismes”6. The integration of scientists in the
CNRS was therefore imperative. Two obstacles were to overcome: First, the pregnance of the
“Comité National de la Recherche Scientifique”, known as “Comité National”, which is com-
posed of scientists and strongly inclined to defend the disciplinary interests, inside the organi-
sation of the CNRS. Despite of efforts of Currien and others, this orientation was not really
changed. Second, all scientists in the “grands organismes” are public employées with a tenure.
There is no need for these scientists to accept resources from outside as long as their career is
guaranteed out of the institutional resources of the CNRS. In addition, one finds in general a
profound distrust of large parts of the scientific community to the programming of research,
which curtailed the “freedom” of scientists.
There is no need to elaborate this example. It can be briefly summarised by saying that the
only attempt of programming during the 1970s, the ATP, failed out of a lack of a strong po-
litical structure, a general decline of interest of the government for research and the existing
operational and regulatory structure that favoured the interests of the scientific community. It
is therefore justified  to contend that the 1970s were the “black years” of French research.
Based on former experiences but confronted with a more unfavourable institutional structure
(lack of a strong political centre), France failed to learn and finally abandoned initiatives of the
programming of research, which was, by the way, an alien element in the overall hardware and
software of the system: the French system is based on institutional funding and delegation but
not on the “American” logic of temporary research projects initiated by the political system.
The programming of research must therefore fail and one of the lessons for the new social-
democratic government in 1981 was to reform the extra-university research institutions and to
strengthen the political centre. Lessons were drawn, therefore, but only by a new and more
active, social-democratic government.
Two additional features can be added that might explain the failure in programming despite of
already existing experience and knowledge: Switzerland has demonstrated how important re-
flexive institutions can be in setting up the programming of research. In France, the CCRST
was never able to develop a similar authority as in Germany and Switzerland. A possible mis-
take in the set-up of the CCRST was perhaps that only scientists participated in this body.
Scientific authority alone can, however, not create a consensus in the public-funded research
system. The corporatist structure of the German and Swiss Council seems, at first hand, bet-
ter to do this though one should be aware that there is a trade-off involved: The more corpo-
ratist such a reflexive institution becomes the less “reflexive” it might be. This is because all
recommendations will be, of course, compromises and not purely outcomes of rational argu-
ment. On the other hand, these recommendations have sufficient legitimacy – and still the aura
of “reflexivity” – to be heard by most actors in the system. In addition, one should not under-
estimate the “informal function” of such an institution, i.e. the trust between the actors of the
public-funded research systems that can be created by regular contacts within these bodies.
The more distant location of the scientific CCRST to political means was not functional to
raise the reflexivity of the system or to convince the CNRS or other actors of the necessity to
foster the programming of research.
                                                
6 Due notably to the the teching duty university professors have to fulfill, which is not the case for the research-
ers belonging to “grands organismes”.
32
Finally, the concentration of the French government on “high politics” issues in the promotion
of research, i.e. on key technological areas, dampened the eager to also introduce programming
in the more basic oriented research or in other areas.
We see that a concentration of power and a strong centralist tradition of the state do not guar-
antee the introduction of an active research policy. The “empty” political centre gave institu-
tions on the boundary a predominant role in the formulation of research policies. As these
institutions were often directly linked to the scientific community, it was particularly difficult
to convince these actors of the merits of more social responsiveness of research. The political
centre was therefore weak and not strong.
Germany
The story in Germany is completely different. Given the existence of a differentiated ministry
of research, the introduction of programme funding was no major obstacle, at least as far as
project funding is concerned. Gradually, programme funding become more important since
1968 (Winnes and Schimank 1999) and as long as money was flowing generously into the
public-funded research system, the proliferation of programme funding continued. Uncon-
trolled proliferation resulted, however, in an increasing internal fragmentation of the BMFT,
with different departments responsible for different funding programs. Each programme fund
developed its own implementation structure with networks on the operational level of re-
search that had a profound interest in the maintenance of these programmes (Winnes and
Schimank 1999). In addition, a fragmentation between those departments responsible for insti-
tutional funding and those responsible for programme funding emerged contributing further to
the rather incoherent character of research policy.
The organisational base of a research ministry was sufficient to promote programme funding
which became the important instrument – imitated from the American model –. The disadvan-
tage was that such an organisational base was also amenable to the development of vested in-
terests that could emerge in this way. The interesting story is that the federal government at-
tempted to correct this uncontrolled expansion of funding programs and to create more coher-
ence and efficiency in the use of funding. Two instruments served this objective: one was the
creation of so-called “project agencies” (“Projektträger”) that were delegated the task to or-
ganise the funding programs. These agencies were usually situated outside the BMFT, mostly
in one of the big science institutes. Officially, this should reduce the influence of vested inter-
ests on the BMFT and also reduce somewhat the political control in programme funding. In
reality, the BMFT kept very much the authority to decide on the funding of programmes and
the project agencies were not much more than a “secretariat” under the formal authority of the
Ministry. The second reform was the attempt to cut down on advisory committees linked to
the programmes and to cut down in general on the number of programmes. For the social-
democratic government democratic transparency was an important aim. Figures show that the
government did not succeed in reducing neither the number of programmes nor the number of
committees. The active policy had created its own children that were now grown enough to
develop their own life, difficult to control. However, this development was the result of the
rather unproblematic introduction of programme funding in the wake of a more active research
policy, something that has not been possible in France.
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Except for this development, another problem arose because the programmes could not always
be clearly distinguished from basic research thereby endangering the relationships with the
DFG that felt a threatening of its domain in the funding of research. The BMFT either had to
renounce to these kinds of projects or find an agreement with the DFG, mostly in the form of
directed funding given to the DFG. This remained, however, more the exception than the rule
so that the ministry was hampered in its development of research programmes.
A more programmatic approach concerned also the extra-university research institutions. As
the big science institutes were financed for 90% by the BMFT and only for 10% by the Land
where the institute was located, these institutes were the main point of attack for the BMFT.
It should be added that they also received the most substantial sums of money given the high
cost for laboratories, machineries etc. used in these institutes. The problem was that these
institutes were created in a period where atomic research, space research, and other “big sci-
ence” topic had been of relevance. A more active research policy meant however a shift in ori-
entation to topics of “social responsibility”, i.e. energy, environment, social problems etc.
Since the 1970s, one sees therefore also attempts of the ministry to re-orient the big science
institutes into the direction of the new funding programs. Another policy design shift was the
introduction of “global steering” as a new intervention concept vis-à-vis the big science insti-
tutes. Global steering contained already ideological elements of new public management
thinking, i.e. the reduction of state intervention to the developments of global strategic orienta-
tions and operational autonomy of research institutions. In the literature all these attempts are
in general judged as failures: the big science institutes were able to resist – like in France – ma-
jor reorientations in their research topics and global steering was refused as a much too strong
and interventionist policy of the BMFT (Winnes and Schimank 1997; (Hohn and Schimank
1990). The main success during this period can be seen in the creation of the Fraunhofer Insti-
tutes, financed for 40% by the federal government and the Länder, that should link public
funded research and industrial innovation. As additional money was invested into these new
institutes, this created no major refusal by other organisations.
This brief summary demonstrates that the existence of a research ministry was conducive to
the implantation of the new policy-design in the research policies of Germany but that the
execution of these new ideas generated new problems and could in part not be realised because
of a strong resistance potential on the operational level. The universities, in addition, were a
problem for the BMFT as already described as they were not yet “fit” for the new ideas and
because the BMFT had no direct access to the working of these institutions. One cannot say
that the federal government in general and the BMFT in particular did not react to perverse
developments like the uncontrolled proliferation of programmes or the out datedness of the big
science institutes. These learning processes were however not successful because the internal
fragmentation of its own ministerial structure and the strong resistance potential of the big
science institutes made it impossible to develop a transparent and efficient active research
policy. The overall regulatory and operational structure is deeply divided along several lines
(between scientific and political agencies, between the federal government and the Länder, be-
tween programmes; between public-funded research and industry), which leads the German
Science Council in 1975 in its system analysis to the diagnose that a coordinated policy of
priority-setting is lacking in Germany. There are many activities that attempt to implement
the new policy-design but these activities create successive problems and are often encoun-
tering difficulties during the implementation process. The overall reform capacity of the
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BMFT was not sufficient to really induce a “regime change” in this sense. The new pro-
gramme structures were integrated into the new system but did not sufficiently spread among
all institutions to induce an overall shift in orientation.
Netherlands
Programming was – in contrast to the two countries above – the result of a “big bang”, i.e. a
comprehensive effort to develop and institutionalise a new policy-design. The “White Paper”
in 1974 was the sum of an encompassing survey with regard to problems and solutions in re-
search policy where most of the relevant actors in the public-funded research systems were
heard. The new policy design was built on this survey and the consensus building processes it
involved and thus confirms the “polder-model” culture of the Netherlands (Rip and Meulen
1998): any major change in policy design or priority-setting in general is prepared by an exten-
sive aggregation process where the scientific institutions (like the Royal Academy and the
ZWO at this time) and the emerging sectoral councils played a major role. The government
has, of course, the final say on what it wants to accept. One should not confound the polder-
model with a “democratic voting model”. The process is important: concerned groups are par-
ticipating, the government gets all the informations necessary to take its decision and can ad-
just its position in discussions with the actors on different levels and different institutions.
There is therefore a consensus building logic within the model but once the process has termi-
nated, the government will decide on the base of its political interests without, of course, vio-
lating too much the recommendations emerging out of the process. It should be clear, however,
that there is room for interpretation of the government: the aggregation process seldom pro-
duces one voice in the scientific community. There are differences and the government can use
these differences to choose in its favour. The polder-model is therefore a consensus-based
system but with a hierarchical potential left to the government.  The “big bang” would, how-
ever, not have been possible, if it had not been a “grand coalition” at this time, which was re-
form-oriented and dedicated to an active, and interventionist policy. It needs a consensus in
the “political stream” (cf. (Kingdon 1984)) to change the existing policy-design.
One finds in the “White Paper” most of the points we have discussed as characteristics of the
new policy-design: intergovernmental cooperation, priority-setting by political institutions,
and the promotion of social relevance among the agencies on the regulatory and operational
level. The intention to improve economic competitiveness was also mentioned. At this time
energy, environmental and social topics were, however, at the foreground and to be included in
the newly created priority programs of the government to be implemented by the education
ministry with its minister without portefeuille. OCW became the institutional center for the
implementation of the new priority programs. The attempt to generate, first, a quasi-
autonomous entitity within OCW by establishing a minister without portefeuille, did not suc-
ceed mostly because the upcoming “technological turn” at the end of the 1970s transferred
most of the priority programs to the Minister of Economic Affairs (EZ) leaving OCW with
only a small set of programmes at the moment. The minister for research was dismissed. This
left OCW and a rising EZ to take over responsibilities for the public-funded research system.
OCW was the main coordinating ministry, bundling the research proposals and offering the
research budget to the parliament. That gave it a central role without, however, the possibility
to intervene into the policies of other ministries. The “great divide” between EZ and OCW for
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example seemed to have been overcome only at the end of the 1990s. The advantage of OCW
was, as mentioned, that it had influence on the extra-university research and funding institu-
tions and on universities. This was, nevertheless, very important in order to develop a coher-
ent policy and not to play out one side against the other. This explains why universities were
much earlier under attack than in the other three countries.
Already in the “White Paper”, the lines of the new policy-design were clear in this respect: the
mode of knowledge production in the public-funded research systems had to change including
the universities. The failing economic competitiveness and ailing industries put an emphasis on
the relation of the public-funded research systems and industry, utility and social relevance
were regarded as orientations of all organisations within the public-funded research systems.
The White Paper developed a clear programme in this sense: the mentality and organisational
culture of public funded organisations had to change in order to implement the new policy-
design. This reform program was announced and gradually (above all in the 1980s) it was im-
plemented against the resistance of organisations and the scientific community. The possibil-
ity to do so was linked on the one hand to the centralised structure of the state – no territorial
clivage could protect these institutions – and on the other hand, these institutions had no legal
status that protected them in the same way as the German DFG or the Swiss SNSF. All insti-
tutions were created by a law and any law could change their mode of functioning or even dis-
solve these institutions. The dependence of research and funding agencies in the public-funded
research system of the Netherlands on governmental decisions is therefore quite strong and
demands at least that these agencies take into account what the government wishes if it does
not want to loose its financial resources.
Why did the government not opt for an inclusion of the new priority programs within ZWO?
Partly, because some of the programs were technological oriented and this was not the domain
of the ZWO and partly because domain competence of OCW demanded that political institu-
tions should implement a political programme. The existence of a strong ministry with some
experience in dealing with research institutions forbid therefore the solution of the Nether-
lands, i.e. to transfer competencies in this respect to the existing funding agency.
Since the beginning then, programming research meant in the Netherlands two things: to intro-
duce politically implemented priority programmes of research and to reform the organisations
in the public-funded research systems in such a way that utility and responsiveness become
one of their points of reference. This is comparable to Germany where the BMFT attempted
to at least re-orient the big science institutes without much success however and it is compa-
rable to France where the government attempted to reform the “Comité National” within the
CNRS and to induce scientists of the grands organismes to accept programme funds. Switzer-
land has introduced programme funds by changing the mode of functioning of its funding
agency without, however, attacking other institutions in the research system.
Learning in the Netherlands in the 1970s consisted therefore in a radical turn by introducing a
“science for policy” discourse where new instruments (priority programmes) and reforms
(utility orientation of organisations) were announced. The visibility of the declaration (a White
Paper) and the consensus building process before gave the turn a lasting and influential charac-
ter that was – despite of changing governments – never abandoned. The introduction of prior-
ity programmes was not difficult (though much more difficult to do it in an efficient way) but
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the reform of the “mentality” of organisations a much more difficult one. How this was
achieved, is part of the next chapters.
Switzerland
Switzerland is similar to the Netherlands in that it also seeks to build up a consensus before it
introduces major reorientations. In this respect, the creation of the SSC with its corporatist
structure was the device to do so. While the Netherlands launched a survey on all levels of the
public-funded research system, Switzerland delegated the task to sketch the outlines of a new
policy design to the SSC where the major actors came together. The SSC is a representative
institution, while the Netherlands prefers a bottom-up aggregation process. This does not say
that Switzerland does not know such an aggregation process. The participants in the SSC will
not vote for certain points of view if it was not checked with their base and, on other occa-
sions, if there are new propositions, let’s say by the federal administration or the SNSF, a long
process of distributing a first report to all important actors is initiated (Braun and Benninghoff
2003). In 1973, however, it was the publication of a special report on the Swiss research sys-
tem, which led to the initiation of programme funds.
One should recall that, in contrast to the three other countries, Switzerland had no education
or research ministry on the federal level. The creation of the OFES (Federal Office for Educa-
tion and Science) happened during this phase of introducing the new policy design and was
partly a consequence of it. So, when priority programmes were discussed as a necessary in-
strument in an active research policy, the only actor that could have taken over this task was
the existing, scientifically anchored, SNSF. Switzerland had not the possibility – because of
federal structures and economic liberalism – to create a “dual structure” – scientific and politi-
cal – to implement priority programmes. This is why the federal administration attempted
since the 1960s to incorporate the SNSF in a more fundamental way into the implementation
of political objectives (see above). This notwithstanding, it remained difficult in 1973-74 to
convince the SNSF to take over the task of implementing new priority programmes (the later
PNR (National research programmes)). It was only the threat mentioned in SSC report that
one could think of creating other agencies more sensible to the transfer process and social rele-
vance, which induced the SNSF to react and, in order to maintain its domain competence, to
accept the priority programmes by reforming its organisational structure (the creation of “de-
partment IV” for oriented research).
The delegation of priority programmes did not forecome further struggle between the scientific
community and political representatives – all represented within the SNSF -. There was a de-
bate on how to decide on priorities and the newly created OFES attempted more than once to
influence the process of priority building. The decision to delegate such programmes to the
SNSF was, however, never taken back and has become path-structuring: As the new mode of
programming functioned reasonably well and respected a certain balance of power between the
scientific community and political interests, the set-up of new programmes (in 1988 the “pri-
ority programmes” (PPR); in 1997 the new “centres of excellence” programme (NCCR – Na-
tional Centre of Competence in Research) followed the same procedure and logic. There have
been modifications (see below) but Switzerland has maintained its “flat structure” in this re-
spect by not organising programming research on different levels but to use one institution on
the boundary in order to satisfy political interests. One should state very clearly, that this was
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a path quite different to the set up of the active research policy in other countries and cer-
tainly one that allowed less “politicisation” than in the case of the three other countries where
political actors had an interest in conquering a domain in research policy. Until today, the ad-
ministrative capacities of the federal government have remained feeble so that the “boundary”
still is the focus in research policy.
One should add that this solution had other advantages: it lowered the costs of political ad-
ministration and did not destabilise existing power relationships by installing a new and pow-
erful political actor. Switzerland has found therefore an equilibrium solution in short a while,
France had no solution at all (immobilism), Germany was confronted with “implementation
slack”, and the Netherlands worked slowly but steadily on a transformation of its public-
funded research system.
3.3 Conclusions
In sum, then, we see that the new policy-design took hold in all countries and manifested itself
in the programming of research by, first, the set up of programme funds and, second, by first
attempts to re-orient research institutions and funding agencies into the direction of social re-
sponsiveness. While France had been the forerunner in this policy, it lost momentum at ex-
actly the moment when the new policy-design became the most virulent in the other countries.
This prepared the “big bang” in 1981 when the new social-democratic government installed a
new policy regime.
We also see that attempts to remodel the “hardware” at the same time reveal the “paths” the
learning process has to follow in the future: In France, it is the lack of a political centre and the
heavy weight of the CNRS that structures all future alternatives in research policy; in Ger-
many the dual structure of scientific and political institutions on the one hand and of territorial
cleavages on the other hand is clearly emerging; in the Netherlands the polder-model is estab-
lished and remains the main device to develop future policies. This model integrates a bottom-
up aggregation and political decision-making. In Switzerland, finally, the solution is a flat
structure in research policy where the SNSF plays the main role as a research agency and as a
consensus-building device among conflicting forces.
Only in the two small and consociational countries do we find the emergence of an encom-
passing view on the new policy design and a vision on its implementation. In Germany the
new policy-design is integrated and elaborated within the confines of the emerging research
ministry. The overall analysis of the Science Council of 1975 is already too late to function as
a sparking plug to institutionalise the new policy-design. France must wait until the 1980s to
develop such an encompassing view.
Though the new policy-design took hold everywhere, the policy-regime did not change in the
same way:
- In Germany, it was not really necessary to change the hardware, at least at the regula-
tory level. It had a conducive structure in the form of a research ministry that was able
to integrate the new policy-design in its tasks. Difficulties caused extra-university re-
search institutions and universities, i.e. the operational level. The control of universi-
ties was difficult because of the two main cleavages in Germany: the scientific – gov-
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ernment divide and the federal divide. It was the DFG and the Länder that had main re-
sponsibilities in funding the universities. Each attempt to develop programme funding
at this level was confronted with the necessity to coordinate the policies of the re-
search ministry with those of the DFG and the Länder. The big science institutes had a
considerable resistance potential among other things because the research ministry
needed these institutions in order to mark its domain vis-à-vis the other institutions.
- Switzerland succeeded in modifying quite quickly its regulatory structure by simply
adding new functions to the existing scientific funding agency. This happened with a
large consensus and some threat potential concerning the domain position of the SNSF.
This means that Switzerland did not revolutionise its policy regime but modified parts
of its system to make it function into the new direction.
- The “big bang” in the Netherlands announced a new policy regime which eventually
was established. In this case political interests in the public-funded research systems
were strengthened. Without any doubt, the Netherlands envisaged the most far-going
reform among the three countries.
- In France we find no new policy regime until 1981. The integration of the new policy-
design in policy routines remained feeble because of a lack of conducive institutions.
4 INTRODUCING “RESPONSIVENESS” ON THE PERFORMANCE
LEVEL
4.1 Introduction
Programming research along the lines of an “active research policy” was only the beginning of
a long process of transformation in the policy design and policy regime of countries. Social
responsiveness as a key word for objectives in research policies of the 1970s was first accom-
panied and then almost replaced by “economic relevance” and “economic utility” respectively
in the aftermath of the first transition of research policies. Responsiveness to “user needs”
became the battle cry of policy-makers in the 1980s until today. This transformation was due,
as described in chapter 2, by the difficulties of European countries to cope with the challenges
of globalisation in terms of economic growth and the “new growth theory” explaining the
comparative advantage of technological innovation to research policy-makers. Again, ideas
were “in the air” and one sees that all countries were reacting to this challenge, mostly by
bringing public-funded research systems closer to industry and by integrating science policy
more closely into innovation and industrial policy. In fact, industry policy became – instead of
paying subsidies to ailing industries – the promotion of new technologies. While this policy
opened up new ways to promote the cooperation of public-funded research institutions and
industry, the next step, the more fundamental transformation to a “mode 2” knowledge pro-
duction, was even more radical. While still insisting on responsiveness, the reforms envisaged
were more fundamental and concerned not only project funding – the major instrument in the
1980s – but also the agencies on the operational and regulatory level. The internal logic of
these institutions had to be changed such that a permanent interaction of the public-funded
research system and industry would be possible. In contrast to the period where the “technol-
39
ogy paradigm” prevailed, the 1980s, and still a more linear idea of knowledge transfer was up-
held, it now was interaction and the organization of a permanent exchange between the funda-
mental research trajectory and the technological trajectory, which was the main objective of
policy-makers. This needed, as described in chapter 2, a fundamentally different mentality of
agencies and organizations in the public-funded research system: the “new governance of in-
novation” needed strong and flexible organizations with responsiveness as one mode of func-
tioning.
Reforms since the 1980s envisaged therefore to continue to introduce “responsiveness” into
the public-funded research system by, first, developing a stronger cooperation between the
public-funded research system and industry for the sake of technological innovation by using
project funding (chapter 4.2) and, second, a more fundamental reorganization of the institu-
tions at the operational level (chapter 4.3) and of  the regulatory structures (chapter 5). We
will use in this chapter different reform projects in countries that will reveal to us how the
countries have attempted to learn in applying strategies to promote responsiveness in their
public-funded research systems. The different ways how it is done will show us in what way
path dependency and other constraints have influenced the choice of policy-makers and how
“innovative” policy-makers have implemented the new policy-design.
4.2 Strengthening economic responsiveness: project funding7
4.2.1 When and who?
The end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s were the turning point in “economic respon-
siveness” in all the four countries. This is without any doubt due to the enormous economic
problems especially European countries were facing in the aftermath of the oil price shock and
the ensuing stagflation processes. High labour costs, rising prices and high unemployment as
well as an increasing competition on the world market in many European industries created the
breeding grounds for a re-assessment of technological capacities. This also meant a new indus-
trial policy that abandoned subsidy policies and that envisaged to create a better transfer po-
tential for technological knowledge at the use of key technological industries.
We found that all countries were taking notice of these challenges and were revising their
stance in matters of technology policy. The most important issue became – given the shorter
trajectory between basic research knowledge and technological products – how public-funded
research institutes (universities and extra-university research institutions) that were at the
forefront of basic and applied research could be brought nearer to industry. If we speak of
“economic responsiveness” in this chapter, we mean the promotion of a closer cooperation
between the public-funded research system and industry. Economic responsiveness now be-
came the predominant objective and began to shift social responsiveness to the background.
The Dutch began to focus on technological innovation since 1979. This was the result of a
general re-orientation in economic and industrial policy prepared by an independent expert
                                                
7 We will deal in particular with the IOPs (innovation-orientated research prgrammes) and LTIs in the Nether-
lands, the “Verbundforschung” in Germany, the “PPR” and the PRN in Switzerland and the ACI in France.
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committee (the “Wagner committee”) and the Scientific Council for Public Policy (WRR).
Technological innovation became the key for success according to these bodies. The overall
aim became to develop early technological knowledge in important areas to have technological
advantage and to strengthen the export. A pro-active industrial policy – meaning the selection
of key technological areas – should become the key to economic competition. The Christian-
democratic/liberal government accepted the recommendations of the bodies. Linking the sci-
ence base to industry was one of the principal aims in this respect. The focus on technological
innovation was accompanied by a general change in the “référentiel global” concerning state
intervention: The “active research policy” approach of the former government gave way to a
less interventionist and framework setting policy. This characterized above all the policies of
the Ministry of Economic Affairs that became responsible for the promotion of technological
knowledge.
It is interesting to briefly compare the countries with respect to their “référentiel global”. As
we have stated in the preceding chapter, the social-democratic “conjuncture” had stimulated in
all countries ambitions to install an active and comprehensive research policy though abilities
to do so were different. The rise of the neo-liberal “conjuncture” since the mid-1970s damp-
ened the eager of interventionist efforts and gave more attention to more liberal and frame-
work-setting policies. This had implications for the research system. One can contend that the
rise of the Christian-democratic/liberal government in Germany in 1982 and in the Netherlands
in 1977-1981 and again since 1982 changed the political context and the policy-design in these
countries. Switzerland, traditionally more liberal, installed nevertheless in 1983 – as a retarded
outcome of previous attempts – a new research law that obliged the federal government to
formulate clear research policy goals and to take care of a coordinated and rational research
system. In its working, however, the liberal approach predominated. The major exception is
France where the socialist party won both the presidency and the majority in parliament in
1981. The programmatic of this government was in the beginning clearly Keynesian-based and
interventionist in its reform attempts. In sum, when “economic responsiveness” became the
principal concern of policy-makers, the Dutch and the Germans were influenced by a “neo-
liberal” “référentiel global”, while the French introduced interventionist rhetoric and the Swiss
were obliged to implement a stronger planning character of research policies. We will see in
how far this has influenced the policy-design.
In Germany, the change in government in 1982 was clearly a shift in the intervention rhetoric
of the government though one sees already a shift in the mode of financing of the BMFT from
the mid-1970s onwards. The creation of the project agencies was a first sign of a research
ministry that endeavoured to reduce its direct engagement in programme funding. Protests of
industrial interest groups then led to a shift from a directed mode of funding to more indirect
modes of funding like the use of tax credits and, above all, the setting up of so-called “Ver-
bundprojekte”, i.e. compound and network projects respectively (see below). In 1982, the
federal government promoted a policy that wanted to overcome structural imbalances in indus-
try and ameliorate the framework conditions of technological innovation. “Context steering”
becomes the right term to characterise the intentions of this government (Stucke 1993). The
state should be a mediator, an initiator, or catalysator of innovation but not more. This meant
that the funding of research on the base of thematic selection became less and less an option.
Cooperation between the public-funded research systems and industry became a major aim for
the research ministry.
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France had, as stated in the preceding chapter, failed to install an active policy at the end of
the 1960s. Instead, research policies seemed to have been delegated completely to the interme-
diary organisations during the 1970s. The story is somewhat different though when it comes
to technology policy. It has already been said that here France had developed a number of
large scale technological projects that fostered “national champions” in key areas like nuclear
energy, space, and information technology. These policies were managed by several research
agencies and supervised by the cabinet or the industry minister. Like in Germany, then, France
had its experiences in technology policy but one finds nevertheless a shift in the overall con-
cept with the rise of the new socialist government. The “traditional Colbertism” (Baumgartner
1994; Larédo and Mustar 2001) that characterised the strong nexus between the administration
of the state and some large (state) enterprises was increasingly discredited while the role of
SMEs became a major concern in all states. The new government attempted to develop new
instruments for these enterprises with the help of ANVAR (Agence nationale de valorisation
de la recherche), the transfer agency of the government, which had already been created in
1967. The “White Paper” of 1981, which was the base of the new research and technology
policy, stipulated in addition a number of new and smaller “technological programmes” that
were inspired by the Japanese VLSI and the English ALVEY programme both oriented to a
stronger interlinkage between public-funded research institutions and industry.
The White Paper was an important base of the new policies as was the Colloque held in 1982.
The Colloque was the attempt to integrate all relevant actors in the formulation of a new re-
search policy by creating a forum of discussion. This form of policy-making was not new and
used already in the history of France. In particular, the Colloque of Caen that reformed the
universities (1966) is a well-known example. The different colloques serve to generate knowl-
edge about the problems and solutions in the field as well as to create a consensus on the broad
lines of the government policy. In this, it is comparable to the process preceding the White
Paper in the Netherlands. The new government attempted therefore to follow a “bottom-up”
line of policy-making instead of the traditional Colbertist way to decide alone.
This bottom-up aggregation was pursued next to the creation of a new Ministry of Research
and Technology, which, for the first time demonstrated the willingness to bundle the various
political forces and to formulate a coherent policy. The new research policy of the 1980s was
therefore the result of a double “big bang”, the colloque and the new Ministry responsible for
the formulation of research and technology policies. Therefore, the new socialist government
ended on the one hand the Colbertist style of policy-making in technology policy but it cre-
ated at the same time the institutional prerequisite of a stronger and more coherent and coordi-
nated research policy. The creation was not, however, linked to a stronger interventionism.
The new instruments administered by different agencies were indirect instruments and when
they were direct funds (the “programmes technologiques”) they were formulated together with
scientists and industrialists. In addition, the administrators in the new Ministry were most of
the time scientists working part-time.
Switzerland finally lacked almost completely an institutional base for technology policy in the
beginning of the 1970s. There was just one agency, the CTI, that distributed some money for
technological research. The crisis of several key industries in Switzerland forced policy-makers
to re-think the traditional liberal attitude of the state vis-à-vis a support for industry. This
was the background for the creation of a departmental working group and, thereafter, of the
development of new “impulse programmes” for the technological promotion of industry. The
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CTI received some of this money and became gradually more important as more money was
flowing in favour of technological promotion. One should understand that the sums distributed
by the new programmes were still very modest in international terms but they were a begin-
ning and marked the interest of the federal government to be more active in industrial policies.
Nevertheless, it was constrained by the protests of industrialists who refused each form of
intervention in this respect and the people who refused the adoption of a risk guarantee for
innovation the federal government wanted to give to SMEs in the development of new tech-
nologies (in 1985). One sees in the 1980s a gradual expansion of programmes in favour of
technological knowledge. The implementation was delegated to either the CTI or – with con-
cern to the PNR – to the SNSF. This does not mean that the federal administration did not try
to influence the formulation of thematic fields and the implementation of programmes. We will
come back to this below.
In sum, this demonstrates that the Dutch and this time also the French needed a fundamental
reflection, a “big bang” to reform their policy-design with regard to the collaboration of the
public-funded research systems and industry while the Germans and the Swiss acted more
incremental. The German research ministry was subject to several pressures to modify its
predominant direct funding approach and turn to a more indirect approach in technology pro-
motion. The Swiss found eventually a consensus among the political elites to make technology
policy a subject of great importance while it was almost completely absent before. The step
towards a more active technology policy took, however, quite some time and was modest in
comparison with the other countries.
Industry had an influence on the technology policy everywhere: In the Netherlands, they were
industrialists that – together with scientific experts – who formulated the new industrial pol-
icy (the “Wagner committee” In Germany and Switzerland, industry played a restrictive role:
in Germany the protests of industrialists against the competitive asymmetries the direct
funding policy of the research ministry created led to a revision of this instrument. In Swit-
zerland, we find traditionally a profound mistrust of (above all the big) enterprises concerning
state intervention. This has without any doubt kept the level of government intervention low.
In the end, there is more convergence than divergence in the new policy-design. Even in France
the kind of policy instruments are not fundamentally different from the other countries. The
orientation to SMEs and to more indirect funding instruments with a more restrictive role of
government can be found everywhere.
4.2.2 The programmes
The following comparative description serves to learn to know about converging and diverging
learning capacities of the four countries in matters of project funding directed to “economic
competitiveness” and economic “responsiveness” respectively. We will treat the problem in
five sections: First, we want to know about the kind of projects the countries have imple-
mented and what type of learning is involved in these projects. Second, we will ask how the
learning process – or in other terms how the new projects – was initiated, i.e. what has been
the decision-process and the kind of actors involved within this process. Do we find advocates
and adversaries? Third, the set up of the programme and the mode of implementation will be
presented. This discussion – based on comparative tables – will serve to, fourth, explain simi-
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larities and differences in the programming of research in the 1980s and 1990s. Finally, we will
ask what our results mean for learning.
4.2.3 Types of Learning
In the first chapter, we have developed the notion of learning. It is useful to come back to this
discussion in order to distinguish between different types of learning linked to the creation of
funding instruments we will discuss below. The usual distinction of types of learning was
“social” and “normal” learning. Our concept of policy-design explained that there are two cen-
tral elements of the “software” of policy regimes: the causal theories concerning the interven-
tion of the state in certain matters and the instruments that are used for this occasion. We
think it useful to cross-tabulate these two dimensions of causal concepts and instruments.
Causal concepts are in addition distinguished according to the learning concept in (1) a funda-
mental change in thinking underlying the policy; new causal theories of intervention; change in
preferences; (2) normal policy-making implying no change in the thinking underlying the pol-
icy. The instrumental dimension has three values: (a) a new instrument is set up without for-
mer experiences in this field; (b) an existing instrument in the country is changed with regard to
objectives and contents; (c) an existing instrument in the country is modified according to pa-
rameters of implementation.
This results in a six-fold table with different degrees of difficulties to learn:
Table 6 Degrees of Learning
New Instrument Change in instru-
ment
Modification of instru-
ment
Paradigmatic
change in objec-
tives
6 5 4
Normal policy-
making
3 2 1
It will be evident that a new causal theory will always be more difficult to realise than a reform
where the basic thinking of policy intervention has not changed. This is why our estimation of
difficulties of learning, expressed in ordinal ranking, values all change in this category as more
difficult than in the other category. In addition, we see it as being more difficult if there are no
experiences with instruments in these matters and new instruments must be constructed than
if there is already an instrument, which can be used for the reform. However, the change in
objectives of an instrument is more difficult than to change only the parameters of implemen-
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tation.
In the following table, we have summarised all relevant instruments of “economic responsive-
ness” in the 4 countries. The figure in the last row indicates the degree of difficulty of learning.
Summary Table 1: Description of Programmes
CH Impulse Pro-
grammes 
1978 ; 1982 ; 1986
Reflects a gradual change in the stance of the federal government concerning technol-
ogy innovation: more active than before in order to save crisis industries; Some new
measures are implemented but a part of the money is given to the Technology Agency
using the same instruments as before; no instrument really needed a complete overhaul
of existing models. The success of the first programme leads to replication. We estimate
that the first impulse programme had to overcome strong resistance of industry and
conservative political forces and can therefore be regarded as a “new thinking” in
research policy.
5/4
National Research
Programmes (PNR)
1985
The PNR, set up in 1974 were since the beginning conceived as an instrument for re-
sponsivity, both social and economic. Only in the 1980s, however, the technological
focus set through and became an important part of the instrument. There was no need to
change the objectives of the instrument. Some parameters for application had to be
modified. Therefore, endogenous learning sufficed.
1
Priority Pro-
grammes (PPR)
1992
This instrument could profit from the experiences of the PNR and Impulse Programmes
but it added some new elements, above all directed to long term cooperation, intra-
systemic and inter-systemic. Japan´s cooperation programmes between industry and
academia were example. There was no general change in thinking but new objectives
that changed the outlook of existing instruments.
2
National Centres of
Excellence
(NCCR)
2000
Was based on a critic of the functioning of the PPR and used main objectives but differ-
ent parameters of implementation.
1
FRG “Verbund-
Projects”
1984
The new programme developed between 1980 and 1984 refers to an already existing
programme. The difference is the inter-systemic character of the VP. However, a
general and profound shift from directed funding to indirect modes of funding based on
a change in the intervention philosophy of the government: from interventionism to
framework-setting; from thematic steering to structural steering.
5
Leading Projects
1995
Are based on the Verbund-Projects; Modify parameters of intervention 1
FRANCE Programmes
technologiques
1982
Minor change in philosophy of state intervention : from Colbertism to a more collabora-
tive mode of cooperation. But already a close collaboration between state and (national-
ised) industries. Example of ALVEY followed. Inter-systemic cooperation stressed.
Nevertheless new instruments needed. More indirect mode of funding.
3
Research Tax
Credits ; Aides à
l´innovation
(ANVAR) 1979
Minor change in philosophy of state intervention : from Colbertism to a more collabora-
tive mode of cooperation. But already a close collaboration between state and (national-
ised) industries. Nevertheless new instruments needed. More indirect mode of funding.
3
Thematic Research
and Technological
Innovation Net-
works 1990s
Continuation of technological networks. Stronger emphasis on networks and interaction.
Modification of instrument .
1
Actions Concertées
d´Incitation 1999
Prior programme in the 1960s ; stronger emphasis on cooperation between public-funded
research system and industry; no different philosophy from technology programmes. But
a much stronger intervention of the Ministry. > from “tutelle administrative” to “tutelle
scientifique”
5
NL Innovation-
Oriented Pro-
grammes 1979
Continuation of priority programmes created in 1974 but stronger economy-oriented and
new constructed in 1979. First programmes launched in 1982. Link between public-
funded research systems and industry stressed; key technological area. General change
in intervention philosophy from active research policy to framework-setting
5
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Leading Techno-
logical Institutes
1996
Continuation of IOPs. Stronger emphasis on interaction and long-term network construc-
tion. Modification of instrument
1
The overview demonstrates that the more fundamental changes (4 and higher) happened in the
1980s (and in the 1970s in Switzerland) while the 1990s are characterised more by a modifica-
tion in the parameters of existing instruments. More in particular one can state three periods:
- Period 1: The 1970s > This is the time where forerunners of the new instruments in
the 1980s are coming up where often the focus is less on economic than on social re-
sponsiveness.
- Period 2: The 1980s > Based on existing programmes but often with changes in the
objectives and often linked to a change in the thinking of causal theories, new instru-
ments are created. Switzerland is late in developing its priority programmes with simi-
lar objectives (1992). Given the often important changes, this period should be the
most difficult for installing learning processes.
- Period 3: The 1990s > There is a general shift in objectives more focused on interaction
and long-term knowledge creation but this does not need new instruments. Only minor
changes in existing instruments are necessary. The learning process is therefore much
easier than in the 1980s. One can expect a rather smooth introduction of these instru-
ments.
One sees an astonishing convergence in the time of creation and in the objectives of most in-
struments. The VLSI programme in Japan and the ALVEY programme of the UK are men-
tioned repeatedly as the basic models that have inspired the set up of the new instruments for
technological innovation. The following overview summarises the contents of the major pro-
grammes.
Summary Table 2 Contents of Programmes
1980s. 1990s
CH Impulse pro-
grammes
Success criterion: establishment of new and inde-
pendent research structures and stable cooperation
relationships between industry and economy.
Help ailing industries by research and technology
development. Strengthen education in areas of indus-
trial interest. The development of key areas is seen as
necessary to have a combined effect of research
activities, application and education in this area. The
development of key areas is seen as necessary to
have a combined effect of research activities, appli-
cation and education in this area.
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PNR Introduced in 1974 and directed to relevant questions
of society. Only later technology-oriented objectives
are added. These are “applied-oriented” but in
general not yet “industry-ready”. The ultimate aim is
however to find application in industry.
Priority Pro-
grammes (PPR)
1992
Coordinate research efforts in universities; make
networks; interdisciplinarity; Alvey as model; collabo-
ration between industry  and public-funded research
system; priority areas defined by policy-makers; long-
term research
National Centres of
Excellence
(NCCR)
2000
Attacking lacking transfer of knowledge;
priority areas; created partnership of
industry and science; create interface
universities – industry; build centers of
excellence in the form of networks; Inter-
disciplinary research; very long-term and
basic research with bridges to application;
concentration of resources; better distribu-
tion of tasks between institutions
FRG “Verbund-
Projects”
Inter-systemic cooperation between industry and
public-funded research system; key technology areas;
pre-competitive research; SMEs are the object;
lasting cooperation and self-organisation of research
envisaged
Leading Projects
1995
Identify strategic research areas and
create innovation networks; concentrate
resources; quicker transfer within these
networks; less direct money for industry;
public-private partnership
FRANCE Programmes
technologiques ;
Tax credits, Inno-
vation subsidies
Alvey as example ; directed to SMEs ; objective :
develop synergies between actors. “Encourage
heterogeneous actors to jointly identify competences
of future strategic significance and develop co-
operative activities which will allow them to acquire
and exploit these competencies; cooperation industry
- academia
Thematic Research
and Technological
Innovation Net-
works
. Continuation of technological networks.
Stronger emphasis on networks and inter-
action. Indentification of technological
problems; define research projects and
develop new products; public-private
partnership
Actions Concertées
d´Incitation
Develop coordination in fragmented
research system in politically defined
priority areas; open up public-funded
research system to industry and society;
support the rise of new research groups in
areas; link to innovation networks; support
start ups of academia; interdisciplinary,
problem-oriented; overcome rigid existing
research structure
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NL Innovation-
Oriented Pro-
grammes
Innovation at the centre; create new and experimen-
tal knowledge in promising fields of technology;
foster strategic research in universities; create link
between industry and universities; rely on collabora-
tive ventures; pre-competitive areas of knowledge
creation.
Leading Techno-
logical Institutes
Long-term research at the interface of
academia and industry; lasting anchoring
of research networks; enterprises in the
centre: formulate main areas; integration
of stakeholders; virtual institutes instead of
real institutes;
Criteria: recognisable institutes that are
centrally managed or concentrated in a
single location; each institute will focus on
a single cohesive area of basic-strategic
research; an area that will have been
selected in close cooperation with knowl-
edge intensive companies; will employ
leading international researchers and be
given top quality equipment;  include an
educational component;  flexibility and
interdisciplinary activities will be key
features of research work; substantial
commitments will be expected from the
companies involved, both in terms of
funding and active involvement in the
running of the institutes
Though the two instruments used in the two periods are not fundamentally different, the ob-
jectives are slightly different. While in the 1980s, policy-makers attempted to bridge the gap
between academia and industry on the presumption of the linear model of knowledge transfer
they did so in the 1990s on the basis of a “circular” or “interactive” model. The former model
still insists on an active state that is involved in thematic priority-setting and in creating the
opportunity for industry to work together with academia in order to transfer knowledge. The
new model insists much more on the self-organisation of networks between industry and aca-
demia and the idea that it is necessary to have a long-term relationship between key actors.
The networks are responsible for the whole knowledge production and innovation chain.
The overview explains that there are no real differences in the general objectives underlying the
instruments in the 1980s and 1990s. Convergence of causal theories and instruments, in short
of the policy-design seem to prevail. One finds minor deviances like for example Switzerland
that needs a longer time to implement the first coordination schemes. In addition, there are
perhaps differences in the way policy-makers are developing priority areas (see below). How-
ever, seen from a general angle, we do not find the divergences we would expect given the dif-
ferent starting positions we described in the previous chapter. The economic pressure, the
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“new growth theory” and key models like AVSL and ALVEY as well as a general shift into the
direction of more neo-liberal modes of state intervention seem to explain this convergence. The
OECD has, without any doubt, also played a role in the diffusion of the knowledge in the or-
ganisation of state – industry research relationships.
We want to know, however, how countries managed to make the change and if there are sig-
nificant differences in the set up of new instruments given the different types of learning.
Given the different paths countries have followed in developing a research policy, we can ex-
pect differences in learning capacities here. What were the learning processes of country in the
use of project funds?
4.2.4 The initiation of new instruments
The following overview demonstrates the differences between countries:
Summary Table 3 Initiation of Programmes
CH Impulse Pro-
grammes 
1978 ; 1982 ; 1986
1975 > Initiation by a working group of the department of economy under direction of the president
of the Technology Agency (TA). Task > offer solutions in R&T for ailing industries. Parliament
accorded 5 Mio SFr (more than the budget for the TA). For the first time not only research but also
development projects were allowed to finance > was important later for the permission of the TA
in 1982 to also finance development projects; This was the base for the funding of industry-oriented
research projects in the future; 1977 > new crisis of industries > department elaborates a number
of technology initiatives in concertation with industry organisations; directed to SMEs. This became
the Impulse programmes in 1978 adopted by parliament and a model for future programmes. The
ideas and development came above all from the Office for Questions of the Economic Cycle (Amt
für Konjunkturfragen) within the department of economy.
Difficulties > in pre-parliamentary hearings employers criticised state intervention > led to the
reduction of number of inititatives. In the end 24 Mio for the TA for 4 years and other measures.
Total 63 Mio. SFr. Protest of branch organisation against TA money: SMEs do not want money from
the state. Parliament accepted nevertheless. Since then it was easy to adopt such urgency measures
in times of crisis. But parliament decides to which branches money should go. Discussion on com-
petition distortion of these measures. But accepted. In the 1980s technology becomes key word.
European Union became a key actor and accelerator in this respect. Since 1987 is technology
transfer (not policy) a prime activity of the government according to announcements: increase
competitiveness.
The credits for the TA rose from about 4 Mio in 1975 to 40 Mio in 1989 and more than 80 Mio from
Industry while this was 1 Mio in 1975.  The impulse programmes fixed – according to the model of
COST – that 50% of research must be paid by industry. Was seen as guarantee for interest of
industry (something which the German BMFT had to learn in the early 80s). The clause of 50%
also important to overcome resistance of liberal politicians against research funding for industry.
National Research
Programmes (PNR)
1985
In this case there was no initiation because this happened in 1974. By and large, industrial topics
became more relevant > mood of the time. This needed no new decisions but only new procedures
to integrate industry in the decision-making. Decision-making on choice of topics is very much a
corporatist bargaining among a large number of actors streamlined by the political stream.
Priority Pro-
grammes (PPR)
1992
At the beginning of the 1990s there are two initiatives: the parliament asks the government to
analyse existing structures of applied research, define the problems and develop structural im-
provements. A more efficient and effective structure is demanded by the parliament. At the same
time the former president of the ETH and now secretary of state for research, Ursprung, proposes,
after a Japan visit, to introduce long term projects to develop oriented research in key areas of
scientific development. This fell on fertile grounds because since the law on research in 1983,
there was the assignment for the federal government to create effective instruments for interdisci-
plinary research. With, in addition, the pressure of an economic crisis and the support of the Swiss
University Conference, the federal government decides to build up a new programme which was
introduced in 1992. This project is presented to parliament and quickly accepted. The themes were
selected very rapidly within the ETH, proposed by researchers, and taken up by Ursprung and
within the FNS. There were no general aggregation procedures. Technology is of course a most
important item in this but also the development of social sciences. This time, it is envisaged to give
the federal polytechnics the authority to implement the programme but only after protest of the FNS
it is decided to give each half of the projects.
Final decision on priority areas is taken by parliament. The difference with the PNR is above all the
longer duration of projects.  
49
National Centres of
Excellence
(NCCR)
2000
In 1995 the parliament asks the government again to develop a report on how to improve the re-
search system with the aim to rationalise the system and make it more efficient. Time and again the
parliament is important for the introduction of responsiveness in the system.
General concern for having a very long term research that can more deeply anchor new estab-
lished priority areas in industry and universities. Important considerations of funding agencies: how
to mobilise parliament again for these kinds of projects in a time of budget cuts; how to integrate
better universities. An international expert study initiated by the SSC finds > The PPR have not
functioned well until now: they are lacking anchoring > lesson-drawing. The network-building is
still lacking between universities. The SSC had to struggle to get an evaluation. The NSF accepts the
criticism and develops within its own reflection group the proposition to transform the PPR into a
centre of excellence programme. This is presented in 1997 to the secretary of state for research
who takes up the idea.
The NSF had a profound interest in a new programme because the threat of budget cuts needed a
mobilisation of parliament which could contradict the federal government in this respect. This is
actually what happened several times. In addition, the evaluation group criticised the division of
authority between the federal universities and the NSF. This gave opportunity to ask for the sole
authority of running the programme. And the NSF wanted to change the former top-down process
of decision-making into a bottom-up one. In addition, the NSF wanted a stronger financial partici-
pation of universities in the programme in order to allow for a better integration of the programmes
> this is one of the lessons drawn: only a financial participation – both from industry or universities
– guarantees the anchoring of new programmes. The Sonderforschungsbereiche of the German
DFG and the American “Science and Technology Centers” served as a model.  The proposition of
the OECD to build up “competence centers” was taken up. The NSF project was presented to all
relevant actors for discussion.
Both the parliament and the secretary of state were in favour of the project. The “science and
research group” of the federal government discussed matters in its own reflection group and gave
the instrument a broader view > an instrument to strengthen and to transform the research in do-
mains of strategic importance for the country.  In order to win the parliament, it was integrated that
networks should demonstrate links with potential users.
FRG “Verbund-
Projects”
1984
Austerity > concentrate resources. Increasing criticism of industry interest groups about competi-
tion distortion by direct funding policies. Intervention by Ministry of Economy in favour of more
indirect methods of funding. New mode of intervention by new Christian-democratic and liberal
government: less interventionist role of the BMFT. Organise innovation by science and industry;
Existing Verbund-model for cooperation in scientific system: interdisciplinarity; Sonderfor-
schungsbereiche of the DFG creating interdisciplinary centres of excellence in thematic area
within university.
The Verbund-Project signified a general change in the funding philosophy which took about 10
years. Changes happened within the Research Ministry but were influenced by criticism from
outside (industry; other Ministries) and a change in government philosophy of intervention plus how
to cope with fewer resources. The new programme existed next to other traditional ones but be-
came predominant in the long run. The scientific system played a minor role in the process though
the DFG supported the general outlines. Instead the relationship between the Ministry and industry
seems to have played a more fundamental role for the shift (diverging interests of industry: keep
also direct funding). Austerity considerations and blame avoidance were important considerations.
Existing models for imitation (Japan, UK) played an incentive role. Adversaries could be found
within the research administration of the Ministry among those departments responsible for direct
funding, loosing their competence. The problem was: steering vs. blame avoidance for the bu-
reaucracy.
Leading Projects
1995
Stronger concentration of funds on promising key technologies. Consortia of public-funded re-
search institutes and enterprises should develop new technologies up to the stage of application.
Refinement of the idea of Verbund-Projects developed in house; no major conflicts or discussions
known;
FRANCE Programmes
technologiques
1982
Installed after a White Paper on Research in 1980, in the Research Law of 1982, on the base of
ALVEY model, 7 technological programmes are established. There are former examples like the
“Plan Construction” (from 1971) and some agencies like the COMES for solar energy that had
already established similar programmes.
Research Tax
Credits ; Aides à
l´innovation
(ANVAR) 1982
ANVAR became more and more an agency for technology transfer. Again, in the aftermath of the
Research Law of 1982, the more indirect programmes were installed.
Thematic Research
and Technological
Innovation Net-
works 1998
Like ACI  (Action concertées Incitatives) created by the CCIRST, an intergovernmental coordina-
tion body set up by the Minister for Research in 1998 .
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Actions Concertées
Incitatives (ACI)
1999
Initiated by the socialist research minister Allègre who installed an interdepartmental research
committee. This committee developed the new ACI. The main preoccupation was the lack in
coordination between fragmented research structures concerning priority areas. The next commit-
tee (CIRST II) defines the priority areas for the ACI after “discussions with scientists” (within the
Conseil National de la Science), enterprises as well as the main research organisations and the
different ministries. A forum with scientists and enterprises was created to discuss matters.
The ACI were initiated in 1999 after failure of a former programme in 1997 which should stimulate
oriented research within the CNRS; after that the CNRS was asked to reserve 20% of its money for
such research. But this measure was taken back as the research ministry now wanted to define
itself these areas on a more national level.
A lot of resistance against this “interdisciplinary” and “problem-oriented research” from scientific
community.
NL Innovation-
Oriented Pro-
grammes 1982
After the introduction of priority programmes developed within OCW, the “technology turn”
starting about 1979 developed more technology-oriented programmes which were based, however,
on the example of priority programmes. As OCW was first responsible, this initiated first contacts
between the Economic ministry and OCW. In 1981 it was decided to transfer technology policy to
EZ because of its better links with industry. EZ had, however, no research administration yet. This
made it imperative to include actors from the outside in the formulation and implementation of the
programme. No IOPs were developed within OCW. This gave the possibility to experiment with
new formula within EZ. Decision processes on IOPs were then first taken within EZ and had to be
presented to parliament, which had the final say.
Leading Techno-
logical Institutes
1996
Nota Knowledge in Action decisive for new vision. Enterprises are threatening to go outside the
country: therefore structures to link enterprises and science necessary to make enterprises stay.
Companies can contract out their basic research needs to research institutes.
This idea for new technological institutes, co-financed by industry and government was initiated by
the Minister of Economic Affairs as a way to orient public research toward industry needs, and to
circumvent the laborious and inconclusive processes of science policy. Initially the aim was to raise
new institutes, in research fields suggested by industry, and with funding sufficient to launch them
into world top rankings.    Opposition from academe (including    NWO    and   KNAW   ) and, less explic-
itly, the Minister for Science Policy (who argued successfully that research excellence cannot be
made but has to be nurtured through time and that one should take advantage of the existing
strengths of public sector research) as well as the necessity to have some selection and implemen-
tation procedure, forced the Minister of Economic Affairs to be more  cooperative   and  link    up     with
usual   procedures.  Also the available budget was too small for three new initiatives. Consequently
the Minister of Economic Affairs in cooperation with the Ministers of Agriculture, and Science
Policy solicited proposals from consortia of industry, academe and public research institutes. After
a double evaluation process, with evaluations by a consulting firm and by a “traditional” peer
committee, the Minister decided to finance institutes for food technology, metallurgy, polymer
research and for telematics.
What can we learn from this overview?
What were the reasons for change?
Both in the Netherlands and in Switzerland the fundamental changes were initiated by a severe
economic crisis and the perception that the existing passive industrial policy or the subsidising
of ailing industries could no longer be a long-term solution for failing economic growth. This
perception was enough in Switzerland to launch immediate measures by the federal govern-
ment and the adoption of these measures in parliament in 1977. While the “exogenous shock”
sufficed in Switzerland, the Netherlands – like Germany and France – needed in addition a
change in government: In the Netherlands and Germany, conservative governments took over
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office and installed a neo-liberal mode of policy intervention with repercussions for science
policy-making. In France, however, a socialist government adopted a new philosophy in tech-
nology policy. The differences in the outset of the new technology programmes directed to the
cooperation of industry and the public-funded research systems are, however, negligible. In
the Netherlands and Germany, the arrival of a conservative government was important,
though, because the former socialist and interventionist attitude would perhaps not have been
changed if the former leftist governments would have stayed in power. Both in Germany and
in France the crisis feeling seems to have been less visible than in the other two countries.
This leads to the conclusion that major turnarounds in the use of instruments must be initiated
by a change in exogenous factors, as Sabatier has explained in the case of advocacy coalitions
(Sabatier 1988): the “policy core” will only change if very strong influences from outside –
like economic crisis and a change in government – induce such a change.
The Netherlands and France needed, in addition, a more profound analysis of the situation in
the form of a report by a “reflexive body” (Netherlands) or a “colloque” (France) in order to
find convincing arguments and solutions for existing problems. The PNR in Switzerland had
been developed in the same way already in 1974 and in Germany, the Science Council had
criticised in 1975 the state of the art of research. In the case at hand (the “impulse pro-
grammes” in Switzerland; the compound projects in Germany) there were, however, no new
encompassing analysis to launch the new instrument. All countries used this instrument of
“reflection” and, in France, of “discussion”, to find a common denominator on research policy-
making. In the Netherlands, the report of the WRR had proposed the IOPs as one possibility
to reform industrial policy and the colloque in France formed the base for the decision of the
socialist government in the form a new research law, comprising the new instruments (tech-
nological programmes).
In Switzerland the “impulse programmes” needed no new reflexive analysis as they were ur-
gency measures for the help of ailing industries. The programmes did not change, in addition,
the instrument, though they created some new ones, but added more money to the funding
programmes of the Technological Agency.
We see that, with regard to the later changes in instruments (type-1 or type-2 learning), when
a change in the policy core was not needed, neither a profound feeling of economic crisis nor a
change in the party colour of governments was necessary. The changes in the 1990s were ad-
justments of existing programmes with the aim to ameliorate certain structural deficiencies and,
above all, to install long-lasting networks. The reasons were, therefore, a stronger interaction
orientation on the one hand and the deficiency of existing programmes to promote such an
interaction orientation. It did not need a major revision but only a redefinition of parameters of
existing programmes or, at a maximum, a redefinition of objectives of existing programmes.
Who were the key actors for change? Were there veto-players?
Instrumental change in Switzerland is an affair of „high politics“, i.e. not only an affair of a
ministry or one agency deciding on the implementation of new ideas but an affair for all agen-
cies in the political system and on the boundary. One sees for example that in all cases pre-
sented here, the parliament was a decisive institution even when it did not actively participate
in the policy formulation. All instruments that need a certain budget line must be endorsed by
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the Parliament. The constraint of actors in the research system to convince the parliament of
the necessity to use additional resources or to install a new instrument has its implications for
the thinking on the instrument, when to present and how to present the topics. The parlia-
ment can be an important ally against the federal government that, as responsible executive,
was often inclined to cut down budgets including the budget for research. Parliament resisted
several times in this respect. One has, of course, to pay a toll in order to have the Parliament
as an ally, i.e. one has to present and integrate general concerns of society in the developing of
research issues. Having the Parliament as an ally means to strengthen the role of relevance in
the funding of research. The instruments presented here were all instruments to ameliorate the
relevance of research.
Neither the Parliament nor the federal government cabinet are presenting new propositions in
research. In the political system, the federal offices attached to one of the very broadly defined
ministries are responsible for the development of new policy designs. Since the beginning of
the 1990s, the new “Groupement de la Science et de la Recherche” (GSR; Group for Science
and Research) with the State Secretary at its head, plays an additional coordinating and initi-
ating role. In the formation of the new NCCR, the state secretary did not initiate but take up
existing ideas on reform and transformed them into a somewhat broader scheme conducive to a
general change in the research system. The Ministry of Economy was at the start of the devel-
opment of the new impulse programmes in 1975 and the OFES, the office for Education and
Science participated as one of the actors in the definition of themes for the PNR.
Intermediary organisations have their role in the development of new instruments in Switzer-
land. In principle we have four intermediary organisations of importance on the boundary: the
SNSF, the Technological Agency CTI, the SSC, the Council of the Federal Polytechnics and
the CUS. Except for the CTI, all boundary organisations had their role in the “problem
stream” (cf. (Kingdon 1984), i.e. in the process of raising problems on the agenda of research
policy-making. The SNSF was decisive for developing the new NCCR in the 1990s, while the
PPR was an initiative coming from the Polytechnics. The SSC was important most of the time
in insisting on an analysis of problems of the system and on evaluating programmes and insti-
tutions.
This list demonstrates that there is not one actor in Switzerland that can raise problems and
present new solutions but several actors. In this way, the power of agenda-making is diffused
in Switzerland. The reason for this is, without any doubt, the lack of one overriding, powerful
actor, above all the lack of one powerful ministry responsible for research. The GSR is a very
small unit in the federal administration and, in general, the federal administration is rather weak
in personnel and power. This explains that a consensus is searched for instead of imposing
certain solutions. The forum to do so, the “policy stream” (i.e. the arena where solutions are
looked for and discussed), consists therefore of a number of actors with no overriding powers
reserved for nobody (see figure below). The forum is based on communication and deliberation
between all actors. If a new instrument is launched the reactions of different  actors are gath-
ered and the issuing institution attempts to correct its propositions according to the degree of
resistance. Only the final version – after compromise-building – is presented to the federal
cabinet and to the Parliament. These institutions can also participate as actors in the policy
stream but in general they remain outside. Actors within the policy stream are required never-
theless to also find out if there will be any resistance in the adoption of the propositions in the
“political stream”, i.e. in the political decision-making arena. In this sense, the policy stream
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and the political stream are narrowly connected.
Of course, streams are analytical categories and useful to distinguish between different func-
tions in policy-making but in reality it is people from different streams are interacting directly,
i.e. streams are not necessarily temporarily ordered. In addition, institutions can change posi-
tions in different streams. We think, nevertheless, that we find a group of institutions that
remain the core group in the policy stream.  Actors in the problem stream, however, vary, as
has been shown.
Figure 2 Actors in Switzerland
Again, it should be stressed that in Switzerland it is not the individual power resources that
matter most, though they can be important. It is the capacity of corporate actors to build coa-
litions and find arguments to overcome resistance in implementing new policy designs. The
“art of coalition-building” is a decisive capital for actors in Switzerland. Solution finding is an
informal process where the Federal Offices, the boundary organisations, the GSR, the SSC and
the CUS take part. The prerequisites for coalition-building are good in Switzerland as we find
a lot of double and triple functions of actors in boundary organisations which are, at the same
time, at the centre of most negotiations. The CUS is important for the finding of a federal con-
sensus. In addition, the consociational culture is an important ingredient in this process. It is a
kind of “habitus” actors have developed and use to overcome resistance of other actors.
Such a system does not need “veto-players”.  It is built on “voice” for everyone and a low
potential for exclusion. If corporate actors have about the same potential to act, everybody
can bring in his interests and it needs deliberation procedures and coalition-building to find a
solution for the problems at hand. As there are no formal voting procedures, decisions are not
taken on a majority base. They are developed in the process of deliberation between different
actors. Veto’s can be overcome in this system, but there is a strife to avoid the face-to-face
confrontation to do so. This is why the deliberation process is long and the outcome is almost
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always a compromise between most interests.
Take the example of the confrontation between the Polytechnics and the SNSF in the setting
up of the PPR. The initiative was taken by the Polytechnics but the domain interests of the
SNSF had to be taken into account. This is why a compromise with regard to the management
of the PPR was developed that was acceptable for both sides. When the reports of the SSC
and of international evaluation commission on the deficiencies of this system was published
later on, it was also easy to change the system and give authority to the SNSF alone.
The system is not only open to “insiders” but also to outsiders. Industry has access to the
public-funded research systems. This was evident in the procedure for setting up the “impulse
programmes”, when even pre-parliamentary hearings were necessary to develop urgency
measures during the economic crisis. This was, however, a special case where research policy
measures were a part of a broader package of measures. In pre-parliamentary hearings, interest
groups, above all from industry, have a significant power. This is demonstrated in the curtail-
ing of some measures and the adoption of the 50% co-financing regulation for programmes of
the CTI. Representatives from enterprises are also participating – in majority – within the
managing board of the CTI. Here, they have regular and important influence on how to distrib-
ute the money. As the CTI is participating also in other, general affairs of research policy and
has direct links with the OFFT (Federal Office for professional education and technology) and
the Ministry of Economy, industrialists indirectly also have an influence in other policy mat-
ters though here the voice of the other agencies will in generally be more important.
Switzerland has, in sum, a system of actors with multiple corporate actors, frequent interlink-
ages by double functions, a high diffusion of powers and the lack of clear veto-positions. This
system works according to the logic of consensus-building and deliberation. As the community
is quite small in Switzerland, actors can use face-to-face contacts to build up compromises on
new instruments. In such a system, new ideas can come from everywhere but they must fall
on fertile grounds, i.e. there must be a general feeling that there is a problem at hand and needs
change. In this case, things can advance quickly in decision-making, if it does not need a more
encompassing change in politics which has to be presented within the four-year general budget
of the Ministry of Interior and of Economic Affairs. If there are no fertile grounds, actors have
to take a lot of time to prepare grounds for a consensus and may fail. As it is, the time be-
tween discussion in the problem stream and adoption in the political stream has not been too
long in Switzerland in the programmes under scrutiny: about one year for the PNR (National
research programmes) and the PPR, about 3 years for the impulse programmes and about 4
years for the NCCR.
This does not mean that the Swiss system is, in general quick in reacting to problems. Direct
democracy can be a major constraint: for example, a risk guarantee for technological innovation
in enterprises was refused in the 1980s by the people. The law on research was refused in
1978 and it took 10 years between the acceptance of a federal competence in research and the
adoption of the research law in 1983. The research law was then decisive to built up the PPR
because in the law the task to build up interdisciplinarity by federal policies was defined. On
the other hand, the revision of the PPR after only a few years after its introduction demon-
strates that the Swiss are willing to learn. Evaluation procedures have become an important
means to learn in this respect.
Germany has a very different system.
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The obvious difference of Germany with Switzerland is that decisions on instruments are a
matter of the research ministry. The cabinet and the Parliament have, of course, to endorse the
budget of the research ministry but they do not interfere in the process of policy formulation
and they do not initiate new instruments. The research ministry is at the same time the arena
where problem definition, solution finding and decision-making takes place, as far as it con-
cerns funding instruments directed to technological innovation. The same unity of streams
holds with regard to basic research. Here it is the DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft)
which is responsible and which has the authority to decide what to do and how to do it. This
does not mean that these institutions are “operationally closed”. The research ministry is rep-
resented within the DFG and the research ministry has not only regular contacts with the
DFG but will respect the kind of labour division between political and scientific funding that
has evolved in Germany.
With regard to the two instruments discussed in our context, the scientific institutions – DFG
or MPG for example – have not played an important role. The two instruments were initiated
within the context of the BMFT (Bundesministerium für Forschung und technologie) - later
BMBF (Bundesministerium für Bildung Wissenschaft Forschung und Technologie). In the
process of policy formulation different actors had, however, “voice”: as it concerned above all
the stimulation of new technologies the Minister of Economic Affairs had an interest in the
project and insisted much on more indirect methods of funding. Business interest groups (and
later in the stage of programme formulation also trade unions) were invited to reflect on the set
up of new funding instruments. Without any doubt, the negotiation process with industrial
organisations had a decisive impact on the instrument, both on the contents of the new “Ver-
bund-Projects” as well as on the overall composition of funding instruments (maintain also
direct funding projects). One could call this process of policy-formulation a “corporatist” con-
certation where official interest groups and the state negotiate in order to implement certain
public policies. It is astonishing to what extent the research ministry tried to find a consensus
with business groups. While in Switzerland business representatives are integrated within a
boundary organisation like the CTI, in Germany we find official bipartite or tripartite negotia-
tions to implement the new instrument. In Switzerland, the initiation of a new instrument is an
encompassing process bound within consociational features of decision-making. In Germany
initiation of a new instrument happens within one organisation but in corporatist exchange
with relevant actors from outside. The important point is that research policy-makers in both
systems need the cooperation of beneficiaries (in this case industry) but it is organised in dif-
ferent ways. In Germany a number of corporate actors are excluded from negotiation, e.g. the
scientific organisations. In Switzerland most corporate actors are included in the process. This
is of course to be explained by the delegation of implementation to funding agencies outside
the political system which needs an inclusion of these agencies. The “divide” of political and
scientific funding in Germany makes such an inclusion not necessary.
This does not mean that the DFG is excluded from discussion. The divide creates the neces-
sity for the research ministry to also find the cooperation of the DFG to effectively imple-
ment the “Verbund-Projects”. As the projects need the cooperation of universities and indus-
try, the activities of the DFG in developing interdisciplinary and innovation-oriented research
within universities becomes an important activity. The BMFT has the possibility, for exam-
ple, to influence the programming of the so-called “Sonderforschungsbereiche” (SFB) dedi-
cated to interdisciplinary centres of excellence within universities because both Länder and
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federal government representatives are financing these projects and participate in the selection
committee. It can be seen that the SFB are often contacted to participate within the “Verbund-
Projects”. This means that the BMFT needs a certain inclusion of the DFG – not in the phase
of the initiation of the project – once the Verbund-Projects have been installed. This does not
mean any veto-power for the DFG but it gives the possibility to discuss matters with the
research ministry.
The ideological shift from a more activist stance to a more liberal and indirect mode of funding
has been an affair of lobbying of industry, of influence by the Ministry of Economic Affairs
and by a new cabinet dedicated to a more neo-liberal policy in general. The hierarchical order-
ing within the BMFT makes it possible that a new minister and new state secretaries reorient
the general philosophy of funding within the ministry by, for example, creating new divisions,
setting up new instruments etc. The learning process is therefore initiated from the outside but
takes place within one institution, the research ministry while in Switzerland it needs a proc-
ess of diffusion among all relevant actors to make new ideas predominant.
The overall process to implement the new “Verbund-Projects” took about 10 years if one
counts the first attempts in the mid-1970s. This is quite a long process. The explanation for
this is probably that in order to change the routines of one organisation, in this case the minis-
try, it needs a number of external influences and the pressure from “high politics” to initiate
major reforms. The failure of the reorganisation of the “advisory bodies” mentioned in the
previous chapter is one example how difficult it is to break up existing structures. The general
re-orientation of the federal government was a decisive event in this case. It was helped though
by new “models” emerging in Japan and the UK that were regarded as exemplary and as good
examples of how to organise the collaboration between the state and economy. One can clearly
discern the influence of these models on the politics of the research ministry (Lütz 1993).
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In the Netherlands the initiation of the “innovation-oriented projects” (IOP) is, as in Ger-
many, the result of a general re-orientation of the government concerning state intervention in
general and how to approach industrial problems in particular. New and convincing ideas were
presented in expert bodies and adopted by the governmental coalition as a point of departure
for future policies in this area. The setting up of the IOPs was a direct outflow of the WRR
report and the decision of the cabinet to use this instrument for an improvement of industrial
innovation. In this case, one does not find an extensive hearing of different parties concerned
as it was the case with the White Paper in 1974. The only conflicts at hand were the allocation
of “property rights” concerning the implementation of the IOPs. While it was OCW, tradi-
tionally responsible for research, in the beginning, the new government in 1982 decided to
transfer the IOPs to the economic ministry. One should see the difference here with Germany:
there an autonomous research ministry existed that was responsible for research while OCW
in Netherlands was a “polyvalent” ministry very much oriented towards the management of
basic research. As it was decided not to keep the minister without portefeuille for research, the
Economic Ministry that had no experience at all in these matters seemed to be the right place
for implementing the programme. One can imagine that the decision to transfer the pro-
grammes caused a lot of conflicts and negotiation between the two ministries. The final deci-
sion was taken in the Cabinet.
While the decision at the beginning of the 1980s was taken without inclusion of other actors
this was different in the 1990s. Again, a White Paper announced fundamental reforms, which
inspired the economic ministry to re-think the working of the IOPs. In addition, there was the
obvious problem that for the initiation of new research areas relevant for innovation, IOPs
seemed to have worked well but that the more long time establishment of cooperation between
industry and the public-funded research systems remained a problem. The revision was there-
fore both a reaction to a deficiency of the instrument as well as the outcome of a new spirit in
research policy-making. This time, the announcement of the new programme met considerable
resistance by other actors. In contrast to Germany, both scientific agencies and ministries op-
posed the proposition. The result was a compromise that integrated the preoccupations of
scientific agencies and the ministries. This demonstrates that – as in Germany – a ministry
cannot act unilaterally but needs a certain consensus within the political system and, what is
more, also with scientific boundary organisations that are responsible for the management of
extra-university research institutions and for the financing of universities. In this, the Nether-
lands are more comparable to Switzerland: new instruments are discussed by all actors in the
research system.
The parliament also seems to have a more prominent role than in Germany, at least when it
comes to the 1990s: the economic minister has the right to select the topics but it is up to the
parliament to accept this proposition or not. In the case of the LTI, the proposal as such was
not accepted and the parliament changed the number of themes. In the initiation of the pro-
gramme, however, the parliament did not play a role.
The story of the LTI demonstrates, moreover, that even “1-type learning” can be painful, if
basic interests of other corporate actors are violated. Hierarchical decisions taken by one min-
istry, seem therefore not to function in the Netherlands. More than in Germany, the “policy
58
stream” is enlarged by a large number of corporate actors. Agenda-making, however, is, as in
Germany, taking place within one institution, the responsible ministry. That makes a differ-
ence to Switzerland. The political stream finally includes the parliament stronger than in Ger-
many and more comparable to Switzerland.
It is difficult to designate where the power of decision-making is found in France. The peculiar
structure of a feeble political administration – even though from times to times autonomous
research ministries are created – with nevertheless claims for the authoritative allocation of
“material and immaterial values” and a tradition of strong public-funded research institutions
with delegated tasks of designing and implementing research policies, causes a permanent
combat for and reorganisation of competencies. One of the few means to bring together the
different and fragmented actors is the “colloque”, i.e. a kind of “public hearing” where every-
body can make propositions concerning the future of research policies. These colloques func-
tion like the “Etats-généraux”, like a parliament, though it is the cabinet, which decides in the
end about which propositions are accepted and which not. It is this procedure, which – though
one sees shifts in instrumental use before – initiated the introduction of new instruments di-
rected to the SMEs instead of national champions in technology policy. The set up of the new
technological programmes was integrated and announced within the new research law of 1982
that formed the essence – based on the selection of the socialist government – of the “collo-
que”. In this way, one can say that the re-orientation was a coordinated and institutionalised,
one-time effort of different forces in the research system to develop a new research policy.
Legitimised in this way, the new programmes, which were managed either by the industry
ministry or by different research institutions, were implemented.
Nevertheless, there had been similar experiments of technological programmes before, either
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initiated by the government (“Plan Construction”, 1971) or developed within one of the
“grands organismes” (COMES). The “colloque” and the law only strengthened these efforts to
develop a stronger cooperation between industry and the public-funded research system and
made them first priority for innovation policies.
The events in the 1990s reveal another feature of policy innovation in France: The ACI (Ac-
tion concertées Incitatives) were the result of different failures of the research minister to make
the research of the CNRS more responsive. One sees – as already said – a research ministry
that has the authority to decide – if need be – autonomously on research policy strategies and
the introduction of new instruments. On the other hand, the ministry is dependent on the co-
operation of the CNRS. Without this cooperation, the efforts of the research ministry must be
in vain, as most basic research is organised within the confines of the CNRS. Technological
innovation needs this research to become successful. The ministry was oscillating between
delegating the responsibility of setting up responsive research to the CNRS itself and to or-
ganising an incentive programme that would induce researchers in the CNRS to accept a more
responsive attitude in their research behaviour. The point is that the research ministry has a
rather weak administration that could not until now develop an experience and a know-how as
well as sufficient standing that could establish the ministry as a key actor comparable to the
German research ministry. Activities and policies depend to a large degree on the minister
taking office and his attitude concerning an active or a passive stance in research policy. The
responsible minister at the end of the 1990s, Allègre, was interventionist and activist. He cre-
ated a number of new advisory and decision-making bodies that should improve the decision-
making capacities of the ministry. The problem is that as soon as the minister is replaced by
another minister, these structures are abolished, or remaine but inactive like the CNS,  and
policy intentions can change considerably. In such a way, no institution can become a “heavy
weight” in research policies.
Nevertheless, the ministry has the power to initiate new products and decide them within the
confines of the political system. Actually – and this confirms the examples from other coun-
tries – no policy in public-funded research systems is decided in a unilateral and isolated way.
A consensus is searched for and legitimacy is needed to defend new policy lines. This is why
the minister created a new advisory body with scientific representatives and why a forum
with representatives from industry, research organisations and scientists was used to discuss
problems and solutions. Even though the minister might have had the result – the creation of
the ACIs – already in his had, he has to take into account that no project can succeed that will
meet overt resistance of implementers and beneficiaries. The decision taken was, however,
clearly inspired by a minister looking for more capacities to design research policies. In this
way he was intruding into the domains of competence of the “grands organismes” and was
confronted with resistance.
Though parliament has to adopt the budget of the research ministry and in this way also the
new programmes, one does not find a significant inclusion of parliamentary interests into the
decision-making. Research policy-making is an affair of the executive, i.e. of the cabinet and
depending on the strength of the research minister in the cabinet, of the research minister. In
contrast to Germany, the research ministry is, however, working within different actor con-
stellations: While in Germany a “division of labour” has evolved between political and scien-
tific funding, there are no such clear delimitations and arrangements of domains of competence
in France. This makes that both sides – in this case the CNRS and the research ministry – have
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to pay attention to the moves of the other side that might trespass their domains of compe-
tence. While in Germany conflicts are resolved by bargaining based on mutual recognition be-
tween for example the DFG and the BMBF, in France conflicts are resolved by unilateral deci-
sion of the research ministry and implicit resistance by the CNRS afterwards. This is rather a
policy of “thrust and riposte” with all uncertainties about the outcome that it entails.
Policy innovation is therefore possible in France and, given the authority of the executive,
perhaps more quickly than in other countries. However, this is not the end of the story. The
“colloque” in 1982 has demonstrated it: policy-makers know that the construction of an over-
all consensus – which is difficult given the fragmented structure – will increase the chances of
success of new policy measures. What is lacking though, is a permanent institutionalisation of
consensus-building. Policy-makers create deliberation institutions ad-hoc, when need be and
they are forgotten afterwards. This often gives the impression of a government that instrumen-
talises such institutions to create legitimacy for action than to really accept structural access
and “voice” of boundary organisations and operational organisations in political decision-
making. In addition, the lack of continuity concerning the position of research within the gov-
ernment and the changing attitude of research ministers shifts decision-making powers to and
fro: between the government and grands organismes. Again, policy innovation is possible but
it may fail in the end in France.
These structures explain that the time to innovate in France can be very quick but that changes
in instruments often occur, according to circumstances, failures and changes in government.
In terms of “streams”, one can state that problems are put on the agenda by the research min-
istry, while solution finding is a more elaborate process still occuring within the confines of
the research ministry but with inclusion of a number of actors within specially created “re-
flexive institutions” and “deliberation forums”. Final decision is clearly taken by the cabinet
and endorsed by parliament.
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In sum, we see the following features in countries:
Table 7 Actor Constellations and Policy-Innovation Capacity
Actor Constellations Policy-Innovation Ca-
pacity
Switzerland A large number of actors in problem and policy
stream; no clear centre; no real veto-players; diffused
powers; parliament important in political stream;
Inclusion; Art of coalition-building; the system learns
not just one institution
Innovation can be quick
if there is a general basic
consensus; good chances
for implementation; this
is independent of “para-
digmatic” and “normal”
policy-making
France In-built schism in the system between political agen-
cies and intermediary organisations responsible for
regulation and research; no division of labour between
political and scientific funding; high fragmentation of
institutions; lack of continuity of political agencies;
polarisation if there is a strong research ministry; lack
of centre if there is no strong research ministry >
delegation; Research ministry is a veto-player, so is
the CNRS; “thrust and riposte” instead of long-term
cooperation; experiments possible because of delega-
tion and fragmentation; research ministry predominant
in problem stream; no regular participants in policy
stream, ad-hoc inclusion; cabinet decides in political
stream
Policy-Innovation can be
quick; but implementa-
tion may fail;
Germany Labour division between political and scientific fund-
ing; multiple veto-players; Research ministry pre-
dominant in all streams, learning within one organisa-
tion; “corporatist” inclusion in policy stream of bene-
ficiaries; “voice” for scientific organisations; Strong
pressures from outside needed to change organisa-
tional routines
Profound innovation
takes quite long as they
meet organisational
resistance; pressure from
outside important;
“normal policy-making”
by contrast easy and
quick
Netherlands “Divided government” > two ministries with impor-
tant potential in research; ministries play important
role in all streams; “experts” – but also given other
examples of policy innovation all other actors (“bot-
tom-up aggregation”) – integrated in problem stream;
policy stream includes most actors; ministries and
parliament decide in political stream; ministries are
veto-players, other actors have veto-potential if they
build up coalitions; no thrust and riposte but com-
promise-building or hierarchical decision by ministry;
Innovation takes some
time because of expertise
and compromise-
building process. This
even holds for normal
policy-making.
As expected, we see different configuration of actors in the four countries and one has to ex-
plain learning on the base of these structural features and paths the countries are following. In
a nutshell, one can summarise the qualities of each “system of policy-innovation” perhaps like
this: Switzerland learns in an encompassing way because of a multi-polar actor constellation
with diffused powers; France is learning in a system with fluctuating centres of power and a
high degree of polarisation while systematic inclusion strategies are lacking; Germany com-
partmentalises learning because of a system with “divided powers” between political and sci-
entific agencies where actors have a high degree of veto-power, learning is limited to the re-
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search ministry and inclusion occurs by “corporatist bargaining” either with industry or within
the confines of the Science Council; the Netherlands learn within a system with a strong
power centre but a multi-polar constellation where boundary organisations have “voice”.
4.2.5 Implementation of programmes
Learning is not confined to the initiation of projects but also how to implement them. In what
way do our countries also develop different ways of organising the implementation of pro-
grammes?
Summary Table 4SEQARABIC : Implementation of Programmes
Switzerland Impulse Programmes 
1978 ; 1982 ; 1986
A part of the programme was given to the TA. The priority areas were defined by parliament
after pre-parliamentary hearings where industry had voice. The TA is at that time an organisa-
tion with voluntary and part-time members from science and industry, presided by the president
of the Amt für Konjunkturfragen. A strong representation of industry is searched for (major-
ity). Choice of members according to technology branches. There is interlinkage with other
funding organisations (participation of key actors like NSF; ETH; SSC). Departments are
assisting in meetings. The TA has a small secretariat. The TA has by principle been passive in
its activities. Demands come from industry and science (Bottom-up concept).  Only the impulse
programmes have changed this > partly funds by top-down model > defining key areas. The
standing committee decides after one of their experts has reviewed (with help of external
experts) on application. Usually unanimity prevails. This decision is transferred as a recom-
mendation to department of industry. Frequent evaluations of its work and of its projects.
Top-Down model wants to have a larger radius of influence than individual projects: bundling
of forces.
The 50% clause is handled flexibly
National Research
Programmes (PNR)
1985
Government has decisive influence on choice of topics, but SSC and NSF have their influence
in the process. Choice was – as it was politicised – open to consociational bargaining with a
large number of interest groups (bargaining model). This resulted in a large number of topics
that were integrated into a programme; though industry was reluctant in the beginning, by and
large they begin to cooperate. Since then always at least 2 industry-oriented PNR. Industrial
organisation is now officially included in selection procedure.
The selection process becomes more and more complicated > new actors are coming in (also
the TA) and it is the cabinet that finally decides on topics; in the beginning stronger bottom up
model > propositions from the bottom and then a discussion in working groups of the NSF
where scientists have majority but all other actors are also represented; in the 1980s the gov-
ernment intervenes early in the selection process and also adds own topics which were ac-
cepted only after long bargaining processes with the NSF; Selection process is an encompass-
ing and comprehensive aggregation process with strong influence of science and government.
The government takes the final decision.
Once the programme adopted, the NSF is responsible > establishing expert group > implemen-
tation plan > scientists have majority but other actors are presented > 2-3 years for start > long
negotiation processes. Once published researchers can apply > take ´s another 1-2 years.
Priority Programmes
(PPR) 1992
The selection procedure is top down with parliament being responsible for the final decision
which has not been the case with the PNR. Amounts of money are curtailed by parliament. This
top-down mode has later been criticised because of a lack of sufficient research capacities to
be used in the programmes and a mixed approach is followed for the NCCR, the follow-up of
the PPR. In fact, it was the Council of the federal polytechnics that had developed the topics
with a clear orientation to the needs of industry. It is the SSC who proposes also a programme
on the social sciences.
National Centres of
Excellence (NCCR)
2000
Selection process is a mix of bottom-up and top-down > all researchers can apply as long as
they demonstrate their willingness in developing a network and a centre of excellence. The
topic is not important at the moment. The SNF alone is responsible for first evaluation > inter-
national experts make propositions > FNS gives short list to government > government selects
in the end 11 and then 14 projects. This procedures caused considerable trouble because of
discontent of losers in the scientific system.
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FRG “Verbund-Projects”
1984
Learning process in the beginning: first attempts were bilateral Verbünde where the state
financed public-funded research institutes for 100%. Industry was not enough involved and
institutes could keep to their domain. Since 1984, the official start industry is required to pay
50% of costs.
The BMFT is responsible but project agencies are delegated the task to implement the pro-
gramme. These agencies serve as “communicator”, “information filter”, “contact place”;
“organiser” but BMFT takes all final decisions. These project agencies are “boundary agen-
cies” but closely linked to the political system. They are like a “firewall” before the BMFT.
The formulation of the programme in more detail was part of a “corporatist” negotiation
process between industry interest groups, depending on the programme between scientific
associations and the Ministry. Points of discussion were the mode of financing, number of
participants, and criteria for allocating funds. Compromise between these groups.
Combined Top-Down and Bottom-Up approach in the formulation of thematic fields: expert
groups as top-down procedure and “expert talks” (“Fachgespräche”) as bottom-up procedure.
In the last one again representation of industry but also of trade unions and of scientists. Re-
view procedure includes again enterprises and trade unions > “techno-corporatist” organisa-
tion.
Double delegation: Project agencies are responsible, but Verbund is led by a coordinator
chosen by the partners of the Verbund (industrialist possible).
Leading Projects
1995
No information;
FRANCE Programmes tech-
nologiques
1982
Research Tax Credits ;
Aides à l´innovation
(ANVAR) 1982
Thematic Research and
Technological Innova-
tion Networks 1990s
Actions Concertées
d´Incitation 1999
ACI only stimulating measure. Financed for 4 years: after public-funded research institutes
must integrate these activities.
Money is distributed by two funds within the research ministry: FNS (oriented basic research)
and FRT (technological research).
A director of the programme is nominated aided by a scientific council: last one participates in
evaluation etc. Management by research institutes and universities. Close collaboration with the
Research and Technological Innovation Networks needed.
ACI are a political instrument. The actual choice is made by the ministry, despite of discussion
procedure and recommendations by the CNS (Conseil national de la science).
Adversaries: “grands organismes”: ACI are large sums that are now lacking for own use.
Decisions too political. Ministry takes the position of an own research agency.
Very shortly after, the acceptance of the ACI seems to be low as the CSRT announces. It is
recommended to transfer more resources from the ACI to grands organismes. Against the
“tutelle scientifique” of the ministry > change of mode of intervention
Only the FRT is generally accepted: existed since 1959 > its task was transformed and adapted
> directed more to industry > less resistance by scientists. .
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NL Innovation-Oriented
Programmes 1982
Economic ministry had a long history of passive cooperation with industry; in addition no
research administration; search for scientific entrepreneurs and network-builders in key areas;
The first IOP in 1982  was supposed to take up the promising developments in biotechnology at
this time and create strategic research at universities and other public-funded research institu-
tions as well as to institutionalise links between industry and these university researchers.
Biotechnology was a field where only few scientists were working in though recently the first
national association of biotechnology researchers had been set up. It was, what is more, also an
interdisciplinary field of action combining biological and technical sciences. In the beginning, it
was intended to only accept propositions linking these two fields, but this claim was relaxed
after it became clear that one would not find enough researchers. How was the programme set
up? The beginning was the outsourcing of a pre-study on biotechnology to a private consultant
bureau. The study was then discussed with a group of key actors from science and industry,
which later on became the program committee responsible for the implementation of the IOP.
This committee set up a program. Before the program was publicly announced, EZ took con-
siderable efforts to discuss with Dutch enterprises the willingness to participate in the fields
stipulated within the program or if other more relevant topics should be integrated. The pre-
study served also the aim to identify the key actors in biotechnology research at universities.
Enterprises were also asked to identify the research teams they considered as relevant for
cooperation .
The independent program committee – where EZ was of course represented – attempted to
find scientists with a high reputation as well as industrial stakeholders with a scientific back-
ground who should constitute this committee. Quite in the tradition of the polder-model, the
selection took its time because the ministry paid also attention to “proportionality”: the most
important sectors and organisations should be represented. The committee was alone responsi-
ble for the IOP and free to change priorities and instruments. It had the right to allocate funds,
even before the program was definitively adopted; it had to develop the policies concerning the
program, discuss matters with the ministry and monitor the programs. Only the sum of money
invested in IOP was, of course, under authority of the ministry.
The ministry itself had representation within the committee. This construction of delegated
competence with substantial freedom from political interference, and the lucky circumstance
that biotechnology was already an area of interest also for a number of basic researchers,
created a fertile governance structure to implement the IOP in biotechnology. For Rip and
Nederhorst, this model is a valuable alternative, a “middle course between dirigisme and
laissez-faire”. The program committee operated on the boundary between the economical, the
scientific and the political system as a kind of “fixer”: out by the government” .
The learning process is for example demonstrated by change in procedures of priority-setting.
The committee wanted more responsiveness to industrial needs. To this end “interviews were
held with eight major companies on a strictly confidential basis, and the results were trans-
formed into preferred themes of research…..A new element was that the companies were also
asked to identify good research teams …The Program Committee then published the list of
preferred themes of research, and specified for each theme the core groups identified by
industry”. There was also a change in the set up of the Program Committee. As the Committee
was conceived to have an overarching and neutral position the special interests of industry
were often not sufficiently represented in the decisions. This is why, after 4 yours two com-
mittees were set up, one, the overarching Advisory Committee Biotechnology and, two, a
special committee for industrial biotechnology”.
While there were almost no rules and standards in the beginning, neither for the handling nor
for monitoring, these standards were developed in due course and formed after some years the
base for the implementation of new programs. Today the procedures are more elaborated and
more professional:.it was the committee, in close contact with the scientific    community and
industry, that was able to learn, to “continually repair and add to the rules of the implementa-
tion game that has been set out by the government”.
Leading Technological
Institutes 1996
Procedure as follows: tender for key technology areas > 18 propositions > evalua-
tion on scientific and technological merits; 6 consortia are allowed to write propos-
als. 4 chosen by a committee of “Wise Persons” (3 persons) who give proposal to
minister. Minister accepts insisting on quality rather than political choice. Parliament
refuses however insisting that all 6 proposals are accepted with themes of relevance
for the parliament. The two new ones are grouped under a different name: innova-
tive research clusters.
In order to understand the learning capacities in countries we must distinguish between two
functions in the implementation process: While the previous sections discussed the initiation
and formal establishment of new instruments, the next step is the more precise selection of
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topics within the different programmes (thematic selection), and, finally, there is the actual
running of programmes. The competency to run the programme is important because here
learning processes take place how to detect deficiencies and ameliorate the programmes. It is
therefore of interest who has the right to “act” while the function to select topics is the “right
to decide”.
With regard to the “right to decide” we can distinguish between three different ways of selec-
tion. The “bottom-up” way would be to let scientific or industrial actors choose the general
themes while policy-makers endorse the selection without interfering; the “top-down” entails
a selection by government of the relevant topics without integrating the advice of other actors.
“In-between” are procedures where for example a first selection is held by scientific or other
actors and policy-makers choose among this selection according to own criteria. Another ex-
ample are dual procedures: one part of the programme is selected according to bottom-up the
other according to the top-down logic. Learning is, of course, different depending on the way
of selection.
With regard to the “right to act” there are different possibilities: policy-makers can keep a
large control on the process by either implementing the programmes within own organisations
or organisations that are closely linked to policy-makers or they can delegate the implementa-
tion to boundary organisations that become the main institution for learning. Our comparison
demonstrates that both the Netherlands and Switzerland use “fixers” (cf. (Rip 1986) while
Germany and France prefer a tighter control on implementation. In addition, one finds that
France prefers top-down procedures, Germany and Switzerland “in-between” procedures
while the Netherlands prefer bottom-up procedures.
In more detail, the Ministry of Economic Affairs in the Netherlands decided since the begin-
ning – partly because of a lack of experience and administration, partly because of a liberal
administrative culture – to delegate the IOP to a programme committee and to accept a bot-
tom-up procedure of theme-finding, notably among industrial enterprises. While broad the-
matic fields were defined in advance on the base of expert reports and only the more precise
kind of projects within these fields (e.g. biotechnology) were proposed in a bottom-up man-
ner, the LTIs were defined completely by propositions from industry and science. The minis-
ter of Economic Affairs was prepared to accept the projects finally selected by a “Committee
of Wise Men”. To him it was more important to have “quality” than to impose politically
preferred projects. In this sense, it was a pure bottom-up procedure. Only the parliament
broke with this way of selecting themes and added – as said – two programmes that had been
set aside before because of insufficient scientific quality.
The delegation to the programme committee abandoned most rights for the ministry. Cer-
tainly, a representative of the ministry participated in the committee and the budget had to be
defended by the minister before the parliament, but all details, the actual handling and even
funding decisions were decided within the committee alone, composed of scientists and indus-
trialists. Inclusion played a prominent role within the committee as representatives were cho-
sen on the principle of proportionality to have all relevant industrial branches represented.
When this did not suffice, two committees instead of one were created in order to have indus-
try better presented in the decisions. Rip and Nederhof (Rip 1986) have circumscribed the role
of this committee as a “fixer” that is there to “continually repair”, modify rules and adapt, in
short that is there to learn. This kind of delegation with large authorities given to a “boundary”
66
institution seems to have worked particularly well. It is the position on the boundary, at the
interface of science, industry, and politics, and the function to find a consensus, to effectively
implement the programme, which obliges the participants of the committee to learn by doing.
The willingness to delegate powers to non-political institutions has also prevailed in the 1990s
when a committee of three “wise persons” – not being part of the political system – had the
right after a scientific and industrial review to make the final selection among proposed LTIs.
As said, the ministry accepted this decision without further redue.
One can compare the position of the Dutch programme committee in some way with the
Technology Agency in Switzerland. The CTI has the same role of a “fixer” with regard to the
implementation of technology policy. It is situated on the boundary between the political sys-
tem and industry and science. Daily affairs are delegated to the CTI. The major difference is
the lack of final funding decisions. Even though the responsible ministry of economic affairs
might only endorse the propositions of the CTI, it has the authority to decide. The CTI func-
tions as an inclusive agency with a clear majority for industrialists. As already described, there
are representatives from all relevant research actors, including the government. This is why
compromises found within the agency have a good chance of being accepted at the higher level.
Procedures of self-evaluation fulfill the function to demonstrate to government the effective-
ness and efficiency of the organisation. Learning processes are therefore happening within this
organisation between actors from all systems.
Concerning the other programmes, Switzerland has experimented with several procedures of
defining thematic fields, but always within the confines of “in-between” procedures. The PNR
were constructed in the beginning by a bottom-up procedure in the scientific field while the
government was authorised to make the final selection. It changed to a procedure where the
government insisted on adding its own preferred areas and with the PPR to a rather top-down
procedure where the parliament became the decisive institution to select and define the topics.
The new NCCR came back to the initial procedure of the PNR and – without giving any sug-
gestions in the beginning – demanded applications from scientists. The SNSF had to organise
the scientific peer review, but it was the ministry that, in the end, decided what kind of pro-
jects would have the highest priority. One can imagine that all these “in-between” procedures
took quite some time. Moreover, once the topics were chosen, programmes had to be defined
in more detail and to be prepared for official announcement. Here, the government relied again
on the SNSF as a boundary organisation. The SNSF, already equipped with a special division
for directed funding, created expert groups that had the task to work out the details and to
review the incoming applications. Within these expert groups, scientists had the majority but
other actors, including the government, were represented. Again, the inclusive principle is
manifested in this way.
The role of the SNSF in these procedures is important. Again, one can describe it as a fixer
that, however, is limited by the right to decide of the government. The Swiss were less pre-
pared than the Dutch to give up this final authority of the government. The SNSF is the im-
plementing agency but at the same time, it serves as an arena between different groups repre-
sented within its bodies and expert groups. Again, it is here, where compromises are built that
structure the choices of government without determining it.
It is interesting to see how the big countries have dealt differently with these matters. The
German research ministry had already created project agencies that now became the main im-
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plementing organisation for the “Verbund-Projects”. Project agencies had clearly the “right to
act” but not to decide. Not being integrated within the scientific community nor in industry,
these agencies lacked the inclusive character of the institutions described for the Netherlands.
Working in these institutions were often former officials from the research ministry. The way
to integrate industrialists and scientists happened according to two different ways, one de-
scribed as more bottom-up (expert forums), the others more as top-down (expert groups). The
research ministry defined the broad thematic fields in the beginning and these groups served as
the second selection, to find more detailed topics that could be officially announced for re-
search proposals. Only concerning the more precise procedures how the programme should
function in an administrative way (number of participants, who finances how much etc.), an-
other procedure of inclusion was chosen, i.e. the corporatist inclusion of industrial and scien-
tific interest groups as described in the previous section. Only here, the research ministry was
prepared to negotiate its conditions of work.
After the choice of more detailed topics, the programmes were announced and the official net-
works within the programme founded. A programme coordinator from the participants was
responsible for daily affairs of the project helped by the project agencies. Its task was there-
fore the daily management of the project but no other more relevant decisions on the pro-
grammes.
The research ministry thus used “double delegation” in order to implement its programmes
while keeping the right to decide at the highest level. Project agencies were the implementation
agency directly dependent and directly linked to the research ministry (see for this (Braun
1997). This direct linkage made it more difficult to include relevant actors within the decision
process. The CTI in Switzerland by contrast functioned as a committee with a majority of
industrialists. The project agency is an administration where expert groups are added tempo-
rarily to define a topic. Expert groups do not have the same freedom as the institutions and
organisations mentioned in the other groups. It is political choice that determines finally, what
is selected. Only the expert forums are more built up in a bottom-up way to allow a stronger
input from industry and science.
This description demonstrates that neither project agencies nor the programme coordinators
can be regarded as “fixers” managing the interface and learning to adapt the programme. Impor-
tant property rights are withheld from these institutions and the inclusion is for the most part
less strong than in the other countries with the notable exception of the corporatist proce-
dures. These procedures, however, function according to a different logic: they do not use in-
dividual representatives of industry or science but corporate actors. There is no inclusion
within the daily decision-making of the project agencies but informal ad-hoc talks to find a
compromise. The structure of implementation as such is not thought as an inclusion proce-
dure. That is the difference with the two smaller countries.
France has two ways to implement programmes: the first one is delegation to rather autono-
mous “grands organismes” that become fully responsible for the development of the pro-
gramme, funding decisions and even research decisions as these agencies most of the time dis-
pose of own research laboratories that can execute programmes. ANVAR became the respon-
sible agency for funding directed to technology innovation in SMEs and could function rela-
tively independently in developing programmes. If, however, a programme was ended or a
new one was set up remained a decision of the government.
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The second way is the more political one, somewhat comparable to Germany. It is the re-
search ministry, which is responsible for formulation and implementation. Instead of project
agencies, in the case of the ACI the research ministry used to “funds” within its institution to
distribute money. The location of these funds makes the direct connection to political interests
even more clear. As in Germany, the daily affairs of an ACI are delegated to a programme di-
rector chosen among the participants. This director is responsible for the coordination while
the research agencies participating are running their own administrative affairs. Funding deci-
sions remain with the funds that are, in turn, controlled and guided by the research minister.
This is the most clear top-down model though forums and the CNS (Conseil national de la
science) were used to define the contents of the programme. One does not find the similar in-
clusion of industry or scientist actors within the funds as in the small countries. It seems that
the research ministry is even more closed in this respect than the German one.
This comparison reveals two different way to structure learning processes in the implementa-
tion of instruments: a decentralised and inclusive one vs. a more centralised and less exclusive
one. One sees also gradual differences in this respect: the most decentralised and inclusive are
the programmes of the Dutch economic ministry, then follow the Swiss examples. Germany is
more inclusive and a bit more decentralised than France as far as it concerns the programmes
we have discussed. France has, however, two ways to set up funding: the other way, delega-
tion to the grands organismes, corresponds to the “fluctuating ways” to distribute powers in
research policy we have discussed before: in this case almost complete authority is given to
these institutions which do not belong to any ministry but which know of course formal links
with these ministries. They have, nevertheless, a considerable degree of freedom in dealing
with matters. So, France can, again oscillate between a rather decentralised and a rather cen-
tralised way to set up programmes.
On the two relevant dimensions we have discussed – the degree of centralisation or decentrali-
sation; the degree of inclusiveness – we could, in sum, position the countries in a very sum-
mary and stylistic way like this:
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Bottom-up procedures with a high inclusion of the “field” are preferred by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs in the Netherlands. Switzerland is inclusive in a comparable way but main-
tains a moderate degree of decision-making power of political agencies. France knows, as dis-
cussed, two different ways a more centralised one and a decentralised one. Germany has cho-
sen for a medium way.
Learning occurs differently according to these conditions: “Fixers” represent an inclusive way
of learning, integrating and balancing different rationales of systems. The relative autonomy of
these kinds of institutions fosters a rather long but accommodating way of learning where the
consensus constructed helps to change the status quo. More centralised modes can, of course,
more easily announce policy innovation but they may meet considerable resistance in imple-
menting the projects. In addition, information for learning might be lacking as this way is less
inclusive than the other one. Changes can be more abrupt and radical while the former way
prefers gradual change.
4.2.6 Summary
We have endeavoured in this part of the chapter to find out about the timing and the type of
learning involved in the setting up of new instruments linked to the “technological turn” in
research policy-making. It was demonstrated that there was an astonishing convergence both
in terms of timing and type of learning between the four countries though Switzerland was
Degree of Centralisation and 
Inclusiveness
Decentralised
Inclusive
Exclusive
Centralised
France 2
France 1
Germany
Switzerland
Netherlands
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running somewhat behind in setting up the cooperative types of instruments. We found indi-
cations that the diffusion of models developed in Japan and the UK have contributed to this
convergence as well as the “new growth theory” and a “neo-liberal turn” of governments in the
beginning of the 1980s. We are not capable to prove the causal influence of these factors but
they appear in the discussion of countries and seem to have relevance. From this we can con-
clude what seems fairly obvious if one is familiar with the general development of research
policies: the introduction of new instruments are almost always influenced by models else-
where which are considered as best practices at this time. The OECD plays a major role as a
“diffusion machine” in this respect. There is more convergence than divergence in research
policies despite of different traditions and structures. In this research policies seem to be dif-
ferent from many other policy field where differences are more important than similarities (e.g.
social policies; unemployment policies; fiscal policies etc.). We are still missing convincing
studies that show how these diffusion processes take place but one can imagine that the role
of the OECD, leading countries in technology like Japan (and the USA) and close-knit net-
works of funding administrators who frequently meet each other at several occasions contrib-
ute to such a convergence. In addition, research policy-making is not a field which is highly
contested in party politics, with the exception of ethical issues that are now raised in relation
to genome research. A lack of polarisation favours a policy developed by an administration
that seeks to raise the effectiveness of instruments by using “best practices” developed else-
where. These are just ad-hoc explanations but it would be worthwhile to develop new research
studies in order to develop more rigorously the question how diffusion processes occur in
research policy-making.
We found, nevertheless, that the more fundamental and paradigmatic changes that the intro-
duction of the new instruments implied in the 1980s could not just be adapted as such by ad-
ministrative decision but needed pressure and changes outside, i.e. economic crisis and a
change in government. We have not controlled for cases where these phenomena were not pre-
sent but for our cases at least one of these factors was present. The “normal policy changes”
in the 1990s, by contrast, did not need such exogenous changes to be realised.
Despite convergence in the timing and contents of new instruments, we have revealed different
structures of learning in the four countries. In a strict sense, we cannot deduce from these
structures different learning capacities though one could make guesses. Instead, we can show
how countries learn and base our final conclusions on learning capacities in an inductive way
on these observations.
The important differences and similarities were summarised before in the text. Let us conclude
with some final remarks: Though there are important differences, above all with regard to
regulatory powers (concentrated or dispersed), we think that the two consociational and small
countries Netherlands and Switzerland have striking affinities in dealing with policy innova-
tion. Not surprisingly, they rely more on inclusion and consensus-building than the two larger
countries. This means the need for comprehensive processes of information generation, dis-
cussion and negotiation, and elaborate ways of aggregation and decision-making. Both coun-
tries do it in quite different ways, the one with a stronger representation of political forces
(Netherlands), the other with a system of diffused powers (Switzerland). Both countries also
demonstrate a more important role of the parliament in research policies though this is for the
Netherlands a phenomenon of the 1980s. Both countries are also prepared to delegate institu-
tional innovation to “fixers”, i.e. boundary committees or institutions that are the interface
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between the operational and the regulatory level in the public-funded research systems as well
as between industry and the public-funded research systems. The role of policy-makers is
deliberately reduced8. What can this mean more in particular for learning capacities?
The obvious conclusion to us is that in such countries learning takes place as a communication
process between relevant actors (action, reaction, deliberation). It cannot be only a single cor-
porate actor who learns but it is the system as such that learns. All actors are integrated in the
reflection process and decision-making. Once decided there is a quick diffusion of innovation
possible. As usual, such a kind of innovation, which we will call “deliberative learning”, will
take time. Our hypothesis, stated in the context of Switzerland, was that the duration of the
learning process in this case depends on the degree of consensus already existing. If it is high,
learning may nevertheless be quick. Otherwise, it is not.
It is most important to insist on the structural feature of inclusion in these countries (see for
the Netherlands extensively (Meulen and Rip 2001). These countries have institutionalised
communication and cooperation in manifold ways, among others by double mandates, per-
sonal connections between corporate actors. Inclusion is therefore guaranteed and it is a web
that encompasses the whole public-funded research system. In Germany – and this brings us
to the larger countries – inclusion also exists, but it is of a different kind and, above all, not
institutionalised within the research ministry. The German research ministry – as the French
one – attempts to maintain a high degree of authority in all phases of policy innovation. Inclu-
sion there is in the policy stream but this occurs according to circumstances and it is organised
in a corporatist way and not in a consociational way. This means that highly aggregated corpo-
rate actors negotiate with each other in order to find a compromise. France goes even further
by neglecting all together continuous mediation institutions. In France, a consensus is build ad-
hoc and then in a national way. Once circumstances changes, the mediation becomes neglected.
There is no intermediary layer between the state and research actors that could balance forces
and develop a tradition of consensus. In Germany, there is at least the Science Council that
helps to build up a general consensus in important questions between scientific and political
actors. Again, this is a rather corporatist way to learn as it is within one mediation institution
organised in different chambers where learning takes place. In Switzerland and the Netherlands
it is a process integrating corporate actors from all over with double memberships. One should
underline that all countries attempt to build up a consensus, if need be. The difference with the
smaller countries is that the larger countries do not install a nation-wide and encompassing
consensus. What is more, both Germany and France are suffering from an inherent dualism of
the research system that limits the scope of any consensus: in Germany we have spoken of a
“division of labour” between political and scientific funding and in France of “fluctuating cen-
tres of power”. It seems to us that these internal dividing lines in both countries make learning
more conflictual and more difficult to organise. Domain competence becomes more often and
easier a matter of discussion. Domain conflicts are a permanent undercurrent of research pol-
icy discussions. Of course, we find domain conflicts also in the smaller countries but here
bridges have been built up in an institutional way to overcome these divides and to find solu-
tions that correspond to problems and not to find solutions that are influenced by the domain
                                                
8 This is true for the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The education ministry has a more interventionist tradition.
Here it depends among others on the attitudes and policies of the responsible minister how “reduced” policy-
makers are (see (Dresner 2002); (Braun 2001).
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conflict. In this way the way of learning both in Germany and France – despite of significant
differences – may be called “conflictual learning”.
We will see more in particular, if our first impression in this sense is right when we discuss
reforms of the regulatory structures. For the moment, we think that deliberative and conflict-
ual learning may be the two types of learning capacities we find in the four countries. These
different types have not resulted in very different instruments given the convergence in policy
innovation. They may, however, influence social learning in the sense of the implementation of
the new instruments. France has shown that conflictual learning has disadvantages because it
fails to integrate the important implementation agencies while programmes in Switzerland and
Netherlands are in general considered as a success. Germany has developed the Verbund-
Projects successfully but has problems above all in reforms of operational structures, the sub-
ject we will now turn to.
4.3 Institutional funding
In most countries public-funded research systems are based at the operational level on univer-
sities and on extra-university research institutions. Programme funding is mainly directed to
individual researchers or research groups, institutional funding pays research institutions in
order to have organisations at hand that are capable of engaging researchers and provide the
necessary infrastructure for research. In order to introduce “responsiveness” into the public-
funded research system, these research institutions have a primordial role because of their ca-
pacity to influence the reputation-cycle of researchers  and their capacity to allocate resources
internally to areas of preference. This authority of selection makes research institutions a pri-
mary target of political intervention (Luhmann 1990: 676). Despite of this, policy-makers
have for a long time focused on programme research to influence researchers’ behaviour while
research institutes remained relatively free in their choices, constrained of course by their
“constitution”, i.e. by the tasks defined as an overall framework of research action given to
each research institute. This attitude of policy-makers has changed completely and research
institutes have become a primary target of political intervention nowadays (see below). To
understand learning capacities in research systems means therefore to be informed about the
intentions, decisions, processes, and results with regard to this transformation of organisa-
tional attitudes towards more responsiveness.
4.3.1 Structure
Let us first have a look at the institutional, operational structure of public-funded research
systems. We find two extremes with France relying above all on extra-university research in-
stitutions and Switzerland depending above all on universities. Germany and the Netherlands
seem to be the most comparable as they are allocating their money to about equal parts be-
tween universities and extra-university research institutions. Nevertheless, the structure of
both countries is not identical. In the Netherlands for example, there is no research ministry as
in Germany with an interest in maintaining extra-university research institutions as its own
power base. Even those institutes, which have been under authority of the education ministry,
were transferred in the 1980s to either the KNAW or the NWO. Big science institutes are
linked to different ministries. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has no own research insti-
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tutes. Delegation is a much stronger organisation principle in this respect than in Germany.
However, while in Germany delegation to, for example, the Max-Planck-Society has resulted
in a very strong independence of management, the delegation to KNAW and NWO is not
thought of as a complete position of independence. The links between these institutions and
OCW are much stronger than between the German research ministry and the Max-Planck-
Society. On the other hand, we find a hierarchical authority of the research ministry with re-
gard to the big science institutes, as already discussed. This authority is, however, partly
shared with the Land where the big science institute is located. Another difference between
both countries is that the main funding agency in Germany has no own research institutes
while the NWO in the Netherlands is responsible for several such institutes.
France has no separate funding agency but has given responsibilities of allocating money to
different themes and researchers to a large number of “grands organismes”. These institutions
are therefore operating at the operational level and on the boundary. These institutions usually
have rather strong links to different ministries.9
Switzerland is using extra-university research institutions as a subsidiary structure to universi-
ties. There are a few larger institutes performing direct services for political departments but
this is rather an exception than the rule. In addition, these institutes are protected by interme-
diary structures (see below).
Learning is therefore based on quite different preconditions in each country. We find, never-
theless a clear convergence of ideas and policies, how to organise the existing institutions. To
what extent did policy-makers in the countries perceive a problem of responsiveness with
regard to extra-university research institutions10?
4.3.2 The problem of responsiveness
One can state that the problem of responsiveness has played a role in each country except for
Switzerland. In fact, one can see three periods of policy regimes with regard to extra-
university research institutions: the first period – in the 1950s and 1960s – is the construction
of big science institutes above all in the field of nuclear research. The second period is charac-
terised by the efforts of policy-makers to “re-orient” these research institutes as well as sev-
eral others to a more programmatic research with new topics. In both cases, Switzerland fol-
lows the general tendency. As we will see, there have been discussions on the reorientation of
nuclear research. Finally, since the 1970s, efforts begin to flexibilise the functioning of these
institutions and to integrate them in more general strategic research plans. The major problems
in countries was that most institutes had then already quite some experiences in there field,
they were often very big, with a large number of researchers, equipment was expensive and the
organisational structure was well developed. At the same time organisational slack seemed to
present in all these institutions. To close them down was most of the time no option because
of the sunk costs this would have involved. This is why governments in all countries, includ-
ing Switzerland, began to think about better management strategies to overcome the organisa-
tional slack and to make extra-university research institutions more proactive.
                                                
9 This changed a little with the creation of a research ministry in 1982, implying that the “grands organismes”
have from this moment on a double “tutelle”, their “thematic ministry” and the research ministry.
10 We will not deal with universities which are a topic apart.
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One finds these discussions in France since 1982, when the new research law changed the ju-
ridical position of the “grands organismes” to make them at the same time less dependent in
their operational functioning but also more dependent in terms of obligations written within
the general constitution of these institutions. Since then, there have been permanent discus-
sions, above all on the CNRS, how to make the “grands organismes” more responsive. The
new constitution as such did not suffice evidently.
In Germany, the big science institutes were the targets of critical remarks, as already dis-
cussed, since the end of the 1960s. The first restructuring attempts – reorientation of topics;
combat of “clientelism”; heavy and inefficient review structures – failed. Only since 1996, we
find a new “élan” that also includes other public-financed research institutions.
In the “White Paper” of 1974, the Netherlands had stipulated their willingness to reorganise
their public-funded research institutions to overcome organisational slack and to introduce
responsiveness. The first changes were introduced in the mid-1980s but overall reforms con-
tinue until today at a steady and gradual pace.
In Switzerland the federal government had official authority to create own research institutes.
This possibility existed before the federal law on research of 1983, but such kind of institu-
tional research support was integrated in a national research policy framework only with this
law, at a period when reform intentions became widespread everywhere. This gave Switzer-
land the advantage of learning from other examples and to institutionalise the new institutions
in a flexible way. In this sense, Switzerland had the advantage of the latecomer though the
story is a bit more complicated when we look into the details (see below).
4.3.3 Convergence
The mid-1990s are a turning point in reform attempts of government. Efforts have become
much more determined and one finds a clear convergence in the design of reforms.
The turning point is felt in France since 1997 when the CNRS was confronted much stronger
than before with an active research minister and serious reform attempts. One can locate the
turning point in Germany in 1996 with a speech by the research minister on the reorganisation
of big science institutes and in general on strategic research. Even though the Netherlands have
continually reformed their extra-university research institutions, 1995, the date of the publica-
tion of the new White Paper, seems to have given a new impetus to government’s determined-
ness to reform their institutions. We find a series of reorganisations since then. Finally, in
Switzerland the turning point is not felt in the field of the extra-university research institutions
but in the more important field of universities. Here, the network approach has launched the
NCCR as a new instrument to link research in different universities together, in order to build
up centres of excellence in different relevant areas.
If one compares the discussions, the rhetoric and arguments, above all in the 3 countries with a
strong share of extra-university research institutions, a common denominator is emerging
where “stronger responsiveness, openness to industry; more flexibility; strategic thinking,
pro-active behaviour, and evaluation” are the key words. Without any doubt, one sees a new
concept of organising research institutes emerging in the 1990s. More in particular, one can
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briefly circumscribe the main ingredients of this concept in the following terms:
· The organisation in terms of research institutes is giving way to an organisation based
on programmes and collaboration between research institutes. At the same time this
collaboration is based on interdisciplinary research and not disciplinary research;
· Regularly, decision-making authorities responsible for different research institutes are
reserving a share of their income for innovative research instead of distributing all
money to their institutes;
· A diversification of funding is taking place. Institutional funding is becoming less im-
portant; programme funding and money from different sources is becoming more im-
portant;
· Interdisciplinarity is written in large in all policy designs;
· A more remote way of steering is announced, above all in the Netherlands and Ger-
many;
· Contractualisation is introduced everywhere as the most adequate way to overcome
organisational slack;
· Central powers are strengthened in organisations to react more quickly and more stra-
tegically;
· Researchers should have less tenure and show more mobility.
 This model takes hold of most political administrations because it seems conducive to the new
causal beliefs in the functioning of research institutions:
- They must be flexible in their potential to react to permanent changes on the intellec-
tual market and on the funding market;
- Research must be more directly linked to problems of society and the economy: inter-
disciplinary research and programme financing are ideal to make extra-university re-
search institutions work in this direction;
- More operational freedom enhances the efficiency of action;
- A better link to clients can be installed;
- Market and competition are better ways of organising research than security by public
funding.
Despite of these profound critical remarks and the deep-going reforms envisaged, extra-
university research institutions are seldom dissolved. Though there are intentions to integrate,
if possible, extra-university research institutions into universities, the majority of institutions
is maintained, because they are still seen as a necessary stock of knowledge in times of com-
plex and rapid change. In particular the link between the basic knowledge and the technological
trajectory can be better organised by these institutions, it is often believed, than by universi-
ties.
4.3.4 Developmental paths to reform
We find, therefore, a quite general and converging trend in our four countries, with a new
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model emerging. We are interested, given the different structures and traditions, how each
country has arrived at such a model. This should reveal us other particularities with regard to
the learning capacities of the countries compared to the ones we discovered when describing
programme funding.
Switzerland
Switzerland had no need to reform an existing system of extra-university research institutions
with considerable organisational slack and a high degree of veto-powers as we find it in Ger-
many or France. The reasons for this were primarily not due to a conscious choice of policy-
makers but to, on the one hand, federal conflicts of domain competence and, on the other hand,
direct democracy: it needed a careful campaign to install new competences for the federal gov-
ernment and a first attempt to introduce a federal research law – after a general acceptance of
the right of the federal government to subsidise research in 1968 and then in 1973 – in 1978
failed. Only in 1983, the federal government obtained the right to create and organise extra-
university research institutions.11 So, the federal government could fix its rules at that mo-
ment, i.e. at a time, the new paradigms were already developing and a general neo-liberal mood
was predominating in public policy-making in Europe. What is more, the liberal tradition of
policy-making in Switzerland as well as the relatively feeble resources of the federal govern-
ment in general did not lend itself to the establishment of expensive research institutions nei-
ther was there the intention to use research institutes as part of the federal administration. The
four larger research institutes that developed research for the federal administration (the “An-
nexanstalten”) were managed by the Council of the Federal Polytechnics and not by a minis-
try. The newly created group of research institutes according to article 16 of the research law
of 1983 were clearly regarded as a “subsidiary” instrument to existing institutions where uni-
versities received the highest priority in the research policy of the federal government. This
manifests a clear willingness to not build up own research domains but use the universities by
a stronger influence of the federal government in order to meet the challenges of the future.
While other countries were therefore confronted in the 1980s and 1990s with a strong extra-
university research system while the advantages of universities in meeting up to recent chal-
lenges became clearly visible, Switzerland was lucky in having always relied on universities.
While it was not a choice before 1983, it was a deliberate choice by policy-makers in 1983.
There are no indications that bad experiences in other countries with extra-university research
institutions played a role in this decision. In a way, the decision is path-dependent because
universities had been for such a long time the only institutions at hand and it seemed not right
or adequate to change this. In addition, this would have met strong resistance within the CUS,
the university council of Switzerland. There was perhaps also less urgence for the federal gov-
ernment to build up such a new sector because the two federal polytechnics did in some way
fulfil some of the functions of extra-university research institutions: they were technical-
oriented with a strong sense for applied research and are, until today, of an excellent quality in
                                                
11 The right to create and organise extra-university research institutions does not mean that the federal govern-
ment did not subsidise research institutions before. Since 1968 this was in principle possible. One finds there-
fore already the financing of several smaller research institutions and, above all, the federal government became
responsible for 4 so-called “Annexanstalten”, managed by the Council of the Federal Polytechnics.
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international comparison. The federal government had, therefore, in the form of universities,
assistance if it needed research efforts.
This does not mean that the federal government was able to “steer” the Council of the Poly-
technics. As the federal administration is in general rather weak and because for a long time
there were no strong political actors on the federal level that would have pushed forward a
political research strategy, the Council was always rather autonomous in decisions though
contacts with the federal administration were frequent. This has remained so even today. The
Council has own research funds it can use for the development of own projects (Gessler 2002)
and it has the responsibility for the “Annexanstalten”. The federal government has clearly
delegated the task of controlling these research institutions and of developing projects to the
Council. If one sees the development in the way the Council has dealt with these institutions,
one can notice for a long time a rather passive stance and a relative autonomy of the Annexan-
stalten. This has changed in the 1980s and above all since the beginning of the 1990s when
new public management ideas took hold of Switzerland. Since then contracts have been devel-
oped with these research institutes and the Council has started to be more pro-active and stra-
tegic. Several discussions on the future of the Annexanstalten demonstrate that there are no
guarantees of existence for these institutions in the existing form: integration into universities
and a larger autonomy are discussed as well as the creation of a holding organisation. At this
level, Switzerland has similar problems and solutions as the other countries.
The flexibility to reorganise extra-university research institutions is even more obvious in the
case of the institutes subsidised by article 16. These institutions are financed – with the excep-
tion of four institutes regarded as of enduring national importance – on a temporary base.
They are obliged to submit a budget every four years to the responsible Office and the state
secretary for research. The parliament finally decides on the acceptance of these budgets.
There are evaluations to make sure that existing institutes continue to have a task of particular
importance which cannot be fulfilled elsewhere. If this is not the case, the federal government
has the right to stop the funding ofsuch an institution or to condition its funding of this insti-
tutions to the integration of it within other existing institutions. One sees that in this case
there is no guarantee at all that such institutions can survive. The perennial problem of closing
down research institutes does not occur in Switzerland with the exception of the 4 institutes
with special importance and the four Annexanstalten. But even here, the parliament (in the
case of art. 16) or the Council of the federal Polytechnics can decide to abandon the financing
of these institutions or to reorganise them. There is therefore a high flexibility in using the ex-
tra-university research institutions in Switzerland.
Without any doubt, Switzerland is learning how to organise the relationships between respon-
sible bodies like the Council of the Polytechnics and research institutes in terms of public
management. Switzerland is in line with developments in other countries. And it had to learn
how to reorient thematically extra-university research institutions in the case of the “Paul-
Scherrer-Institut”, an agglomeration of former 7 research institutes specialised in nuclear re-
search. According to the Swiss consociational tradition a long process of negotiation with
propositions from the institutes, local politicians, federal government representatives and the
Council of the Polytechnics took place that started in the 1970s and ended in the beginning of
the 1990s with a compromise. This demonstrates that Switzerland is certainly not quicker in
solving organisational problems in the public-funded research system. The advantage is, once
again, that Switzerland did not need to reorient a large number of these kind of institutions.
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The lack of a long existing and diversified extra-university research system made it easy for
Switzerland to meet the model which is emerging in the 1990s in most OECD-countries.
France
France is the other extreme in terms of structure compared to Switzerland. We will only con-
sider the reforms that concern the CNRS.
The first step, as already indicated, for a stronger responsiveness of the CNRS was the new
research law in 1982. As already said, this marked the first step toward a stronger responsive-
ness of public-funded research institutions. The CNRS was a particular case because of its
responsibility for basic research in general and its firm anchoring within the scientific commu-
nity. The influence of the scientific community was even institutionalised in the Comité Na-
tional, considered as the “parliament of science”. At the same time – we discussed this – the
legacy of the institution and its function linked the CNRS directly to research policy-making.
For a long time, i.e. the creation of the DGRST (Délégation Générale à la Recherche Scienti-
fique et Technique) in 1958, the CNRS was even conceived as the legitimate political research
policy-making agency. This contradiction was always there. The new research law in 1982
attempted to clarify matters in demanding from all EPST (Etablissements publics à caractère
scientifique et technologique) to work closely together with the responsible research ministry
while granting more operational autonomy (among other things by a global budget) to these
institutions. Nevertheless, the ambivalence concerning who is responsible for the administra-
tion of the central structures of research remained. It is interesting, though, to see that, already
in 1982, France introduced a very “enlightened” administrative structure, similar to the new
public management model, without, however, defining any contracts. The main point was the
global budget, the CNRS had at its disposition from this time on.
Constitution and constitutional reality are two different things. This became clear in the fur-
ther development of the politics of the CNRS. There is no need to repeat all the different re-
form projects in detail here. Since that time we see a pattern of reform and resistance, of stop-
and-go that seems to endure until today. There are, however, important changes at the end of
the 1990s.
The stop-and-go pattern is characterised by two controversial tendencies: One is the attempt
of policy-makers to impose reforms on the CNRS, which, in due course, is not implemented.
The other are reform projects developed within the CNRS, which are not taken up by the re-
search ministry.
The first tendency can be explained by the internal structure of the CNRS as well as by the
“competitive character” of relations with the research ministry. The research ministry had the
authority to nominate all important positions within the CNRS. This was not enough to also
set through reform projects even if a reform-minded general director or president of the CNRS
was nominated. The internal structure was much too complex and decentralised to establish
reforms in a top-down fashion. Under the director-general, we find the directors of the differ-
ent departments within the CNRS and under the directors, there are the laboratories which
have, traditionally quite some independence in their management structures. In addition, the
National Council of the CNRS has “voice” in all decisions within the CNRS. One sees that a
policy based on decrees would not function within such a scientific institution and it never
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has. It needs the consent of researchers and department directors if the institution can be made
more responsive. The recent contractualisation, introduced in 2002, might be the right way in
this respect. As contracts force the CNRS to unite efforts and develop strategies to realise the
goals defined in the contracts, there will be a stronger push towards more coherence and coop-
eration between the different parts of the organisation. On the other hand, it is clear that, still,
the success depends in a general campaign to convince researchers within the CNRS to coop-
erate in the realisation of objectives. The results have still to be seen. The introduction of con-
tractualisation took a longer time than in Switzerland or the Netherlands. Today it has become,
though, the “golden rule” for developing a more flexible and programmatic-oriented public-
funded research system. Former attempts to introduce the new public management in universi-
ties demonstrate, however, how difficult it is in France to introduce the new management
strategy. Resistance come from two sides: from research institutions that do not want to co-
operate in national research strategies because they fear to loose their autonomy in research
and from the public administration that is afraid to loose its direct intervention capacity be-
cause of the larger operational freedom granted to research institutions (Braun and Merrien
1999).
The second tendency is caused by the “discontinuity of political authority”: there are several
instances in the history of the CNRS since 1982 where reform attempts within the CNRS are
abruptly disrupted because policy-makers change strategies (either because of a new govern-
ment or because of new constraints like budget deficits). There have been attempts within the
CNRS to develop a more strategy-minded policy or at least to make propositions in this sense
and to build up an inherent consensus on these points. Each time, however, a new government
ends such reform attempts and a new reflection is started with new actors and without – and
this seems to be the most astonishing and disquieting point we have found – making reference
to former studies and reflections. Such ignorance is not always due to a change in party col-
ours of the government. Even another minister of the same party can have a completely differ-
ent way to deal with research policy issues. The frequent changes in the institutional position
of the research ministry and the frequent changes of ministers as well as of nominated general
directors and presidents of the CNRS, have made it impossible to develop a strong and conse-
quent policy vis-à-vis the CNRS. This must be seen as the major structural problem of France
in dealing with its extra-university research institutions: Given the size and the very strong
anchoring of the CNRS within the scientific community as well as because of its “institutional
legacy”, only a long term policy can have a chance to eventually change the institution. It
needs a policy elite that is willing to put pressure on the CNRS and that has a “project” to
overcome the organisational rigidities. Otherwise, institutions will pursue their “paths”. The
contractualisation is a step in the right direction but it will possibly not be enough to introduce
responsiveness as a second point of reference within the CNRS. This can be learnt from the
Netherlands where we find a similar resistance of the NWO and where a consequent policy
has in the end contributed to a change in identity of the NWO (see below).
Another feature is that a confrontational attitude of policy-makers vis-à-vis the CNRS is con-
demned to fail. The example of the policies under the minister Allègre, at the end of the 1990s,
demonstrates that an interventionist and top-down policy will meet double resistance of ac-
tors within the CNRS. For the first time, the National Committee gathered all forces to resist
such an attempt to steer from outside. The positive effect, however, has been that from this
emerged a report with own propositions of reform that seemed reasonable enough. The new
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minister, however, would not hear the outcome of these reflections and initiated new reforms.
This example reveals that reforms within the CNRS are not originating from own needs and
problem perceptions but are always a result of external political pressure. The reforms in 1988
undertaken by a reform-minded general director confirm this rule as the new director was cho-
sen for his reform capacities.
Learning capacities in France seem to be particularly low when it comes to the reorganisation
of extra-university research institutions into the direction of more responsiveness. The unclear
domains of competence and a changing mood for intervention at the political level prepare the
grounds for a “competitive mode of learning” without continuity. These seems to be a ten-
dency to “reinvent the wheel”, early reform attempts in the 1980s are interrupted by political
decisions and the implicit resistance of the lower levels in the CNRS make radical changes very
difficult. The necessary consensus for reform cannot be created in such a “thrust and riposte
pattern”. The outcome confirms this pattern: Until today there have been no major changes in
the functioning of the CNRS – despite of far-going propositions - and the case of the ACI has
demonstrated that there are still problems to make CNRS scientists behave according to a re-
sponsive mode. Without any doubt, one finds a stronger political pressure since 1997, like in
the other countries. The contractualisation is the only visible outcome until now, which dem-
onstrates that France has just started its reform process.
The propositions developed within the CNRS since 1997, which have finally served as the
base for the contracts starting in 2002, demonstrate that France is approaching the “ideal
model” sketched above. In the former study “CNRS-Avenir”, initiated by the CNRS director
C. Bréchignac under the pressure of the research minister, already a stronger coordination be-
tween the different departments and scientific council is recommended; more mobility of the
personnel and less tenure become primary goals; and the Comité National is supposed to be
organised along the lines of programmes and not disciplines. In the “establishment project” of
2001, which has been prepared by the foresight exercise “Reflexion Strategique” implemented
in january 2001 by the new CNRS direction, three priority areas are installed, with a strong
emphasis on the increase of responsiveness within the CNRS; a more pro-active attitude is
demanded, as well as the construction of partnerships within the CNRS and with outside in-
stitutions. The new priority areas will be implemented on all levels of the CNRS and not re-
main just an announcement from above. This is, of course, a long-term project. Continuing
evaluations will become a central part of the new “strategic research” to be developed.
Though these new fundaments of the contracts contain many elements of the new reform
model, one is still not sure how the CNRS will be able to realise these objectives more con-
cretely. There have been good intentions in the past of the CNRS and reform projects failed. It
remains to be seen if the new form of contracts can more radically change the attitudes of re-
searchers in the organisation and transform the CNRS into a “strategic” agency participating
directly within the general research policy. One has to remember that there has been, again, a
governmental change in 2002, which may forebode, once again, new reform projects. It has to
be admitted though that the new contracts are the most serious attempt so far and the overall
reform mood seems to enhance the chances of the project. In addition, these contracts have a
time-horizon until 2005, which leaves small room for the actual government to embark on a
completely different course. This progress in reform attempts must, without any doubts, be
ascribed to the general change in the “referential global”: new public management has become a
legitimate intervention and organisation strategy in all fields of public administration. It is this
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diffusion, which has driven reform attempts with regard to the CNRS further than before.
While France is, therefore, slowly converging with other countries concerning the contents of
reforms, it seems to less impressed by best practices than other countries. Our studies reveal
that foreign examples of institutional reform are only serving as trump cards in the discussions
between actors but are not really evaluated and used in the reform projects. In this way,
France still demonstrates its closed character.
There is one last point we should evoke in understanding learning capacities in institutional
funding of France: This is the authority relationship between the CNRS and the research min-
istry. The so-called “tutelle” means supervision and surveillance but not explicitly hierarchical
intervention (Braun 1994). Given the fundamental tasks ascribed to the CNRS in research
policy, it would be difficult to install such a hierarchical relationship. Since the beginning, the
CNRS was conceived in corporatist terms, i.e. as an institutionalised meeting place of the sci-
entific community and policy-makers. As the state failed to develop an institutional base that
could act as a representative within the CNRS, the CNRS gradually became more a body of
self-organising fundamental research. Its function of contributing to research policy-making
has, however, remained. One should therefore see the relationship as one of two heavy
weights, which are – this was repeatedly said – often competitors because their domains are
not clearly delimitated.
The power resources, the research ministry has vis-à-vis the CNRS are threefold: one is the
budget and the second are nominations of key positions within the CNRS (president of the
administrative council, director-general, directors of departments, one third of representatives
within the Comité National). The third is the participation in the administrative council in
order to discuss the budget and prepare recommendations for the research ministry. These are,
of course, important powers if one wants to “irritate” (cf. Luhmann) the CNRS. In addition,
the research ministry does not need the parliament to take short-term action in research policy
as a simple decree suffices. Formal powers, then, are clearly top-sided but that does not give
yet the right or the capacity to make the organisation behave in a certain way. As we have
stipulated several times, the CNRS maintains a large room for interpreting the general policy
lines of the research ministry and the decentralised structure contributes to further contingen-
cies in the implementation of these policy lines. Moreover, such formal powers only lend real
powers if the research ministry pursues a consequential and long-term policy strategy, which,
as has been shown, has not been the case. Though the research ministry has, therefore, never
explicitly developed the philosophy of a “steering at a distance” or of a “global steering” as in
the Netherlands and in Germany, it depends on the cooperation of the CNRS to implement its
policy lines. The contractualisation is seen as a way to better link CNRS and research ministry
policies in a medium-term perspective.  
Germany
We have already discussed the failure of reform attempts of big science institutes in Germany
in the 1970s. This situation seems to be comparable to France: the big science institutes have
an enormous size in terms of budget and personnel which makes that sunk costs to close them
down are very high. Attempts to reorient these “dinosaurs”, as critical tongues called them in
the 1970s, failed, both because of internal resistance of the management and researchers and
only half-heartedly intervention by the research ministry. The difference between the CNRS
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and the big science institutes is that the big science institutes in Germany are directly under
control of the research ministry and that they are not supposed to fulfil any major strategic
coordination or regulatory functions in research policy. The relationship between the research
ministry and the big science institutes is much more straightforward: the research institutes are
the agents and the research ministry is the principal. Even in this case, however, there is no
hierarchical intervention capacity: the “global steering”-philosophy developed in the 1970s
and reiterated recently in the latest reform attempts, meant a combination of strategic guidance
by the research ministry and operational freedom of the big science institutes.12 This combina-
tion seems not to have other implications than in France: the “power of the purse” (with the
federal government paying 90% and the Land where the big science institute is located pays
10%) gives an influential say in strategic decisions of big science institutes but the organisa-
tional structure and operational freedom of these institutions makes “a hierarchical and de-
tailed political direction of research activities impossible” (Winnes and Schimank 1999: 135).
This relative freedom of big science institutes is strengthened by an alliance between the re-
sponsible Land and the big science institute in question because each Land has an interest –
because of employment, status, diffusion effects – to keep its big science institute.
This constellation – “global steering”, double “tutelle” by the federal government and the Land
government; the size and organisation structures of big science institutes; the big science insti-
tutes as a power base for the research ministry in a very differentiated and dualist public-
funded research system – resulted in the same failure of reforms as in France. One has to admit
though that, after the 1970s, the institutional reforms were less important for the research
ministry. One sees a resurgence of the issue – and now it concerns not only the big science
institutes but also the research institutes financed by both the Länder and the federal govern-
ment (the so-called “Blue List Institutes”) and, later on, even the Max-Planck-Society – in the
mid-1990s. At the same time, the big science institutes are creating a stronger holding organisa-
tion the “Hermann-von-Helmholtz Gemeinschaft Deutscher Großforschungseinrichtungen”
(HGF). This creation must already be seen as a reaction to an increasing political pressure on
the big science institutes to become more efficient and responsive in times of severe budget
crisis. A concentration of resources was need and clear priorities should be developed. The
HGF was supposed to install more centralised powers and a stronger cohesion and coopera-
tion between the different big science institutes. Such a holding organisation has somewhat
ambiguous effects: on the one hand it allows an easier access of the research ministry to the big
science institutes because the HGF can be used as a delegate and intermediary, which has more
powers to realise objectives that have been agreed upon with policy-makers than the former
“working association” (AGF). On the other hand such an organisation – and this was certainly
the intention of the institution-builders in the big science institutes – can create a stronger
identity of this type of research organisation and defend the interests better than dispersed big
science institutes can. In this way, the HGF and its big science institutes has become much
more a type of organisation comparable to the CNRS in France.
Things started to change already by the organisational reforms due to the reunification
                                                
12 We recall this philosophy: The state “lays down the overall research goals and the overall financial contribu-
tions. It setzs priorities, coordinates the activities of the research institutions, ensures an objective and effective
evaluation and takes care for an economic and efficient use of public resources [..] within this framework applies
the principle of independence and autonomy of the research institutions; in scientific and technological questions
the decisive weight of the representatives of science and technology shall be insured” (BMFT 1974).
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(Mayntz 1992; Stucke 1992; Stucke 1992). After a long process of negotiation, three former
Academy Institutes of East Germany were transformed into big science institutes. This gave
the opportunity to modernise the organisational structures of these institutions with the im-
mediate consequence that the big science institutes in the West were confronted with obvi-
ously well functioning and modernised big science institutes in the East. This difference made
it once again clear that organisational reforms could contribute to a better functioning of big
science institutes.
The next step was the decision in the federal cabinet in 1996 to evaluate the big science insti-
tutes from a systemic point of view. Evaluation was delegated to the Science Council who
already had some experience with the evaluation of research institutes and universities. In ad-
dition, the Science Council was predestined to also develop more comprehensive and encom-
passing views on the public-funded research systems in Germany. The demand to have a sys-
temic evaluation was, nevertheless, something which was new. Until then, research institutes
and institutes at universities had been evaluated from a micro-perspective, according to the
scientific qualities in research. Now, the evaluation was expanded to develop a better under-
standing of the very differentiated research system and to reflect at the same time on the posi-
tion of each type of research organisation within this system. Recent working groups in the
Science Council are considering the problem how to introduce a more strategic orientation in
the public-funded research system. The task of the Science Council was, therefore, this time
not to see how the individual big science institutes function but how the aggregate, the group
of big science institutes, is working and fitting into the public-funded research system13.
The reason why this was delegated to the German Science Council was, without any doubt,
also because of budget deficits but the willingness to impose a more thorough analysis of the
different types of research organisations was certainly the most important consideration.
Other evaluations were dedicated to the “Blue List” and – this could not be imposed – to the
Max-Planck-Society and the DFG. There was therefore a new willingness to overcome the
fragmented action of functioning in the public-funded research systems and for this “systemic
evaluations” seemed to be the right way. The fact that this was done by the Science Council
was important because any recommendations emerging from this body would have a high le-
gitimacy because both scientists and politicians were participating in the decisions. The danger
was much more that any recommendations would be based on the smallest denominator in the
Science Council and thus radical reforms would be prevented. As it is, one can demonstrate
that there have been more radical reform attempts in the beginning and that this was somewhat
boiled down. Nevertheless, the result concerning the big science institutes was nevertheless a
break with traditional ways of organising these institutions.
The research ministry had already started in 1997 to impose on big science institutes that they
reserve 5% of their institutional funding to strategic purposes and distribute this money on the
base of research applications. The procedures of allocation followed the usual peer review
procedures. A special committee of the Senate of the HGF decided on the demands. It is
noteworthy that this way of making the big science institutes more responsive did not work
                                                
13 “to identify systemic deficits and thus reach conclusions on structural aspects and produce generally applicable
recommendations. There, the concept of system evaluation clearly contrasts with the traditional approach to
analysing and managing large-scale research, where the main focus was on the work of individual research cen-
tres” (Wissenschaftsrat, 2001: 1).
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out. The strategic funds was stopped shortly after because the procedures of distributing the
money remained within the usual “old boys network” style. Innovative projects were there-
fore seldom found. It was clear that a more radical change was needed in order to arrive at a
more fundamental reorientation of the big science institutes. This was done on the base of the
Science Council report.
The Science council recommended to “enhance the strengths of the HGF by focusing its work
on high-profile activities and by improving internal coordination processes. For this to be
achieved, the Science Council recommends fundamental changes to the structures and proc-
esses used for strategic decision making concerning the work of the HGF” (Wissenschaftsrat
2001). The way to concentrate activities on high-profile activities  - which, by the way, meant
simply responsive research activities – was conceived in terms of a fundamental restructuring
of the mode of institutional funding: The individual big science institutes and their different
research laboratories are maintained but, in order to obtain their funding they must learn to fit
within broad programmatic lines that are developed by an elaborate process: Policy-makers
can announce their thematic preferences, which are transferred to the Senate who launches an
evaluation procedure in different committees. The Senate finally recommends on the basis of
recommendations from this procedure what thematic priorities should be chosen and how
much money should be distributed to these areas. The policy-makers as the financing institu-
tions decide in the last instance on the budget for these research areas. It is then up to the big
science institutes to apply for money within these research fields. In this way only 20% of
the money is allocated by the former procedure of institutional funding in order to maintain
the basic infrastructure within institutes. The other 80% are allocated in the form of pro-
gramme funds. This does still not guarantee that no old boy networks will abuse the procedure
but there are more safety nets involved in this procedure. The Senate remains, however, re-
sponsible for the selection of the projects. Together with the coordinator and in agreement
with the directorates of the Helmholtz Centres, the President then prepares a proposal. Based
on this proposition, the financing partners prepare their notification of award of funds to the
Parliament, which must in the end decide on the budget (HGF 2001). In this way, the big sci-
ence institutes have realised what was suggested in “CNRS-Avenir” as a major reform of the
Comité National, i.e. to organise this council on the base of programmes and not disciplines.
Within the HGF, profound changes have taken place based on the recommendations of the
German Science Council: the Senate has become a true centre with encompassing decision
authority. The Senate is composed of the research minister and two research ministers from
the Länder, external scientists, a large number of industry representatives, the finance minis-
ters, representatives from the different boundary organisations, two parliamentary representa-
tives and the president of the HGF who presides the Senate. In addition, guests can partici-
pate. One recognises that this is a corporatist body indeed with a large representation from all
over the research system. In fact, the HGF itself is underrepresented, which gives hope that
final decisions are not decisions avoiding confrontations with the interests of the individual big
science institutes. In addition, it is obvious that the Senate cannot be seen as a pure body of
presenting the collective interests of the individual big science institutes. It is a corporatist
body where compromises are found between a large number of different interests. Industrial
stakeholders are participating in the policy development.
The programme mode of funding was conceived in order to also enhance the cooperation be-
tween different institutes. Laboratories from different institutes can cooperate to apply for
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funds. A former proposition by the Science Council to also allow other institutes from the
Blue List to participate in the programmes was, however, refused. This demonstrates that
resources are still treated as a “closed shop” with all dangers of the old boy network mentality
that this promulgates.
In sum, one sees an astonishing turnaround of the treatment of extra-university research insti-
tutions, in particular with regard to the big science institutes, since 1997. Though one may be
sceptic with regard to the actual results of the turnaround – it is still too early to see how it
actually works – it is already clear that – similar to France – the reforms are more far-going
than one could have imagined. Many points of the reform come, in addition, near to the “ideal
model” we have sketched above. Above all the change from an institutionalisation of funding
on the lines of institutes to a funding based on programmes seems to be a radical turn de-
manding a much stronger responsive and cooperative attitude of researchers and institutes. It
is indeed in this way that one can think that the reform might succeed: while France has con-
cluded contracts with the CNRS but has not changed its internal allocation structures, Ger-
many has not introduced contracts but relies completely on programme funding. It seems to us
that this can be the more promising road as it leaves no room to escape for individual entities
and researchers in big science institutes to think in terms of responsiveness. Everything de-
pends, however, on how the themes were won and formulated and how much responsibility is
asked within these programmes. With this construction, Germany has – at least with regard to
the big science institutes – followed the Netherlands which has already before introduced
similar measures of responsiveness (see below).
Important elements of the turn were the adding of “modernised elements” within the group of
big science institutes due to the reunification. This initiated a new thinking on the functioning
of these organisations. Second, continuing budget deficits that forced government to think in
terms of efficiency. Third, the willingness to think in terms of the system as a whole, which
was, without any doubt, stimulated by the spread of “systems of innovation” theories. The
systemic approach forced all actors to think in terms of the whole rather than in individual and
egotistic categories. Fourth, the Science Council was an important institutional element. With-
out the compromise-building within this institution and, at the same time, its experience in
delivering large-scale and encompassing studies, each reform would have failed. Fifth, it was
certainly easier to reform the big science institutes which are overwhelmingly financed by the
federal government than the other extra-university research institutions which are financed
most of the time for half by the Länder. In this case, the research ministry had a predominant
voice in the overall process. The big science institutes had already strengthened their unity and
their voice in the reform process by setting up a more centralised organisation, the HGF. But
this organisation became, after recommendations by the Science Council, a corporatist body
that cannot any longer just defend the selfish interests of the big science institutes.
The learning process took a long time in Germany. This is comparable to France. Only the
general reform mood since the mid-90s initiated a new élan that, this time was seized by pol-
icy-makers. The “systemic analysis” seems to have been the most important element in the
learning process: it was new and innovative and prepared the common grounds for a more
radical reform. In the end, the big science institutes could not any longer oppose the winds of
change and had to adapt to the new features of research.
Again, we find similar elements compared to the ideal reform model: the reservation of money
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for innovative activities was the beginning of reform attempts and the final programme funds
follow this logic; the whole organisation is now funded on the lines of programmes thought the
organisation as such has not been changed; the new thematic priorities demand more interdis-
ciplinarity in funding; powers within the organisation have been centralised; and the state de-
fends a policy of “global steering”: the position within the Senate and the authority of the
Senate within the programm formulation process is conceived in this sense: it ensures policy-
makers of a considerable influence in presenting thematic priorities as well as of the final deci-
sion-making powers what should be accepted and how much should be paid. What kind of
projects are proposed is a bottom-up process and the organisation of research remains the
prerogative of the institutes. Though no special contracts are set up this can be regarded as an
equivalent form of managing these institutions.
Netherlands
Project funding was one means to start up a narrower cooperation between the scientific sys-
tem and industry in the Netherlands. Dutch policy-makers were, however, since the beginning
well aware that this might not suffice. As long as the public-funded research institutions were
cut off from other systems and as long as there were no stronger incentives than just a few
program funds, one could not hope to structurally change the system. As in France and Ger-
many, the diagnosis was very clear: The public-funded research system, including technology-
oriented TNO, possessed research institutions strongly anchored in the scientific community
and without any openings to user systems. Universities were heavily criticised as well as the
main scientific funding organisation ZWO because of their disinterestedness in the utility of
their products. With the “Nota Wetenschapsbeleid” in 1974 this attitude was no longer ac-
cepted. The science-push model was beginning to loose credibility and did never recover ever
after. The policy aim was to open up research and funding institutions to user interests and
introduce utility as a second point of organisational reference. This needed organisational re-
forms and – in the end – a new governance structure in the public-funded research system
leading to more flexibility, responsibility and accountability. It is our impression that the re-
form intentions in the Netherlands have been – since the beginning in 1974 – more encom-
passing, directed to all public-funded research institutions, than in the other countries. It was
actually a “system reform”. The astonishing point is that this aim was pursued gradually with
different governments and with persistence until today. There may have been modifications of
earlier projects and strategies, but the original claim to “open up” public-funded research insti-
tutions, universities included, remained unchanged. “Strategic research”, as van der Meulen and
Rip have baptised this policy strategy (Meulen and Rip 2001), has been a permanent project
of policy-makers in the Netherlands.  
This aim was realised in several steps. Formally, the new statutes of universities, the TNO
and the funding agency, the NOW, were all changed in the 80s under the Christian-democratic
– liberal government. The big science institutes followed in the 1990s as well as the KNAW-
Institutes. The time lag between announcement and achievement demonstrates the intense
discussions these reorganisations induced. Even after reforms were accomplished, one can
demonstrate that organisational adaptation to the new thinking needed again a considerable
time. It is our impression that now, in the beginning of the 21st century, the reforms started in
1974 have indeed been accomplished and a new public-funded research system has been set in
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motion. This means about 25 years of discussion, conflicts, formalisation, organisational re-
forms and change in the Dutch public-funded research system. The “polder-model” needs time
but it seems that it is able to achieve profound institutional change in the end.
One should not hide that there was a second drive at work for organisational reforms in the
public-funded research system, i.e. austerity measures. The wish to reduce the expenditure of
the state led to a search for more efficiency and higher quality of state services and strategies
that could realise this aim. The “new managerialism” seemed to be one means, more “goal-
rationality” in the use of funding resources another. The new managerialism led not only to
organisational reforms but also to a revision of the “principal-agent relationship” in the public-
funded research system. Goal-rationality in funding demanded that the use of funding re-
sources was linked to specific goals and that there was an evaluation in how far these aims
were reached in the end. This meant a revision of the financial structures in the public-funded
research system from an institutional and global funding model to a more directed mode of
funding. This had implications for all research and funding institutions. More efficiency meant
also a revision of the distribution of tasks and functions in the public-funded research sys-
tems. Research institutes should develop their own profile on the “funding market” as well as
unite forces in order to make it possible to concentrate resources. Finally, similar to Germany,
flexibility in organisational responses to an increasingly complex and changing environment
became a preoccupation of policy-makers.
The lines of organisational reforms in the 80s were therefore set out: openness to user sys-
tems; a more efficient and flexible management, a stronger directed funding component, evalua-
tion and specialisation and cooperation with other research institutions.
The organisational reforms of making research institutions more responsive started in the
1980s first with the universities, the TNO, and then the ZWO, which became the NWO.
Recipes of how to do reforms were quick at hand perhaps because the Netherlands had their
own intellectual resources in this respect and because of the long tradition of “corporatism”,
i.e. the guided delegation of public tasks to semi-private or private organisations, which was
conducive to the new ideas of delegating responsibilities and granting operational autonomy.14
Though new public management was not yet en vogue, there were similar thoughts in adminis-
trative sciences in the Netherlands which were already propagated in the beginning of the
1980s (Kickert 1998). This turnaround in ideas of organising the state occurred at about the
same time as the other important changes in the thinking on science and technology policy
(idem: 18). The administrative turnaround envisaged the creation of private or semi-public
“autonomous administrative units” (ZBO; “zelfstandige bestuursorganen”), which had to im-
plement public tasks while the state remained responsible in last resort. Overall, 50 such new
administrative units were created between 1983 and 1991 (idem: 28). The Netherlands have
been very active in matters of a reorganisation of public administration: we find no less than 6
different propositions between 1972 and 1993, which discussed the efficiency and flexibility
of public administration (Frissen 1998: 31-33). These propositions were not always along the
same lines: we find more network-oriented propositions and more efficiency-oriented proposi-
                                                
14 Frissen contends that the process of autonomisation is deeply rooted in the Dutch tradition of subsidiarity and
corporatism. Similar kinds of independent agencies have already existed before. “Functional decentralisation” has
always been an important feature of Dutch administrative organisation (Frissen 1998: 22).
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tions with quite different recommendations. Nevertheless, a new steering philosophy was
emerging in this context, which merged later on with new public management ideas.
Kickert resumes the new intervention philosophy by using the terms “steering at a distance”
(“sturen op afstand”) and “steering on the base of political guidelines” (“sturen op hoofdli-
jnen”). These terms began to dominate the discussions on state intervention and have remained
so until today. The new philosophy can be seen as a paradigmatic change in the governance of
public tasks. What exactly do the new terms mean in comparison to “tutelle” in France and
“global steering” in Germany?
The main thought is to distinguish “steering” and “rowing” (see (Osborne and Gaebler 1992)),
in Dutch between “bestuur” and “beheer”. Political administration in ministries should, in the
future, not any longer be concerned by how to do it, but only by what to do.15 The knowledge
of “how to do it” should become the rationale of the new independent agencies. Operational
autonomy of these agencies was conceived to raise the efficiency of effectiveness of imple-
mentation of public tasks. At the same time, the public administration had more time to con-
centrate on the rationale of the political system, i.e. to develop guidelines in policy areas.
Quite comparable to the “new public management”, contracts with negotiated tasks for inde-
pendent agencies should be concluded between the responsible ministry and its agencies (idem:
28-9). These contracts contained also the budget for a certain period. Until recently, however,
the budget had to be approved each year by parliament. Today, there is a longer time-span of
four years. The agencies obtained the right to decide on their own how they would like to use
their financial resources (“zelfbeheer”). The budget based on capacities (“input”) should be
replaced by a budget oriented to the output, i.e. the performance of these agencies (idem: 68).
More independence needed, however, also more control and therefore more information on the
activities of agencies. A more elaborated, systematic, and regular information system on the
activities of agencies was therefore created. Evaluation became a keyword and, in the long run,
a standardised procedure for all research institutions.
The most important point perhaps, characterising the new governance, is the change in
authority relationships between the ministry and independent agencies:  The Netherlands fully
adopted the system of “contracts”. Contracts put agencies and ministries at an equal level to
negotiate the conditions of the contract. Of course, independent agencies had no alternative
and could not just step out of negotiations. Nevertheless, in comparison with hierarchy, a sys-
tem of contracts gave agencies the possibility to bring in their points of view and search for a
consensus with the ministry about goals and budget. One should not forget, however, that still
both sides have different functions and that the contract only serves to make sure that policy
formulation is linked in an effective way with policy implementation. For Kickert then
“steering at a distance” meant nevertheless not less steering but just another way of steering
(idem: 160-1). The overall rationale is to remove administrative inefficiencies and to foster
flexibility and innovation. It is here, where the link with the research system can be made. The
                                                
15 This should, as Frissen explains, strengthen the political importance because now policy-makers can focus on
the essence of politics: make decisions. This does not mean, however, that politics has more power: While at the
one hand, politics can focus on decision-making, autonomisation also means less influence because there are
processes of implementation which can not be directly steered and because new actors are entering the arena and
developing policies together with the implementing agencies. It is exactly this last point which limits the politi-
cal influence: network-building without the government makes it difficult to influence the processes within these
networks (Frissen 1998: 28).
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more complex environment, rapid changes in knowledge development and the imperative of
societal and economic needs induce flexible and innovative organisation. The changing govern-
ance paradigm corresponded to this functional pressure and envisaged to create exactly the
kind of public administration in general and the kind of public-funded research system in par-
ticular it needed to raise the productivity, quality, and efficiency of public services.
More concretely, the changes meant that the agencies received a global budget (no more dis-
tinction between salaries and other material expenditures) and that they could make medium-
and long-term financial planning. A very important point is nevertheless that operational
autonomy did not mean independence from budget decisions of government and parliament.
The fixation of the global budget depended on the budget policy of government and parliament
with the consequence that all these organisational reforms took place while austerity measures
were enacted and the budget of agencies did not rise. If therefore the government decides to cut
down expenditures, this has an effect on the budget of independent agencies. In this way, the
medium- and long-term financial planning did not mean more independence and security for
agencies.
The Dutch version of agency independence is therefore a very “controlled autonomy” and this
should be kept in mind in order to understand the learning capacities in the Dutch public-
funded research system. It is not intended to reduce the role of the ministry, above all not in
the domain of OCW, which had a long tradition of state interventionism. The main policy lines
and control by an intense interaction between agencies and the ministry remained the authority
of the ministry. In a certain way, granting more operational autonomy was conceived to have
a stronger grip on agencies in the public-funded research systems.
It seems to us that both the active and interventionist stance in France at the end of the 1990s
and the global steering idea used in guiding the big science institutes in Germany are based on
very much the same ideas. The intentions of research ministries has never been to abandon
powers but only to have a more efficient and effective system which can be better guided by
political rationales. Despite of this, the new “operational freedom” engenders without any
doubt its own dynamics that might not correspond to these guiding intentions of ministries.
This overview demonstrates that the Netherlands were gradually developing both in terms of
finances and regulations, a model which comes near to the ideal model described above. One
can speak of one model because, despite of differences corresponding to the different func-
tions of research institutions (more basic science oriented or more technology oriented), the
reforms have changed most research institutions in a similar direction. A centralisation of deci-
sion-making powers has been realised everywhere in order to break with the strong “bottom-
up” influence of the scientific community within these institutions; Contracts are concluded
both with holding organisations and with research institutes; evaluation with external peer
review is obligatory and sophisticated; financing is usually based on three financial streams:
depending on the kind of research institution (basic research or not) global institutional funding
is the first stream (often, as in Germany, not contributing more than 20% of resources), a sec-
ond stream is negotiated directly with several ministries which are interested in the kind of
research a research institute offers, the ministry is prepared to pay research infrastructure for
the research it is interested in and offers programme funds; finally, research institutes must
find their money on the “market”, i.e. with funding agencies, industry, foundations etc.; hold-
ing organisations always have reserved some money for innovation purposes; interdisciplinar-
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ity is, of course, valued very prominently in research proposals by institutes; collaboration
with other institutes and with universities is strengthened and required.
One can say that the Netherlands have institutionalised this model to a much far-going degree
than France or Germany, which have just started their new institutional models. There are
permanent discussions and modifications but in general one can say that “strategic research” is
part of the organisational culture of all research institutions today in the Netherlands. In this,
they are certainly more advanced than the other three countries.
What explains this success? Several factors seem important:
· The most important push factor has certainly been austerity. The Netherlands fol-
lowed a rigid regime of budget discipline since the beginning of the 1980s which had
consequences for all public policy sectors. Efficiency was and is the buzzword for
policy-makers both in the government and in parliament. With a determinate “political
stream” in this sense, the research sector had no chance to oppose to the cuts in the re-
search budget nor to the “efficiency measures” in institutional terms. The negotiations
concerning the statutes and internal organisations, the contracts and finances were in-
fluenced by this superior principle of austerity.
· The second factor is without any doubt the strong centralist tradition which – and this
is important – is linked to an extensive “voice” process in decision-making. Neither
Germany nor Switzerland with their federal state dispose of such a centralised power
as the education minister. France is lacking, on the other hand, the “voice” process in
decision-making. It is probably this unique combination of centralism and “voice” that
is conducive to an elevated level of learning. This centralism can be observed in the
predominant position of the education ministry in the organisation of the public-
funded research system and its interventionist tradition in regulating affairs both in
education and research. If the ministry has decided on a strategy it has a large number
of prerogatives to realise this strategy. This power is strengthened by the otherwise
high fragmentation and even conflictive relations between boundary organisations. If
these organisations do not unite and develop a common strategy vis-à-vis OCW, as it
happened when the research minister wanted to unite all KNAW and NWO institutes
into one research society (1995/1996), the ministry has important leeway to set
through its intentions.
· “Voice” is, as said, an important part of the process of decision-making of the minis-
try, though. Boundary organisations have their say when strategic plans at the political
level are developed and there are extensive and intensive negotiations at the administra-
tive level between the organisations and the ministry to develop the more concrete
strategic plans of the boundary organisations. The long and all-including aggregation
process guarantees that all important forces are heard and – most of the time – also re-
spected in the decisions of the ministry. Only seldom will research themes be imposed.
This institutionalised “voice” is an important “cement” for the stability of the Dutch
public-funded research system. A hierarchical strategy by OCW would have much less
chances to be implemented. Even in the process of organisational reforms, therefore,
organisations were not confronted as such with a decision by policy-makers, but it was
a long process of negotiation which, in the end, resulted in the new organisational
model. It was the cohesion of the central actor, the education ministry, though that
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made it possible to realise a somewhat coherent model for most organisations in the re-
search system.
· Without any doubt, the corporatist tradition of functional delegation has also played
its role in making boundary organisations acquiescent to political “irritation”. Taking
public responsibilities and think in terms of public responsibilities belong to the “leg-
acy” and “culture” of Dutch institutions, even though this may have played a lesser
role in the research sector. There is less resistance in comparison to for example Ger-
many, to accept public responsibilities as long as, of course, the state accepts “voice”
and a certain degree of freedom of these institutions.
· Moreover, the frequent use of review committees in the reorganisation process, though
not systemic, have helped to create a more “objective look” on the problems of the re-
search sector. In addition, we find encompassing analyses and “White Papers” that
stipulate the problems and general strategic lines to follow. It is difficult for the various
boundary organisations to negate these reports.
4.3.5 Concluding remarks
Again, we find that regulatory policies in institutional funding are clearly converging between
the four countries in question. Though there are differences in the timing of introduction and
variations in the precise application, the ideal model of reform discussed in the beginning of
the chapter can be found in broad terms in all countries. Even in Switzerland where extra-
university research institutions are rare, new public management delivers the blue print for
organisational reform. The three most important elements are:
- A shift from institutional global funding to institutional programmatic funding. This is
the most obvious and dramatic in Germany, where the big science institutes receive
80% of their funding under the new formula. Part of the institutional funding in the
Netherlands is defined on the base of commonly agreed programmes with ministries,
another part is project funding on the “funding market. In France there have been sev-
eral attempts to reserve some money for the responsive mode of funding. This formula
did not succeed. Today the priority areas defined in the contract must serve this pur-
pose. Switzerland, finally, uses programme funds to connect university research and
concentrate it on promising areas. This can be regarded as institutional programmatic
funding because universities are deeply involved in the management of these centres of
excellence and a part of the money of the federal government reserved for university
research is distributed in this way. In addition, it is a long-term programme.
- Competitive funding is the second element. A 100% funding by institutional public
funds is no longer tolerated. Research institutes are supposed to find additional re-
sources in competition with other research institutes. This is the most obvious in the
Netherlands where ministries are allocating their research money in an open tender in-
stead of giving it to “their” research institutions. However, big science institutes and
other public-funded research institutions in Germany are equally supposed to find
their money with funding agencies or other sources. In France such a process of look-
ing for industrial and other money was first introduced in the more thematic oriented
“grands organismes”. It is still less obvious in the CNRS.
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- Evaluation, finally, has become a common procedure policy-makers use in all countries
to make sure that research organisations are working efficiently.
 These three elements are supposed to create the necessary openness of public-funded research
institutions to other clients than the state and to flexibilise internal decision-making.
 The convergence in policy ideas and – finally – in the policy regime concerning institutional
funding can very probably explained by a number of factors:
- In all countries the “reféréntiel global” is changing: the state is supposed to intervene
less directly but make sure that the research institutions “row”;
- The diffusion of new public management ideas has structured policy ideas how to or-
ganise this process;
- Economic pressures and the comparative advantages of generic technologies in combi-
nation with ideas from the “systems of innovation” have made governments sensitive
to the functioning and above all failures of the public-funded research systems;
- The OECD has played an important part in diffusing critical ideas and “best prac-
tices”;
- Budget deficits have been a most important factor to think about efficiency and con-
centration of resources.
The encompassingness of the reforms still differs between countries, though: It is the most
far-going in the Netherlands where all public-funded research institutions are falling under the
new model. Germany has started with the big science institutes but attempts to define similar
rules for the “Blue List” institutes and “strategic thinking” is even becoming a preoccupation
of the Max-Planck-Society, though policy-makers cannot oblige this association to accept
such reforms. The reforms in France have been more profound and far-going with regard to
thematic research institutes. With the contract system for the CNRS all institutions seem to
have been implied by the new thinking. The new public management model is relevant for the
“Annexanstalten” but not for the other extra-university research institutions. They fall under
another rule, which, in its implication, is comparable to the ideas of the ideal-model. New uni-
versity laws also respect the contract model. Though we still find differences in the “system-
wide” realisation of the model, it is obvious that no country sticks to the reform of just one
research type. This is a general reform, even more general than only linked to the research sys-
tem.
The timing of reforms has varied considerably. Though all countries (with the exception of
Switzerland perhaps) were experimenting with reform ideas already in the 1970s, serious re-
form attempts occurred in the 1990s with one notable exception, i.e. the Netherlands. The
Netherlands have gradually and steadily modified the system since the mid-1980s. Though it
needed a second push in the mid-1990s, reforms are now accomplished as far as it concerns
the ideal model. All countries needed this second push in the mid-1990s to more seriously
pursue institutional reforms. This is evident in Germany where systemic evaluation starts in
1997. The introduction of the reform is 2002 and results are not yet there. It might take an-
other 10 years before the new model will be installed throughout the system. France is a simi-
lar case because one can regard 1997 as the second push for instrumental reforms in the CNRS.
The new system of contract also started only in 2002 though other research institutions can be
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considered as more advanced in their attempts to introduce the new model. The network and
centre of excellence idea came up in the mid-1990s in Switzerland. New public management
reforms were realised in the 1990s. Institutional reforms have played a minor role, though,
because of the underdevelopment of the extra-university research sector.
Why these differences?
The success of the new model in the Netherlands must be explained by a number of factors.
One advantage the Netherlands had, was that they disposed already of intellectual organisation
models that were familiar to the new public management model. This gave continuity to the
process of reform. A second point was the long experience with “functional corporatism”
practiced in several public policy fields. This kind of corporatism knew already functional
delegation to semi-private and private institutions. It was and is part of the political culture in
the Netherlands and can be used, with a high consent by all actors, in different fields and in
different times. The affinity of this model with the new organisation ideas in the  research sys-
tem helped. So, structural isomorphy helped, without doubt, to give the Netherlands some
advantage in organising the reform. A second important structural feature is the relation be-
tween policy-makers and boundary organisations, which has been described already with re-
gard to project funding. We can induce from our analysis that two dimensions may be of im-
portance for “social learning”, i.e. the degree of centralisation of political decisions and the
access of research actors to the political system, i.e. “voice”. A typology demonstrates the
differences between countries in this respect:
Table 8 : Variables for social learning
Access to political decisions
Decision-making pow-
ers
No “voice” “Voice”
Centralised France Netherlands
Dispersed Germany Switzerland
It is the combination of rather centralised formal decision-making powers at the level of the
education ministry – that is the main actor with regard to the organisation of the public-funded
research system – and the developed “mediation system” (cf. van der Meulen and Rip) that
creates both the possibility to react and to build up a consensus among actors. This does not
at all mean that we always find a consensus in the Netherlands: there have been conflicts be-
tween policy-makers and boundary organisations abound but hierarchical decisions are not
accepted in the Netherlands so that even if the ministry decides in the end and conflicts per-
sist, the decisions will have been influenced by former discussions among all actors.
Finally, the Netherlands have used several times review committees and encompassing reports
(“reflexivity”) to create a consensus on reforms.
Switzerland is the only other country that had similar advantages but did not really need it:
The federal structure and the liberal policy regime was conducive to a model of delegation and
operational freedom of organisations. In addition, Switzerland bases its decision-making in a
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similar way – as shown above – on intensive and extensive “voice procedures. In the case of
research institutions such procedures are, however, seldom needed. We just quoted one exam-
ple where a change in the orientation of a research institute took place along the lines of “con-
sociational” negotiation. Switzerland had the blessing of being a “latecomer” – though not vol-
untarily – and could – in the case of research institutions financed under the art. 16 of the re-
search law – avoid rigid procedures in the public financing of research institutes. In this way,
Switzerland has never used the extra-university research sector as an important part of its
research policy. Universities were the objects of policy-makers and here Switzerland was in
line with the “second push” in the mid-1990s that resulted in the network and centres of ex-
cellence model we discussed in the previous chapter. Switzerland followed, therefore, a differ-
ent path in institutional funding than the other countries.
We think that the difficulties of France and the late achievement of reforms can be ascribed to
the combination of a high degree of political centralisation and the lack of “voice” in research
policies. The formally considerable powers of the research ministry in France seduce policy-
makers to use hierarchical powers in order to determine research policies in the “grands organ-
ismes”. The main problem is that these powers are used in a discontinuous way and that they
are not clearly delimitated from the powers of the CNRS. This pattern causes what we have
called the “competitive mode of learning” in France resulting in a “stop-and-go”-policy that
for a long time showed no results with regard to organisational reforms. The mean of nation-
wide “colloques” used several times launched a major organisational reform in 1982 but could
not solve the problems thereafter. It was the “second push” in the mid-1990s and a very ac-
tive and interventionist government that put reforms more determinedly on the political
agenda and which led, in the end, to the contract system. The experiences in the past make it
difficult to believe that the new formula will be implemented successfully. However, there are
some elements in the contract systems that could break with the former “stop-and-go”-policy.
Germany has, without any doubt, difficulties in reorganising its public-funded research sys-
tems because of the federal structure and “distributive coalitions” deriving from this structure
between research institutions and either the Länder or the federal government. There was no
need to confirm this point once again in our study. Much of the belatedness of Germany can
be explained by this structure. The dispersed character of political powers is certainly a disad-
vantage for encompassing institutional reforms. It is certainly somewhat exaggerated to say
that there is no “voice” at all for the scientific community in political decision-making. The
key institution for this is the Scientific Council. There is, however, no system that can aggre-
gate the different opinions in the public-funded research system and this must be seen as a
weakness in creating the necessary consensus in institutional reforms.
This having said we have clearly demonstrated that the Scientific Council has played a key
role for the reform process that – belatedly – took place after the “second push”. This was,
however, due above all to the “systemic evaluations” of the different research types in the
public-funded research system of Germany. We have stipulated that two processes may have
been decisive for the turnaround: the one is the “alternative” that the Eastern big science insti-
tutes presented to policy-makers in terms of organisation and the second is the introduction of
the systemic evaluation that gave the opportunity to think in terms of the whole. The Scien-
tific Council was important to create the consensus among policy-makers and the scientific
community concerning the necessary reforms. One of the intellectual influences on this proc-
ess was certainly the discussion on the “systems of innovation” that made it clear to policy-
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makers that only an encompassing policy, linking the different elements of the public-funded
research systems in a sensible and rational way, could build up the technological innovation in
Germany. These factors, plus the budget deficits and the economic crisis, were able to break
through the impasse between the big science institutes and the research ministry before. In this
sense, then, there was clearly a learning process on all levels of actors in Germany. As these
systemic evaluations were copied with regard to the other types of organisations and as there
is a profound reflection within the Scientific Council on the promotion of the institutionalisa-
tion of cooperation in order to develop an encompassing strategic research in Germany, this
could have been an important turning point in the organisation of the public-funded research
system in Germany. The implications for the other parts of the system must still be seen
though.
These different components are found to a stronger or lesser extent in all four countries which
confirms one more time that the new policy-design is gradually be transformed into a new
policy-regime which cannot exclude the regulatory structures. The different steps to introduce
the new model, the different paths are, however, diverging. See the following overview that
summarises main events in the reform of funding agencies since about 1974.
Summary Table 5 Funding Agencies
Types of
funding
Structure Projects
NWO  Own
research
insitutes
 main
second
money
flow fun-
der for
universi-
ties im-
plying
ability to
steer
univerity
research
 ZWO : bottom :  multitude of legally independent
foudations  and their research commitees based on
the disciplinary configuration of the scientific com-
munity.Centre : weak governing board. Decision :
decentralised. « old boys network ». Necessity to re-
form legal structure.
 1988: NWO: Hybrid organisation with considerable
complexity. Foundations had the choice of accepting
or not to become area council.
 1994: internal reform: a) separation of competence
of assessment and funding, the task was to avoid the
rise of new networks, break up “subgovernements”
and iron triangles. B) problem of inefficiency of the
foundations. The governing board decided to fix a
minimum amount of funding capacity for the foun-
dations to be authorized to live on. This induced,
from 1994 on, the dissolution of 19 foundations, and
the creation of 9 new ones, and strengthens the in-
fluence of the governing board, but they are still hy-
brid organisations
 1998: New Reform: only governing board and area
councils
 1974: White Paper fail to reform ZWO
 1979: money transfer (fail)
 1982: attempt to reform ZWO through
working group (later success but on a con-
sensual basis with reduced ambitions from
OCW)
 1988: reform of organisation with deceiving
influence on the operational level.
 -1994: reform of the organisation, impulsed
by the board.
 mid-1990: Ritzen (Social-Democrat),
intervensionism, a) funding transfer from
University to NWO (failed); b) unification
KNAW-NWO research institutes (failed)
 1998:  reform of organisation (success)
 
 CNRS  own
research
institutes
  indirect
Univer-
sity
funding
through
UMR
(mixed
unity of
research)
 Organisation: CNRS is governed by a President and
a General Director (from the world of science) both
appointed by the national cabinet. the General Di-
rector is linked to the scientific departments or na-
tional institutes, which have each a scientific direc-
tor in charge of elaborating a strategy for the de-
partment, and a scientific council, they attribute
funds to laboratories.
 1982: EPST statute: simplification of the accounting
budget and increased importance of the planning
budget. Budget must serve as policy instrument and
therefore have to express choices and strategies
(Sevin, 1992: 37); lump-sum treatment of the labo-
ratory resources. Programme funding and individual
f di i i h CNRS
 1970’s: more programmatic funding (fail-
ure)
 1979: integration of CNRS in the Secretariat
of University (failure)
 1986: project of the opposition (RPR-UDF)
to transfer large parts of research from the
CNRS to Universities, abandoned once op-
position was on government (minister
Devaquet)
 1989: modernisation project (from execu-
tive director F. Kourilsky) idea of remodel-
ling the Comité National. First project 32
sections instead of 49 (+ reduction of CNRS
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funding is very rare in the CNRS.
 Evaluation by the Comité National: individual
evaluations; evaluation of laboratory programs;
drawing up reports every four years. Comité Na-
tional is divided in sections, which are the core of
the Comité National. Two third of its member are
elected, the last third appointed by the Minister on
the proposition of the General Director of CNRS. Its
decision are not binding for the general director and
the administration council, but, in fact it is rare that
its advices are not apllied. Comité National is consi-
dered as the “Parlement de la Science”.
 2000: creation of an eighth department on the CNRS:
Sciences and technologies of information and com-
munication (STIC), which was decided by Allègre.
 2000: reform of CNRS: 1) changing relation be-
tween president and General director. President with
administration council set the general guidelines and
General director manage the Centre, which implies
a brightening of the role of the president; 2) expan-
sion of the responsibility of the administration coun-
cil, it now set the priorities and control the relation
with the other organisations, it is also responsible for
the new evaluation comitee and the new ethic
comitee; 3) strengthening of CNRS independency
through the autonomy of the scientific council (the
Direction of the Centre is no more represented in it),
and moreover, the creation of scientific departments
of CNRS is now on under the responsibility of the
General director with approval of administration
council (before it was let to a ministerial decree).
 2002: Contractualisation with the State: implied a
new way of thinking the interaction with political
level.
department from 7 to 6).Then, broad con-
sultation led to working proposal with 39
sections (still 6 departments). Reform ended
with 40 sections (1991).
 1988-1994: Under Director Kourilsky:
attempt to set up CNRS policy through stra-
tegic schemes
 1994-1997: as a results of finance crisis, the
only project is the balancing of budget. At
the end (1997), the situation ameliorates and
thirty programmes were launched (180 mio.
Frf) , responding to the minister push to-
wards more incentives.
 1997: Minister change and CNRS director
also, as a result, programme funding on
CNRS turn from a recomandation to a “bad
thing”
 1997: authoritative push toward reform
from the minister Allègre: setting up of
“CNRS-Avenir” in 1998, which has been
abandoned.  
 2000: new actors, setting up of “Reflexion
stratégique”, which gave birth to a “projet
d’établissement” (2002-2005) serving as a
frame for the State-CNRS contract.
 2002: State-CNRS contract
 DFG  Univer-
sity re-
search
funding
 no own
institutes
 Private Law Association: founding members: Higher
Education, research organisations (MPG, FhG, etc.)
and scientific academies.
 Basic research
 Its Autonomy from politics is inscribed on the Ger-
man Constitution (Grundgesetz)
 Financing: 60% Bund; 40% Länder
 “self-governed body of academia” (Winnes et
Schimanck, 1999:166)
 Organisation: - General Assembly composed of the
founding members defining the guidelines; - Presid-
ium with a president and a vice-president; - a Senat
composed of scientists, which decide the research
principles; - a Kuratorium in charge of finance
planification; - Commissions, composed of scientists,
dedicated to the  attribution of funding.
 The project that the DFG funds are inititated by the
researchers (bottom-up)
 mid-1990’s: BMBF gives the DFG 5% of the Blaue-
Liste, in order that the DFG participate to the fund-
ing of extra-university research
 2000: DFG take into account the advices of the
Evaluation commission: modification of the organ-
isational structure with the coordination of groups
“international collaboration” and “ quality insur-
ance” and the setting up of a group on “research
perspectives”; creation of the Forschungszentren to
satisfy the demand of the evaluation commission
about strategic instrument. The specific themes of
those Forschungszentren are selected through re-
searchers proposition and not imposed by the DFG.
 Begin 1990’s:proposition of WR to set up
more thematic – instead of disciplinary – re-
search (success: Graduierte Kollege)
 1999: proposition of the evaluation commis-
sion: definition of priority areas of research
implying new decision-making structures;
strengthening of the DFG direction; DFG
have to be not only at the service of scien-
tific community but must also shape it; evo-
lution of the evaluation system with the in-
troduction of interdisciplinarity criterias,
foreigners experts etc.; introduction of mid-
dle term planification.
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 SNSF  Univer-
sity re-
search
funding
through
program
and pro-
ject
funding
 No own
institutes
 Privatte Law foundation
 Funding of basic research. Also oriented research
from mid-1970’s on, through the PNRs.
 1975: introduction of PNR. Reorganisation of the
structure of FNRS: augmentation of the members of
national council of research (60 max.), four divi-
sions, strengthening of the “Bureau du Conseil na-
tional de recherché”, which could ratify the funding
decision of the divisions.
 1985: non-swiss researchers could be members of
the “Conseil National de la recherché”.
 1991: first PPRs are in activity
 1994: creation of the GRIPS – following the experts
evaluation – pushed by the new general secretary of
FNRS (Hertig). Which is an internal reflexion group.
 2001: Division IV is in charge of  the « Pôles de
recherche » (PNR)
 2002: revision of the statutes with the objectives of
simplifying and flexibilising the organisational
structure. Making a clearer differentiation between
“conseil de fondation” et “conseil national de la re-
cherché”: 1) “conseil de fondation” is in charge of
the strategy and of the scientific policy of FNRS, it
must also represent FNRS interests. As a counter-
part, it is no more concerned with scientific func-
tions. It is reduced from 60 to 50 members, from
which 20 are appointed by the Federal Council to
represent political and economical world; 2) the
“Conseil national de la recherche” is the scientific
organon of the FNRS. New statutes reinforce its
autonomy and scientific responsibility. Members are
elected on a scientific basis, so there won’t be no
more members directly appointed by the Federal
Council
 1990’s: international experts report incite
FNRS to formulate more clearly its objec-
tives and to announce it in political and eco-
nomical spheres and also in the population.
 1996: GRIPS analysed the programmatic
research and made recommendations. PPR
and PNR were too similar and must be fur-
ther differentiated. PNR must have little
changes, but PPR have to be deeply re-
formed. Proposition of GRIPS was to trans-
form PPR in “Sonderforchungsbereiche”
 1997: FNRS report on the “Pôles de recher-
che”
Position inside the PFRS Relation wiht political level Relation with operationnal level (inside
and outside)
NWO  ZWO : Research council with deep
anchoring  in the scientific commu-
nity, identity based on the funding
of basic research. Decentralisation.
Not innovative : « old boys net-
work ». Linear model (mode 1)
 1988: became NWO, evolution of
its view of the linear model.
Strengthening of the strategic func-
tion as a task.
 1992: NWO discussed what its
intermediary position meant for its
autonomy: becoming “agent” of
OCW will permit to rise the re-
sources for NWO (as institutional
“block grants” tended to disap-
pear); and it will also permit to ex-
pand the domains of the NWO in
the PFRS
 end-1990’s: turn from a competi-
tive to a cooperative stance. Also,
reduction of the “dependence” of
the NWO as independent agency.
NWO receive the intermediary
status it has aspired. New organisa-
 1974: Resistance of NWO and
scientific community to the reform
(1974 to 1987). Political pressure
through austerity.
 1982, new government weakened
the reform proposals and create a
working group which succeed in
managing consensus.
 After 1988 relation depends on the
minister in place: a) minister Ritzen
(SD 1988-1998) caused turbu-
lences, confrontation and hostility
by its interventionism; b) minister
Hermans (lib) used “New manage-
rialism, better relations.
 End-1990’s: “controlled delega-
tion” as the relation between OCW
and NWO
 1974-1988: Top Level agreed the
reforms (at least the idea to reform
ZWO), but organisational base re-
fused. Still existence of a distance
between management and profes-
sional base. Governing board had
to deal with both the foundations
and the  OCW
 1988: After the organisational
change, the functioning did not
change the first seven years.
 University didn’t agree with the
increase of second money flow.
 End-1990’s Evolution toward
strategic role of NWO. Boudary
role imply relative differentiation
vis-à-vis the research community
as it imply the necessity to choose
priority.
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tional spirit and identity of NWO
(see strategic plan 2002). NWO is
now a corporate actor which plays
the typical part of a boundary.
 CNRS  Creation as a “quasi ministry”.
 Evolution of the position of CNRS
when DGRST has been set up, it
introduced a competition, but
DGRST was too weak to direct
CNRS. Moreover, the “conseil des
sages” of DGRST entertained good
relations with CNRS.
 Comité National has a powerfull
real position inside the PFRS as it is
the evaluating structure that “de-
cide” (with no formal power to do
it) the individual nominations and
the ability of laboratories to receive
or not CNRS label.
 The creation of a research ministry
in 1982 lowered the position of
CNRS inside the PFRS as it intro-
duced competition for the coordi-
nation role. But the CNRS kept  the
central role in French PFRS.
 Debate around the position of the
CNRS always exists in French PFRS
 1970’s: decline of the government
interest in research.
 End 1970’s: government try to
integrate CNRS in the decision
structures of State Secretary of
University.
 1980: changing views about re-
search.
 1982: creation of a ministry implied
a dualism with the CNRS. Ministry
has formal power over CNRS but
the real power is counterbalanced
by the power of the scientific
community.
 1986: electoral victory of UDF-
RPR, idea of dismantling the CNRS
 1997: new governmental cohabita-
tion. conflict between CNRS and
ministry (Allègre)
 2000: Normalisation of the rela-
tions. Minister has less reform am-
bition and is more consensual than
Allègre.
 1970’s: generational change at the
head of CNRS, from defender of
free research to science managers,
will to turn to programmatic re-
search and to reform the Comité
National, but no success.
 1989: reform of Comité National:
need consultation of the research
community and reduction of the
first ambitions, conflict between di-
rectorate and researchers, solidar-
ity among researchers, consensual
outcome.
 Begin-1990’s: Finance crisis im-
plied that laboratories kept money
in reserve and it increased the cri-
sis.
 1998: Plenum of the Comité Na-
tional (for the firs time), in reaction
to the threatening represented by
the minister’s Allègre will to re-
form CNRS. Research community
unite to face the threat.
 DFG  DFG is central in the PFRS as it
funds the basic research in Univer-
sity. Universities are, therefore,
dependant on the DFG.
 Its reluctance to define priorities
implies problems of research policy
for the political level
 1990’s: questions about the quality
of basic research lead to an
evaluation decided by minister Rüt-
gers.
 1997: evaluation of DFG: the DFG
made great effort to define the mo-
dality of its own evaluation, which
was an evaluation by international
committee.
DFG is considered as a part of the
scientific community
SNSF  Difficulty of its position in PFRS:
sustain research and researchers
but FNRS is constraint to take into
account the political demands in
reason of its budgetary depend-
ence.
 1974: The FNRS must use 10% of
its funds to fund research pro-
grammes oriented towards solution
of societal problems.
 1976: Federal council criticise the
autonomy of FNRS but augment the
subventions.
 1983: debate on the legislative
chambers for the augmentation or
reduction of subventions. Partisans
of augmentation won.
 1989: Federal Council define new
research orientations. FNRS took it
into account and sustain those ori-
entations
 Begin-1990’s: evaluation mandated
by OFES to international experts.
FNRS is said to be not enough pro-
active, too influence by the political
level. It needs to develop its own
strategy regarding research pro-
motion.
 Sometimes FNRS must argue with
the Parliament concerning the
budget. FNRS had more ability to
 The milice structure implies (like
the DFG) implies that critic is un-
easy for the researchers.
 Conflictual relation with the EPF
council. Beginnig-1990’s conflict
for the management of Priority
Programmes. Each actors obtained
a part of the PP.
 Conflict with GSR.
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communicate since the arrival of
Hertig, as he saw the advanntages
of communication for the FNRS.
 GRIPS has the objective to repre-
sent FNRS in the political debate.
5 “RESPONSIVENESS” ON THE REGULATORY LEVEL: FUNDING
AGENCIES
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we have discussed how policy-makers or funding agencies have
changed the performance structure in public-funded research systems, i.e. the responsiveness
of researchers and research organisations with regard to industrial or societal demands. The
objective of this chapter is to analyse in what way policy-makers have attempted to make the
new policy-design imperative for “productive boundary organisations”, i.e. for funding agen-
cies at the intersection of the political and scientific system. Funding agencies are part of the
regulatory structure. They are, therefore, an essential part of the policy-regime and, hence, for
any reform of the existing mode of operation. Social learning cannot take place without consid-
ering the role of these organisations.
Why do funding agencies have such a crucial role for governance in public-funded research
systems? Since the end of the 19th century one sees a policy of delegating the task of funding
specific topics of political interest or simply of funding scientific research to agencies created
for this purpose by scientific or political actors (see in extenso (Braun 1997). The purpose of
delegation, instead of organising research funding within the confines of public administration,
was above all the consideration that such funding agencies with direct contacts to the scientific
community would be better able to “irritate” scientific research than any political command
could have done. At the same time, delegation was functional because it meant less work and
costs for the political administration itself.
As policy-makers pursued for a long time a rather passive stance in research policy-making,
funding agencies became intricately interwoven with the scientific community and scientific
interests. The organisation itself of these agencies was such that important decisions on re-
search projects were delegated to the scientific community. The tradition of funding and or-
ganising the funding became very often – and above all with regard to the funding agencies in
our four countries – managed by scientists and the authority of policy-makers remained weak
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in the decision-making of such agencies.
This is true for the German DFG, which was the creation of scientific organisations and not of
policy-makers. Its “freedom” from political intervention is guaranteed by the German consti-
tution. In a similar way the Swiss SNSF was a creation by scientists and it took a long time –
from 1952 to 1974 – that the SNSF was recognising its boundary function as both an agency
of the scientific community and as an instrument of research policy. The Dutch ZWO had – at
least legally – a less independent status but regarded itself clearly as a representative organisa-
tion of the scientific community. Officially, this was changed in 1988. Only the French CNRS
was created in 1939 with the task of representing the scientific community and of developing a
national research policy. This did not prevent the CNRS to become after the war a bastion for
scientific interests.
In terms of the principal-agent theory and its theoretical enhancements (Braun 1993; Guston
1996; Guston 1998), such a development can be regarded as a “capture by the third party”
(see above all Braun 1993). While the primary act of constituting a funding agency can be seen
as an act where the “principal”, the political institution, delegates the task of funding to an
“agent”, the funding agencies, further developments prove that the agent becomes to such an
extent interwoven with the adressees of funding, scientists, that two principals, science and
government, are influencing and controlling the work of the funding agency. This is indeed the
definition of a “boundary organisation” according to Guston (1998). However, the first prin-
cipal, government, is gradually loosing grip and authority, while the authority of the “new
principal”, science, is growing.
If we try to situate the four funding agencies in question within this framework, one sees other
differences in the relationship between the two principals and the agent:
The CNRS for example was seen in the beginning and often afterwards as the principal and
agent at the same time. Because of the lack of a genuine political actor in research policy and
the clear delegation of research policy tasks in general, there was no authority that could in-
form and command the CNRS. This changed, first with the creation of the DGRST and, above
all in 1982, when a research ministry was established and the tasks of the CNRS were defined
in relation to this ministry. Only then can we speak of a principal-agent relationship. How-
ever, even then there are – as shown – several periods where the research ministry remained
passive and the CNRS could once again assume its double function of a principal and an agent
in research policy. It became therefore imperative for policy-makers in France to, first, clearly
establish a principal-agent relationship and, second, to make sure that the CNRS respects the
task of developing the responsiveness of its organisation and researchers.
The German DFG is the other extreme when it was created, first as the “Notgemeinschaft” in
1919, and then again after the Second World War. Both times, it was an initiative by scientists
and after the War the legal form chosen as a “Verein” demonstrated the willingness to keep a
distance to the political “financier”. One can thus say that the principal of the DFG was not
government but the scientific community. The government can rather be understood as the
“third party” in this construction with growing influence but clearly remaining the third party
and not the principal of the DFG (see below).
The creation of the SNSF in 1952 was likewise the result of an initiative of scientific forces
(Academies, universities) (Fleury 2002); (Freiburghaus, Balthasar et al. 1991). The federal
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government as the main “financier”agreed to confer the statute of private foundation to the
SNSF and to abstain from direct interference and even representation in the beginning. Much
quicker than in Germany, the influence of the federal government was, however, strengthened
and 1974 represents clearly the turning point, where the SNSF can be regarded as a true
boundary organisation with two principals though its rhetorics aim clearly to underline the
authority of the scientific community as the main principal of the organisation.
Finally, the Dutch ZWO confirms this pattern: Created by scientists and financed by the state
it was mainly conceived as a scientific organisation. This changed in 1974 with the explicit
objective to transform ZWO into a responsive organisation. Since 1988 it is officially an or-
ganisation with two different points of reference: fostering the responsiveness of research and
guaranteeing the scientific quality of the research.
In three of our four cases the initial authority was therefore placed at the scientific level and
not at the political level. The CNRS followed a different pattern. In all cases one sees from the
1960s onwards some attempts by the government as the main banker to make itself heard
within these funding agencies, though this was often limited to the control of the financial flow
of resources. This means that in 1974, the turning point in research policy, a complete reversal
in principal-agent relationships had to be performed which meant that the government had to
be installed as a principal first and then that one had to find means and instruments to make
sure that the funding agencies were changing from “scientific organisations” to “intermediary”
and “boundary” organisations without, and this remains important, to loose contact to the
scientific community.
Both in France and in Switzerland this needed the establishment of a true political agency for
research that could influence the policy-making of funding agencies while Germany had done
so (see chapter 3) already in 1962. The Netherlands used the education ministry for this pur-
pose.
We want to know in this chapter how governments endeavoured to force funding agencies into
a principal-agent relationship and how they installed responsiveness within these organisa-
tions. How did funding agencies adapt to the pressures?
We will see in the next section that, once again, three of the four governments succeeded to
establish a new model of responsiveness with regard to funding agencies that is quite similar
while the path that led to the introduction – and therefore the learning processes – are re-
markably different. The exception is Germany, where the status of the DFG has not changed
but where organisational reforms are nevertheless pointing into a similar direction as in the
other countries.
5.2 Converging model and divergent paths
Taken together, we believe to have found several components of a new “responsiveness”
model that governments have attempted to introduce. These components are:
(1) There is a clear tendency to improve the “strategic capacity to act” of funding agencies.
Using the term strategic does not yet imply top-down or bottom-up strategies. The introduc-
tion of strategies is value-neutral and not biased. It means that agencies should from now on
base their behaviour on goal-means relations, i.e. develop clear objectives, and find efficient
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means to realise them. It is more the increase of effectiveness and efficiency of funding activi-
ties than the actual guidance of certain contents of the objectives that is at stake here. Strategic
capacities need, in addition, coordination between different part of the organisation, something
which is particularly difficult in an organisation that is often built on the image of the scientific
community. Funding agencies were often using the same disciplinary structure as the scientific
community in order to develop their policy. This resulted in a very fragmented and often un-
linked structure.
The strategic capacity to act follows in principle new public management ideas. This means
that on the one hand, we see – but this depends on countries and governments – a tendency to
develop objectives where the government can play a decisive role in developing the overall
strategic framework and discuss the more concrete organisational objectives together with the
management of the funding agency. At the same time, “operational freedom” is also valid for
funding agencies. In order to have more flexibility in implementation and adaptation the gov-
ernment reduces its direct political influence in the more scientific matters of funding agencies.
One sees a tendency here to increase the importance of stakeholders and policy-makers within
strategic boards of the funding agencies while the boards responsible for the implementation of
concrete programmes etc. are becoming more independent (i.e. without political representa-
tion). This exemplifies the strategy – operation divide. This tendency can be found in the
CNRS, the SNSF and in the big science institutes in Germany, but not in the DFG.
(2) The development of strategic capacities means also – as in the previous case of extra-
university research institutions – a strongern internal, central decision-making power. Every-
where there are reform attempts strengthening the powers of the executive within the funding
agencies.
(3) Strategic boards or working groups have emerged everywhere in order to develop ideas
which can be presented to policy-makers and in order to develop reflexive capacities for the
adaptation of the organisation.
(4) The introduction of a “pro-active” stance is demanded everywhere. While the traditional
attitude of funding agencies was very much following the logic of action of the scientific com-
munity, i.e. respond to the initiatives of individual researchers and institutionalise the same
structure as the scientific community, it now becomes a function of funding agencies to struc-
ture and guide the scientific system, to recognise problems in advance, to act and guide the
system in less troubled waters. This is a clear regulatory policy which is increasingly de-
manded. Within NWO this was inscribed within the statutes of 1988, the DFG was con-
fronted with such a demand in 1999, after the evaluation of its function; the SNSF since the
beginning of the 1990s and the CNRS since 1988. Funding agencies are considered as strategic
actors.
(5) In general, the role of funding agencies is becoming more important. This is an effect of the
policy of governments to reduce institutional funding and to promote project and programme
funding. Though governments are also using their own agencies, the general tendency is rather
to use the funding agencies for distributing the money in a responsive way. At the same time,
this also explains that policy-makers want to have more influence within the funding agencies.
(6) Finally, interdisciplinarity is becoming a main demand and funding agencies have to institu-
tionalise programmes fostering interdisciplinarity and new forms of peer review.
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These different components are found to a stronger or lesser extent in all four countries which
confirms one more time that the new policy-design is gradually be transformed into a new
policy-regime which cannot exclude the regulatory structures. The different steps to introduce
the new model, the different paths are, however, diverging. See the following overview that
summarises main events in the reform of funding agencies since about 1974.16
SEQARABICThe overview demonstrates important events concerning the introduction of a
more “responsive mode of funding”. This may be changes in the statutes of the funding
agency, important  evaluations leading to reforms or the introduction of directed funding pro-
grammes.
One sees three major organisational reforms before 1990 (1974 in Switzerland; 1982 in France,
1988 in the Netherlands) where the intention was clearly to introduce a stronger responsive-
ness of the funding agencies in question. The introduction differs considerably. The DFG is
not starting any organisational reforms before 1999, when an external evaluation committee
advised organisational changes. The somewhat growing influence is only recognisable in the
                                                
16 See also the summary table 5
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NWO
DFG
CNRS
NSF
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External
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Internal
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kollege
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Kollege Ost
Share of
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1999 External
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Funds (failure)
1979 Integration
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(failure)
1982 EPST Transfer part
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104
introduction of some new programmes that are mentioned in the list and the transfer of 5% of
the money for the Blue List institutes to the DFG.
Then it needs the “second push” we have already recognised in the case of the extra-university
research institutions to install new reforms in all four countries. Since 1998 the convergence
process is clearly progressing and this time even the DFG is not spared the need for reforms.
In the end all organisations have accepted that they need an organisational reform to improve
strategic and responsive action.
There are differences in the path of the countries. This is not only to be seen in the case of the
introduction of major reforms before 1990. One can also deduce from this overview that re-
forms and reform discussions were a permanent feature in the Netherlands and France. France
is in addition characterised by frequent failures of reforms and ensuing new reform attempts.
The major exception here is the change in the organisational statute in 1982 which was, as ex-
plained, the outcome of a nation-wide colloque and the rise of a new socialist government.
After that point of time, reforms have been laborious. The previous chapter on the CNRS as
an extra-university research institution has already demonstrated the details. The Netherlands
by contrast are characterised by a gradual but progressive change. Once the new /organisation
was created, the reform process inside the NWO was set in motion though it took quite some
time before the “intermediary” position was reached. The latest reforms in 1998 can be seen as
the point of time where the reform process as such is concluded.
In comparison to these two countries, the German case demonstrates a stable structure with
no organisational reforms before 1999. The DFG has maintained its position as an agent of the
scientific community and is only now under pressure to change this attitude. This has not led
yet to major reforms concerning the influence of policy-makers within the organisation. Fi-
nally, one sees that after the rather quick reform of the SNSF in 1974 new organisational re-
forms were not needed though in the 1990s it becomes obvious that the functioning of the
SNSF is not satisfying and there have been 10 years of discussion and reform attempts before
the new statutes were introduced in 2002.
5.3 Learning how to reform funding agencies
What can we say more in particular about the process of change and resistance in each coun-
try? Let us start with the two countries of continuous reform attempts but with a different
path (gradual transformation in the Netherlands and stop-and-go policies in France).
5.3.1 Netherlands
In the Netherlands, we find three main actors playing the reform game (the education ministry,
the management of the ZWO/NWO and the disciplinary communities represented within
ZWO/NWO) and several other actors who have an interest in these reforms because they
change the actor constellations at hand like the KNAW, universities, or the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs. The game started with the clear announcement of the government in the White
Paper of 1974 (see chapter 3) to transform ZWO into a more responsive organisation. The
government would not any longer accept that disciplinary interests represented within “foun-
dations” (with an independent legal status) within ZWO determined the distribution of public
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money. Neither the identity of the ZWO nor its organisational construction (fragmented along
the lines of disciplinary foundations) gave hope that minor reforms would do to introduce
responsiveness on this level. It needed the establishment of a new organisation to create the
institutional opportunities for responsiveness. As has been stated several times, this process
of reform took 13 years. In the meantime, we see, nevertheless, already first concrete changes
in the direction of a more responsive mode in the ZWO by setting up some priority pro-
grammes that envisaged fostering more interdisciplinary and applied research.
In order to understand learning capacities it is interesting to notice that the education minister,
though he would have had formal powers to do so – ZWO was not a private foundation as in
Germany and Switzerland –, did not just decide to change ZWO into a new intermediary body
but that he searched for a consensus with the existing management by setting up a working
group. This working group consisted of thre representatives from OCW and three from ZWO.
The more radical versions of reform were abandoned within this working group and, finally, a
consensus was found among these representatives with two essential elements: the construc-
tion of “foundations” should make place for “area councils” that were not disciplinary but
more encompassing and, above all, directly subject to the policies of the strengthened man-
agement. Second, the Foundation for Technical Science (STW), with a focus on applied tech-
nological research, should become part of the NWO to manifest the stronger link with clients.
The process to transform this compromise into a legal act is revealing as it demonstrates that
the scientific base of ZWO did not at all agree to these changes. Lobbying set in to convince
delegates in parliament that the foundations should subsist. The result was a compromise –
the intention to install area councils but not yet the obligation to abandon the existing councils
which resulted in an even more hybrid structure than before – the negative effects of which
took 10 years to overcome.
The lobbying of scientists in parliament demonstrates that the newly created NWO was based
on a coalition between OCW and elites in the management of ZWO while the scientific base
that would have lost powers refused the compromise. The structure of a “professional organi-
sation” with a large degree of institutionalised delegation to the scientific community became a
problem here. On the one hand, it was always thought of as a necessary condition for a suc-
cessful link with the scientific community, on the other hand, it was clear that ZWO was
“captured” by disciplinary communities and that the management lacked authority and legal
means to overcome the interests of these communities. This, of course, is a problem that all
funding agencies deeply anchored within the scientific community had to face. The Nether-
lands created the base for a fundamental reform by a legal act that was still a compromise but
that gave the management all possibilities to refine the organisational structure into the direc-
tion of a stronger management position and thus, of a strategic orientation. As we have worked
out , we believe that the establishment of a stronger management in combination with a new
“constitution” clearly defining the NWO as an “intermediary agency” serving both the scien-
tific community and “clients”, fostering both basic and applied research (which is, for exam-
ple, until today explicitly refused by the DFG in Germany), was a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition to transform the organisation. Hence, there were actors that had an interest in
fulfilling the new function but they were still confronted with a strong resistance of discipli-
nary communities and their institutional strongholds in the foundation. The additional condi-
tion was not only permanent pressure by the government but above all two further evalua-
tions, one internal the other external and set up by the government. Especially the last evalua-
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tion in 1996 made it clear that the existing hybrid construction cannot be a key for success.
Only then – and here certainly “conjunctural” elements helped, i.e. the “second push” – the
management had sufficient backing and legitimacy to abolish the foundations and introduce the
original construction for NWO in 1998.
The continuity of the reform process was, therefore, guaranteed by an actor, the management,
and was helped at several times by pressures from the government. Without a further shift
into the direction of “mode 2” setting through in all countries in the mid-1990s, it still remains
doubtful, if the final internal reform in 1998 would have been possible.
The achievement of the complete reform does not mean, however, that the organisation is hier-
archically directed by the management. The position of a boundary organisation means that
mediation activities in both directions – the ministry and the scientific community – remain
necessary. This is for example shown in the presentation of the strategic plan which serves as
a medium to create a consensus with both sides because of intensive discussions and “voice”.
Boundary organisations remain hybrid organisations but the organisational structure can be
modified in such a way that “immobilism” as an outcome of the mediation procedures become
unlikely. With the reforms in 1998 the NWO seems to have reached this stage.
While the scientific community has certainly lost “veto-powers” within the organisation with-
out being set aside, it seems yet unclear in what sense policy-makers have strengthened their
influence within NWO by the transformation.
One interesting lesson we have found in the case of the Netherlands is that the government has
voluntarily given up its representation within the former administrative board of the ZWO
because it had the feeling that such a representation, even with the power of the purse, was no
guarantee for influence. The new construction is based on new public management ideas:
though the government has no official representation within the organisation it has several
“veto-powers” by its right to confirm the budget, to appoint persons for the governing board
and by its authority to define strategic guidelines and discuss the strategic plan of the NWO
with regard to these guidelines. We characterise this power of OCW by the term “controlled
autonomy”: there is operational freedom of the NWO but all major strategic and budget deci-
sions are clearly under control of the ministry. This means a frequent process of consultation
and negotiation . In fact, it depends a lot on the stance of the responsible minister how inten-
sively the political authority is used. The liberal minister until 2002 pursued a policy of “dis-
tance” but this might change with a more active and interventionist minister.
This demonstrates that, without any doubt, policy-makers have been able to transform the
funding agency into an “agent” while it was the agent of the scientific community before 1988.
This does not mean – and this should be repeated – that the scientific community is without
any influence. NWO depends on the input of the scientific community in order to become
effective. The “authority”, however, is nowadays situated on the political level and the NWO
must take great pains to consolidate as a boundary organisation that can communicate with
both levels.
The example of the Netherlands shows that a scientific organisation can be transformed into a
strategically operating and responsive organisation. We do not intend to conceal the difficulties
NWO is still confronting in establishing the promotion of more applied research as a basic
activity. Progress has been made though and NWO is actively searching for directed money by
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the ministries it can allocate to researchers. According to official documents and in interviews,
the new identity of an “intermediary body” is accepted.
The transformation process has not passed without conflicts with other organisations. One
should mention here at least the reform project of the former social-democratic minister to
transfer money from universities to the NWO in order to have a stronger responsive mode in
universities. This transfer failed because of the strong resistance of universities and other bod-
ies. Reform and learning processes take place in interaction with the interests and strategies of
other actors.
The manifold activities we find in the Netherlands with regard to NWO are therefore explained
by the strong resistance of those actors that are loosing their veto-powers. Even a legal act did
not suffice to overcome this resistance. The legal act was, however, most important to create a
new “path” for the institution that could not any longer be controlled by disciplinary commu-
nities. After that, learning and reforms took place under different conditions and ideas. Only
then was it possible to change the institution into the direction of the new model.
5.3.2 France
There is no need to repeat in extenso what has been described in the previous chapter. As the
CNRS is both a funding agency (though financing its own or “mixed” researcher groups) and a
research organisation, the structure and learning capacities revealed in the previous chapter
also hold when it comes to the funding activities. We have stressed though above all the rela-
tionship of the research ministry and the CNRS in the previous chapter. In this section we can
add information on internal processes within the CNRS concerning the transformation proc-
ess. The frequent failures of reform are, of course, attributed – as we have stressed already –
to the internal organisation and veto-powers within the CNRS.
The transformation into an EPST in 1982 has, as in the case of NWO in 1988, installed the
logic of a boundary organisation responsible to two “masters”. In addition, we find similar
resistance within the organisation as in the NWO. In contrast to the NWO, however, the lead-
ership in the CNRS failed to overcome this resistance. This is certainly in part due to the
varying reform pressure on the CNRS, the political stop-and-go we have already described.
Another weakness has been the political nomination of leading positions within the CNRS
that, in combination with the frequent changes in party colour of the government or new min-
isters, contributed to a weak position of the management of the CNRS. The reform orientation
was, often, short-term oriented and no authority can be established when the lower levels in
the organisation know that after 2 or 3 years a new policy might be adopted. Another differ-
ence with the NWO is the role of the “Comité National”. In some ways, it has a similar posi-
tion as the former foundations in the NWO. It represents the different disciplines. Its function
is, however, even more powerful as its position as the “scientific parliament” gives it suffi-
cient opportunity to intervene in all decisions that concern the reorganisation of the CNRS. In
principle, the National Council is an advisory body but in fact, it decides, on the base of own
evaluations, on the construction, closing down, and changes concerning research groups. Re-
search plans are presented and discussed within the National Council. Even when the man-
agement attempts to circumvent the National Council, there are sufficient means for the Coun-
cil to oppose these kinds of policies, above all by its power to decide on the recrutement and
appointment of researchers within the CNRS. For example, the Council has resisted clearly
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the appointment of researchers in thematically defined fields arguing that this would under-
mine the scientific quality of research. One sees therefore, without going into much detail ,
there is a fierce struggle between the scientific and responsive mode within the CNRS. Until
today, this strong veto-power of the National Council is unbroken and one has still to see if
the “contracts” can induce a different stance in this respect.
At the same time, we understand that the success of the reforms in the Netherlands is, without
any doubt due to the abolishment of the “foundations” and the strong and coherent power of
the education ministry. France failed both to overcome the veto-powers of the National Coun-
cil – and, in addition, of the strong individual powers of directors of research departments –
and to install a strong and coherent political power. The policies since 1982 are permanent
attempts to either reduce the role of the National Council or to strengthen the position of the
management, without much success. Other tensions are found in the relationship between the
president of the CNRS and the general director. Reforms have rather increased this tension
than to overcome it . Finally, we find tensions between the scientific and the administrative
management within the CNRS.
This points, briefly summarised, make clear that the transformation into a “boundary organi-
sation” serving two masters has been clearly opposed by actors within the CNRS that had,
because of the institutional construction, sufficient veto-powers to not implement a more re-
sponsive mode. Once again, the new system of contracts is regarded as the breakthrough in
this respect because these contracts force all levels in the organisation to make an effort in
achieving the objectives fixed in the contract. Given that we find no major institutional reforms
within the CNRS, it can be questioned if the system of “checks-and-balances” of the CNRS
can be overcome. In simply stipulating that responsiveness must be a second point of refer-
ence in the evaluations of the National Council, we have not yet institutionalised a new iden-
tity of the organisation. Though this new identity was fixed in in the constitution of 1982, it is
not yet acknowledged by most actors within the organisation. Further reforms have to be
made.
5.3.3 Germany
The major difference of the German DFG with the previous funding agencies is the legal form:
The DFG is a private foundation created by its members and not the state. Since the begin-
ning, these statutes were conceived as a protection against demands from the political side.
The state has, therefore, no direct means to prescribe reforms to the DFG. It would need the
creation of a new organisation like in the Netherlands to do so but this has never played a role
in Germany.
The DFG can therefore be regarded as better protected against reform projects of the govern-
ment which is part of the story why we see a rather stable structure and only in 1999 some
tendencies that the DFG is drifting into the direction. The other part of the story explaining
the stable structure is the existence of a research ministry that is supposed to deal with ap-
plied and technological research. This division of labour, already valid since the end of the
1960s, has contributed to the lack of political pressure on transforming the DFG into a more
responsive organisation.
This does not mean that the research ministry did not endeavour to influence decision-making
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within the DFG and that it did not try to install directed funding within the DFG. We have
already sketched that one of the negative repercussions of the division of labour was and is the
lack of direct access of the research ministry to university research as well as the difficulties to
bring basic and applied research together. This is the reason that the research ministry has
attempted, time and again, to convince the DFG of the necessity to set up programmes that
were focused on certain groups or the combat of certain structural deficits as in the case of the
“Sonderforschungsbereiche” aiming to ameliorate interdisciplinary research at universities. The
DFG did not always refuse such instrumental action under the condition that it would define
how the implementation would take place and that scientific quality would be the main crite-
rion of selecting researchers. If the DFG had to learn something it was how to maintain its
autonomy despite of these more directed funding programmes. And the research ministry had
to learn that it could not impose its policies on the DFG. The compromise was often, as indi-
cated, a transfer of resources from the research ministry bound to some specified objective and
the management of the instrument by the DFG. The representation of the research ministry
and of the Länder within the DFG in the so-called “Hauptausschuss” that is supposed to dis-
cuss the budget plans of the DFG does not give sufficient influence to guide decisions of the
DFG in more detail. The fact that a programm is financed by the research ministry does not
lead to a strong position of political actors as the example of the SFBs demonstrates: in the
review committee deciding on projects there is only one representative from the federal gov-
ernment and one from the Länder while the majority of committee members are scientists.
This demonstrates very shortly that the DFG has always understood to keep the political
“principal” at a distance and treating him as the “third party” with legitimate demands but no
rights to interfere into the business of the DFG.
The main tensions between the DFG (and this includes also the MPG) and political actors
was this pressure to accept increasingly directed funds while the global institutional funds of
the DFG were stagnating. If there was one reason for the DFG to accept the money from the
research ministry, it was this stagnation of other resources. The strategy became then, of
course, to end the austerity plans of the federal government and to introduce a medium-term
growth guaranteed for several years by policy-makers. In fact, this is what happened in the
mid-1990s when the federal government and the Länder conceded a 5% growth of resources of
4 years mostly because of the additional task of integrating the research institutes in the East
of Germany (Winnes and Schimank 1999). Today, in 2002, another budget cut is intended.
One sees that, nevertheless, the DFG was under no immediate threat of being transformed into
a responsive organisation and boundary organisation respectively. The directed funds were
disturbing but they did not change the rationale of the organisation and they did not change the
principal-agent relationship valid since the Second World War.
Why then do we find a change at the end of the 1990s?
The impetus was the same as in the case of the big science institutes, i.e. a stronger belief of
the research ministry and the Länder that more directed fund and more competition were
needed in the public-funded research systems of Germany. Regularly evaluations of research
and funding institutions should guarantee and ameliorate the scientific quality. Policy-makers
decided, after a recommendation by the Science Council, that all research institutions should be
subject to an evaluation. This was no problem when it came to the big science institutes or the
Blue List Institutes. It was much more a problem to do so with concern to the DFG and the
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MPG. Both organisations could have interpreted such a demand as an illegitimate intrusion
into their autonomy, something policy-makers wanted to avoid. In addition, the Science Coun-
cil refused to make such an evaluation for the DFG because of the narrow personal links be-
tween these two institutions. As it is, the DFG and MPG did not oppose an evaluation of
their organisations as such – the recommendation of the Science Council was difficult to negate
– but first, they wanted to be evaluated together and, second, they looked for another organi-
sation that could organise this evaluation. The solution was found with the Volkswagen-
Foundation which set up an international expert committee.
Again, the Science Council recommendation and the willingness of policy-makers to have this
evaluation, played a decisive role for the reforms of German research and funding institutions.
One should underline that the objective of the evaluation was clearly to ameliorate procedures
for strategic planning in organisations as well as for the research system as a whole, and to
evaluate the allocation of money by the DFG. In addition, it was stipulated that it should be
analysed if the DFG had sufficient cooperation with other research actors and with industry
(Krull 1999). One sees that for the first time, the degree of responsiveness of the DFG to in-
dustry was clearly formulated as well as its overall position within the research system.
The result was, though politely formulated, a bad write-up: The DFG reproduced the discipli-
nary structures of universities and forecame that researchers in universities looked for funds
from other clients and it contributed to a weakness of the overall public-funded research sys-
tem because of its refusal to develop priorities and strategic capacities. The review committee
ended with a number of recommendations that envisaged above all new decision-making struc-
tures, a stronger management, a different, more interdisciplinary-oriented peer review system,
the introduction of more flexible administrative procedures, and the development of planning
capacities .  
After this report of internationally reputated scientists, the DFG had small leeway to escape
from reforms though it was autonomous in introducing them. These reforms are still going on
but there are structures becoming visible already: There are efforts to achieve a stronger inter-
nal coordination and, above all, a new group for developing perspectives in research is created.
A new instrument, the “Research Centres”, is created that should serve as a strategic instru-
ment in universities though specific topics are formulated in a “bottom-up” way. In fact, this
is similar to the NCCR created at about the same time in Switzerland. In a first reaction, the
Science Council recommends to develop in addition internal procedures for priority setting of
specific topics.
This recommendation of the Science Council reveals all the tensions in the reform process:
Though the DFG cannot any longer refuse to also contribute to a more competitive research
system and to think more strategically in terms of priorities, it has chosen for an instrument
that follows the usual bottom-up procedures and which therefore cannot steer thematically.
The Science Council advises to correct this stance. The problem is that the acceptance of this
proposition would be in contradiction with the role of the DFG as an agent of the scientific
community. It would clearly be a step into the direction of a boundary organisation and the
DFG is not yet willing to take this step. In addition, one sees that there have been no internal
reforms that would have strengthened the role of policy-makers in the organisation nor the role
of other stakeholders. There is therefore a demand for a stronger strategic orientation but the
Science Council recognises in a new analysis that capacities to define strategies on the macro
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level of the public-funded research system is still lacking. The DFG cannot be instrumental-
ised to accept certain topics defined for example by the research ministry and it has still to
accept a major reform in order to institutionalise thematic priority setting. The solution, the
Science Council is presenting, is an overall advisory body of funders where coordination
should take place. Implementation would remain autonomous, though.
One notices, without any doubt, that the DFG has largely maintained its position as a scien-
tific agency though a strict “no” to any strategic research has been modified to a “yes-no”.
Together with the division of labour in the German public-funded research systems this ex-
plains that a major coordinating body is needed to put together the different input and inter-
ests and try to develop a stronger encompassing sense for strategic research. The lack of a
system of contracts makes it difficult to procede otherwise. One wonders, if such a coordi-
nating body can have success. A lot depends on the willingness of participants. As long as
implementation remains completely the domain of the DFG and other organisations, it seems
unlikely that official strategic plans announced in such a coordination committee will be exe-
cuted without further difficulties. The system of contract seems to be a necessary step in or-
der to arrive at a stronger responsiveness of the DFG in the future.
5.3.4 Switzerland
Since the introduction of the PNR and the institutionalisation of responsive instruments in a
separate department, these seems to have been an equilibrium situation in the interests of pol-
icy-makers on the one hand and the scientific community on the other. At least, we do not
find another reform attempt since the beginning of the 1990s when an evaluation committee
criticised, much in a similar way as in the case of the DFG later on, the passive stance of the
SNSF in the structuring of the research system as well as with regard to the representation of
scientific interests in the public. The lack of political pressure can in part be explained by the
existence of the PNR that seemed to function well, in part by the existence of the Technologi-
cal Agency that should take care of applied, technological research, and in part by the absence
of a stronger political research actor until the beginning of the 1990s (as the creation of the
GSR illustrates). In addition, policy-makers were represented in the two main bodies of the
SNSF, the foundation council and in the research council and had the right to nominate a num-
ber of other representatives in both bodies. In other words, there was the feeling that the
SNSF should not become a body responsible also for applied research like the NWO in the
Netherlands and policy-makers had enough “voice” within the body – comparable to the
CNRS or even stronger – to articulate demands.
The equivalent programme to the German “Research Centres” of the DFG, the NCCR, were,
in addition, the creation not of policy-makers, but – as has been shown in chapter 4 – by the
SNSF itself. Preoccupied with less funding and a critical evaluation of the PPR, the SNSF
started to create its own “strategic group” and to think about future projects, the position of
the SNSF etc. The new state secretary for research took up the ideas emanating from this
body. This demonstrates that the SNSF is not seeing itself as the agent of the scientific com-
munity alone but it recognises its responsibility to the government and society. The “respon-
sive mode” has been introduced in 1974, an early solution for the problem and one which
seems to have been largely accepted by the scientific community after its creation though con-
tested before. In 1974, the SNSF has become a boundary organisation. The tensions this in-
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duces are becoming obvious when, for example, resources for directed funds are augmenting
while resources for undirected funds are stagnating, a situation we find in the 1990s. It is here
that internal struggles are taking place within the SNSF to change this situation and to find an
equilibrium, which makes that about 20% of the resources of the SNSF are directed funds,
while still 80% are undirected. The PNR seem to be widely accepted by the scientific commu-
nity.
Switzerland presents therefore a rather peaceful picture. Nevertheless, there has been a change
in statutes in 2002 that wanted to push the SNSF stronger into the direction of the new model.
The main point was not to strengthen the responsiveness but to ameliorate the functioning of
the organisation. In the wake of this reform, the influence of government in the Research
Council was reduced which corresponds to the idea of a stronger independence of scientific
bodies in the organisation. The research council becomes responsible for basic reflections and
strategic planning documents. By contrast, the government as well as industry are broadly and
even stronger represented in the foundation council. The special committee (Ausschuss des
Stiftungsrates) of the foundation council serves as a direct linkage to governmental bodies.
Four members of this special committee are nominated by the federal government. While the
research council prepares the scientific planning, the foundation council is responsible for the
broader strategic planning in terms of research policy. This confirms the status of a boundary
organisation and the particularity of the SNSF: policy-makers are participating with an impor-
tant number of representatives that explicitly have to represent the interests of the federal
government within the SNSF, above all concerning the research policy decisions. This is easily
understandable as the federal government has no other instrument to implement its own re-
search policy ideas. The SNSF must therefore be the mediating body between political, indus-
trial and scientific interests. Such a strong position of the government is not found in the DFG
where the representation does not include strategic planning, nor in the NWO where contracts
serve the influence of government or in the CNRS where government is only directly repre-
sented within the administrative council in order to discuss budget matters. This does not
mean that political actors have more influence in Switzerland than in the other countries. The
strong position of the government in France and the Netherlands has been described. It is an
open question, if the direct participation in bodies of the funding agencies yields different re-
sults than the discussion of contracts that are then implemented by the organisation.
The recent changes in the SNSF have been adopted without major open conflicts. The com-
promise of a stronger independence in research questions and a stronger position of
stakeholders in general research  policy questions seem to have been acceptable for both sides.
5.4 Conclusions
If we take the four main characteristics of the new model of responsiveness (see section 2, this
chapter), i.e. the strategic capacity to act, centralisation of management, strategic boards and
pro-active stance, one clearly sees a difference  between the NWO and the DFG. While the
NWO has introduced all these characteristics, the DFG is very much at the beginning and has
until now only institutionalised a working group for the development of research preferences.
Strategic groups of reflection are in the meantime found in all funding agencies. The CNRS is
still struggling though with the development of strategic capacities to act and the integration of
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a pro-active stance. The intentions and the new contract system are, nevertheless, going into
this direction. The SNSF in Switzerland has not centralised decision-making powers but it has
reorganised its possibilities to develop research strategies by the new statutes accepted in
2002. We have also seen that there has been a strong convergence process into the direction of
the new model at the end of the 1990s, when governments intensified their claims for a con-
centration of resources as well as for the strategic planning and priority setting in the public-
funded research system. The developmental path as well as the outcome has been different,
though.
A decisive point for a successful transformation of a funding agencies into a boundary organi-
sation serving two masters, has, without any doubt been the capacity to design a new consti-
tution for the funding agencies as it was the case in France and in the Netherlands. The institu-
tionalisation of the PNR in Switzerland can be regarded as an equivalent mechanism: Such a
constitutionalisation has defined a new “path” for organisational behaviour and has redefined
the powers of different actors within the organisation. Insofar the constitution was not clear in
redefining these powers (this was the case both in the Netherlands and in France), a strong
resistance of the “loosers” of the new path could be expected. In fact, this explains the long
transformation process in the Netherlands and in France. While the Netherlands have been
able, through the strengthening of the centre, permanent political pressure and evaluation pro-
cedures, to succeed in this transformation, the ambiguities still existing in the case of the
French CNRS still make it dubious if the transformation into a boundary organisation will
succeed. In Switzerland the 1974 transformation seems to have installed a rather stable equilib-
rium that did not induce further reform attempts by policy-makers. The reasons for this have
been mentioned: the existence of CTI “responsive instrument”, the existence of the Techno-
logical Agency, the absence of a stronger political research actor until the beginning of the
1990s, and a strong representation of political stakeholdes in the two main bodies of the
SNSF, the foundation council and in the research council. Learning could therefore take place
within the confines of the institution.
The “stubbornness” of the DFG in becoming a boundary organisation can also be explained by
its constitution that links the DFG to the scientific community, and in addition by the legal
status, and the existence of a strong research ministry. Changes in the status quo can only
come about by financial pressure, negotiations or, as happened in the 1990s, by the authorita-
tive advice of the Science Council where the DFG itself is strongly represented. We have
shown that even after a critical evaluation, the changes into the direction of a “responsive or-
ganisation” have been minor. As long as there is no new constitution or at least contracts that
redefine the functions of the DFG, it is unlikely that the transformation process will go further
than what has been achieved until today.
Despite the differences in accomplishing the transformation, there is a common trend towards
strategic thinking in terms of the system. Funding agencies recognise more and more that they
fulfil an outstanding function in developing the research potential of the research system and
that they have become the nodal points for the organisation of public private partnerships in
research. This is a driving force that will transcend the position of all funding agencies.
If we think in terms of learning capacities, we can summarise that government had to learn
how to fulfil the role of a principal and funding agencies had to learn how to adapt without
loosing their privileged linkage to the scientific community.
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In the Netherlands, government learnt how to develop strategic plans and how to bind funding
agencies to these plans. The contract mechanism was the instrument. Developments in France
demonstrate that there was no continuous learning process by the government. Stop-and-go
policies, the abrupt changes in intentions etc. have not been expression of the willingness to
learn but to govern without often drawing lessons from previous failure. The institutionalisa-
tion of the contract mechanism can, for the first time, contribute to such a learning process
because these contracts define objectives for several years therefore binding governemental
intervention at least during this period. Nothing promises, however, until now that after ter-
mination of the existing contract a stable policy line would be continued. In Germany, gov-
ernment had to learn how to conciliate the interests of the research ministry and the DFG.
Financial pressures served to oblige the DFG to accept more directed funding but the role of a
principal is not possible for policy-makers given the labour division we find in Germany. In
Switzerland, policy-makers had to develop their own reflexive potential and interests as a re-
search actor. Federalism had, as described in chapter 3, constrained the development of federal
research policies considerably. Since the beginning of the 1990s a process of emancipation set
in that installed a small secretariat with a state secretary who has the capacity to define re-
search priorities and seek a consensus with other research actors. Policy lines have become
clearer since then in Swiss research policies. This Group for Science and Research within the
federal administration also gives the possibility of presenting a more coherent view within the
governing bodies of the SNSF, since 2002 exclusively within the foundation council. The
“voice” of the principal has, therefore, become stronger.
At least two of the four funding agencies have learnt to serve two masters, i.e. the Dutch
NWO and the Swiss SNSF. They have clearly integrated procedures that present possibilities
to both sides to express their interests in a suitable fashion. The stronger interventionist stance
of the Dutch government makes it more difficult for the NWO to keep its balance in compari-
son with the SNSF. The “checks-and-balances” structure of the CNRS has for a long time been
an obstacle to become a boundary organisation. It remains to be seen if the contract system
will overcome this hindrance. Finally, the DFG has clearly maintained its position as an agent
of the scientific community but will be put under pressure in the future to collaborate within a
more encompassing effort to organise the public-funded research systems in a strategic way.
If we therefore summarise the actual situation in the four countries in terms of an “equilib-
rium”, one could say that Switzerland and the Netherlands have found a relatively stable insti-
tutional solution for future challenges while France and Germany are still experimenting.
France still needs a major institutional reform of the CNRS while Germany needs a functioning
coordination of its fragmented parts of the research system
6 THE ROLE OF REFLEXIVE INSTITUTIONS IN THE CHANGE OF
POLICY-REGIMES
In this chapter we will discuss the place of reflexive institutions in the different national pol-
icy regimes and the role of these institutions in the policy-regime change we have described in
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the preceding chapters. By reflexivity we mean the capacity of systems to “reflect” on their
own behaviour, their structures, and problems and the attempt to find solutions to problems.
Reflexivity is therefore an integral and important part of learning.  
This chapter is structured by the following questions: When and what kind of reflexive institu-
tions countries have set up? What is the degree of ”density” of these kind of reflexive institu-
tions? How are they connected to the policy-design and to the regulatory and operational
structures? How have public-funded research systems used their reflexive capacities in order
to adapt themselves to new challenges and to implement policy design change and ultimately
policy-regime change?
6.1  The use of reflexive institutions in countries
First of all, it seems useful to simply describe the components of reflexivity in the different
national public-funded research systems. To do that, we will discuss when each country set
up reflexive institution and what are their organisational structures and activities.
6.1.1  Switzerland
The Swiss Science Council (SSC), established in 1965, was the first reflexive institution that
had been set up in Switzerland, some years after the German Science Council (1957), the
French CCRST (1958), and about the same time as the Dutch RAWB (1967). This corre-
sponds to the pattern we have described in chapter 3: The small countries were somewhat
later in developing their research policy frame than the big countries. The creation corresponds
to the beginning of the institutionalisation of a national research and higher education policy.
The federal government created the SSC in order to implement the results and recommenda-
tions of a national commission that treated the question of universities support. Formally, the
activities of the SSC were to support the national government in all questions related to sci-
ence policy. Members, appointed by the federal government, are coming from different areas:
scientific, political, administrative, and economical. Therefore the SSC can be defined as a co-
operative and integrative reflexive institution. The council is also a militia organisation even if
it has a permanent secretary.17 The organisation is as follows: a plenary assembly, a main
committee and sub-committees, and, as mentioned, a permanent secretary. The different sub-
committees show the diversity of the SSC activities: “research policy”, “higher education
policy”, “technological policy and innovation”, “science studies and monitoring”, “evalua-
tion”, “technological assessment”, and “foresight”. And since 1983, according to the adopted
Law on Research, the SSC formulates, every four years, recommendations for the federal gov-
ernment in term of research policy objectives. In more than two decades (1965-90), the SSC
has produced an astonishing number of reports and analyses related to the public-funded re-
search system that helped the federal government in its activities of designing the research
policy. Due to its militia structure, the SSC often mandates national and international experts
to evaluate or do other kind of analyses for the SSC.  
                                                
17 The militia organisation is related to the Swiss liberal political system and can explain why the Swiss politi-
cal system has a weak state or bureaucratic apparatus. On the advantages and disadvantages of militia organisa-
tion see (Germann 1996).
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In terms of learning, it is without doubt that the activities of the council played on important
role in the “adaptation of priority-setting” and the “operational functioning of research sys-
tems” to new challenges. The Council was very influential in the priority-setting of  research
policy. Its contribution to the operational functioning of the public-funded research system
was more indirect.
Despite of these important reflexive activities, the SSC never possessed a high degree of le-
gitimacy. One of the critical remarks was the too close connection to the federal power and
more generally to politics due to the presence of politicians and federal civil servants within
the SSC. It would lack therefore independence and would have pursued a too consensual
course in matters of the public-funded research systems.18 At the end of the 1980s, the minis-
ter in charge of the science policy, F. Cotti, argued on this point that the role of the SSC was
not to find a consensus but to produce new ideas.
The situation changed during the 1990s for a couple of reasons. First, by creating the GSR in
1991, the federal government reinforced the strategic capacities of the federal administration.
With this new structure, the SSC lost a part of its power in policy-design activities. Second,
with the set up of other reflexive institutions (see below), the SSC lost its monopoly of exper-
tise.
Ten years later, in 1998, in the context of a global reorganisation of the federal administration
and under the impulse of the new State Secretary, C. Kleiber, the SSC was reformed. The main
change was related to the organisational structure. Since this reform, only scientists compose
the SSC and the size of the secretary was reduced. Since this reform, the existing sub-
committees are organised, with contractual arrangements, in the form of two independent cen-
tres: the “Centre of Technology Assessment” and the “Centre of Science and Technology
Studies”. The latter was the core of former SSC activities. In 2001, this centre was definitively
de-connected from the SSC.  The rationale of this reorganisation was to strengthen the SSC
mission as “spokesman” of the scientific community and to become an independent “think
tank”. In term of activities, the SSC now had to deal also with technological policy and the
new polytechnical universities (HES, “Haute écoles spécialisées”). For all these reasons, the
SSC became in 1998 the “Swiss Science and Technology Council (SSTC). The reform of the
SSC was initiated and imposed from the outside (from the state secretary of science and re-
search). The idea of producing large reports on all domains and activities in science policy was
abandoned. The Council should rather produce advise and recommendations on a few domains
in order to take quick decisions on strategic issues. These reforms have, nevertheless, be put
into a more global context and be linked to the general transformation of the public-funded
research system.  The SSTC is no more the structure where large and deep analyses are real-
ised on the public-funded research system (even if the SSTC produces reports19) and could be
interpreted as a think tank where reflections on strategic questions are developed.
One can contend that with this reform the public-funded research system had become more
conflictual: actors struggle for pre-dominance in the policy-design. The reform of the SSC con-
                                                
18 See the debate in the annual report of 1988 (SSC 1988).
19 Four reports were produced by the SSTC : “Promoting academic careers at Swiss Universities” ; “a nine pro-
gram for the Swiss science and technology” ; “Clinical research in Switzerland” ; “Structural reform of the Swiss
higher education system”.
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tributed to this: Because there are no more politicians or civil servants represented, the SSTC
has radicalised its discourse and has become less consensual and more demanding.
During this period of time, but a little bit earlier (in 1994), the SNSF set up an “Informal
Group for Strategic Research” (GRIPS). The aim of this group that exists until today is to
strengthen the presence of the SNSF in the political debate on the public-funded research sys-
tem and to better defend its interest.20 Different experts of the Swiss research and higher edu-
cation policy participate in this group. Various topics are discussed within the GRIPS: pro-
grammatic research,21 gender, evaluation, knowledge transfer, academic career access for
women and young researchers, etc.
Few times after the creation of the GRIPS, the State Secretary of science and research set up,
in 1997, a think tank called the “Brain Trust”. The objectives of this organisation were numer-
ous: to discuss and to test informally new ideas and to get information of different national
organisations; to diffuse informally new ideas in the different institutions of the public-funded
research system; to help the state secretary in the production of reports, etc. The members of
the Brain Trust were distinguished personalities in the public-funded research system, repre-
senting the different political orientations. The Brain Trust played an important role in differ-
ent funding topics such as: the creation of the NCCR, “science and society”, the promotion of
young researchers, the promotion of social science, the financing of research, as well as the
foreign relations in science policy.
In a similar vein, the scientific societies re-organised themselves into one council, the Swiss
Scientific Societies Council (Conseil des académies scientifiques suisses, CASS) in 2000. The
aim was to have a more active (“intellectual”) participation in the national debate on  Swiss
research and higher education policies. As the SSTC, the CASS presents itself as the
“spokesman” of the science.
In sum, we observe that from the beginning of the 1960s to the 1990s the reflexive function in
the Swiss public-funded research system was mainly fulfilled by the SSC, except for a few
independent reports. As we have seen, this institution didn’t only produce advice and recom-
mendations for the federal government but it functioned also, due to its organisation, as a
“consensus producer” or as a “broker” (see chapter 2). This double function (consensus
building and reflexive knowledge producer) was put into question during the 1990s. After its
reorganisation, it became an adviser of the federal government with a clear anchoring in the
scientific community. The reflexive knowledge producer function was transferred to an “inde-
pendent” agency: the Centre of Science and Technology studies (CSTS). In this period of
transformation, we see the creation of other reflexive institutions, but this time – and that is
new – in organisations that are considered to be on the productive side of the boundary. This
is an indication that the necessity to think in reflexive terms is expanding and that there is a
blurring of boundaries between reflexive and productive organisations.
                                                
20 The idea to implement such kind of structure inside the SNSF came from an international committee evaluat-
ing the SNSF. In their evaluation, the experts criticised the passivity (too reactive) of the SNSF, especially
linked to the political and administrative actors. The GRIPS should increase the independence of the SNSF and
to better express its objectives.
21 As mentioned earlier in chapter 4, the GRIPS had suggested and developed the ideas and concept of the PRN.
118
This is an important change of the science policy-regime and of the public-funded research
system. The system becomes more reflexive but not only due to the activities of the science
council but because different actors have developed reflexive structures. The point is that re-
flections are now produced at different sites with the evident consequence that they are linked
to different interest and that they may conflict with each other. The multiplication of reflexive
institutions can, therefore, lead to an intensified struggle about the predominance in discourses
on the research policy-design.
How did the public-funded research system use the reflexive institutions in order to adapt to
new challenges and implement policy design change and ultimately policy-regime change?
If we compare the 1990s with the former period we see that the SSC was an important actor
for the institutionalisation of the national research policy until the 1980s, perhaps because it
had a monopoly in developing encompassing views and perhaps because it was organised in
the form of a cooperative-integrative body. We have seen that the federal government has used
the recommendations of the SSC for priority-setting activities. It is more difficult to evaluate
the impact of the SSC on the reforms introduced during the 1990s. Quite interesting in this
respect is the perception that the SSC has itself of its role. The president of the SSC under-
lined the important role played by the council in the priority-setting of the government and on
two other issues, i.e. the promotion of social sciences during the 1990s and the promotion of
young scientists. We have also to mention that the SSC has initiated a lot of international
evaluations on different instruments (for example, the evaluation of the “priority pro-
grammes”) or institutions. These evaluations, done by international experts, were often at the
beginning of reforms set up by actors of the Swiss public-funded research system.22
For the other changes that occurred during the 1990s, the SSC was just one actor among others
and perhaps not even the most important one. Initiatives and recommendations also came, as
mentioned, from other reflexive institutions like the GRIPS or the Brain Trust. It is clear that
the establishment of a reflexive group inside the SNSF increased the ability of the funding
agency but also of the public-funded research system in general to face new challenges. Works
and reflections done inside the Brain Trust have been important for the policy stance of fed-
eral government.
In the 1990s, therefore, several reflexive institutions contribute to the capacity of the system
to act with all conflicts that this involves in terms of competence but also with the advantage
of having several points in the system that contribute to a reflexive thinking on strengths and
weaknesses of the system.
6.1.2 Germany
As in the Swiss case, the German public-funded research system is characterised by a coop-
erative and integrative reflexive structure. From the beginning the German Science Council
(WR; “Wissenschaftsrat”) was thought as a “forum” between the Bund, the Länder, and rep-
resentatives of scientific institutions, in particular the DFG and the MPG. Initiated by the
                                                
22 Of course, the a reflexive institution cannot be the only factor explaining changes in national public-funded
research system. The knowledge produced by the SSC often informs, provokes, and stimulates but this in itself
is not sufficient. In how far the reflexive studies are “heard”, depends a lot on the legitimacy of the institution
inside the public-funded research system.
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president of the DFG in the 50’s, the aim was to exchange information between these actors
and to coordinate research policies more systemically on questions related to research financ-
ing (Stucke 1993). The set up of the WR received the support of all actors and was the first
intermediary structure between the Bund and the Länder and between the State and Science
(Stucke 1993: 53; Winnes and Schimank 1999: 29). The WR did not only focus on coordina-
tion activities. It is also an organisation that produces knowledge on individual research insti-
tutes, disciplines, universities, and on global problems of the research system. Thought as a
cooperative and an integrative structure, the WR has the following organisation: A scientific
council23 and an administrative council.24 The plenary assembly of the WR takes decisions at
a two-third majority. This decision structure obliges to find a consensus between members of
the two councils. Expertise and knowledge of the WR stem from commissions and working
groups, which are composed of members of the two councils and of external experts.
The decision-making structure and the organisation of the WR could be interpreted as a con-
sensus-oriented reflexive institution similar to the SSC in Switzerland. This last characteristic
has its advantages and disadvantages, which can be summarised by the following argument
stressed by Winnes and Schimank 1999: 139).
“Only through such an intermediary body the minimum level of coordination for public-
sector research and a productive dialogue between science and state on priorities and
problem-solving can be ensured. The strong impact which the recommendations and re-
ports of the Science council had on the structural and thematic development of the re-
search system are a clear indicator for this. On the other hand, the WR shows the disad-
vantages of the ‘the joint-decision-trap’ in full force. The need to balance the interest of the
Bund, Länder and representatives of universities and non-university research organisa-
tions reduce decisions often to the lowest common denominator. (…) Recommendations of
the Science council therefore are rather status-quo oriented and unable to deal with fun-
damental structural problems”
Therefore, in a paradoxical manner, the WR can be defined as a strong and weak actor of the
German public-funded research system. Strong, because it has, due to its structure, a high de-
gree of legitimacy with almost all actors of the public-funded research system (Hohn 1990);
Winnes and Schimank, 1999: 30) and weak because it is unable, also due to the structure, to
change deeply (or radically) the structure of the German public-funded research system. So,
the recommendations published by the WR put research actors under pressure even if the
statute of the expertise is a recommendation and not a legal decision (Winnes and Schimank,
1999: 30). But the recommendations will not change radically the system and its “référentiel”.
It is interesting to notice that the outcome of the integrative and consensus-oriented structure
seems to be different in Switzerland and Germany: The SSC was criticised because of its
proximity to policy-makers while the German Science Council is hampered by a “joint deci-
sion trap”. In fact we think, as we have stated in chapter 3, that the corporatist organisation of
this kind of reflexive structure will have “averaging out” effects both in Switzerland and in
Germany. Even if policy-makers may have had an outstanding position in the SSC it is diffi-
                                                
23 24 scientists and 8 public personalities compose the Scientific Council. The DFG, the MPG, the „Hochschul-
rektorenkonferenz“ (HRK; Conference of University Presidents) and the HGF propose the scientists. The Bund
and the Länder propose 8 reputated persons.
24 Representatives of the Bund and Länder compose the administrative council (22 members, 11 each)
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cult to see how they would have imposed their view in the forum of a consensus-oriented fo-
rum. The precise process of decision-making within the Councils is, of course, difficult to
know but a status quo tendency and gradual reforms in recommedations seem to be more
likely than radical turns.
Next to the WR who is the main and predominant reflexive institution in Germany, the BMBF
has set up during the 1990s two other reflexive institutions: the “Council for Research, Tech-
nology and Innovation” and the “Council for Innovation”. The aim of these institutions is to
advise the research ministry in its activities of policy-making and design as for example, the
“GRIPS” or the “Brain trust” in the Swiss case. These structures are more policy-design and
decision-making driven and do not produce knowledge on the whole public-funded research
system. The Council for Research, Technology and Innovation was, by the way, abolished by
the new social-democratic and green government in 1998. In a similar vein, a couple of Länder
has introduced similar kinds of “think tanks” on research policy.25
How did the public-funded research system use the reflexive institutions in order to adapt to
new challenges and implement policy design change and ultimately policy-regime change?
Since its creation, the WR has produced many reports. However, the recommendations for-
mulated by the WR were not always taken into account, especially not by the universities.
During the 1960s and the 1970s, the WR formulated suggestions to reform the research done
in the universities, such as to differentiate the budget allocated to research from the budget
allocated to teaching; competitive allocation of financial resources based on evaluation: inde-
pendent management of planning activities; more flexibility, etc. The universities saw this kind
of propositions as a “violation of Humboldtian legacy” (Winnes and Schimank, 1999: 63).
Therefore, despite of the initiatives taken by the WR (and also by the research ministry), few
changes occurred during the 1960s and 1970s and even the 1980s in the German public-funded
research system (Winnes and Schimank, 1999: 73). There were exceptions: It is during this
period that the DFG introduced, on the recommendation of the WR, the “Sonderfor-
schungsbereiche” (1968). With the context and the pressure of the 1990s (reunification, inter-
national competition, and financial scarcity), the position of the WR became more prominent
in the consideration of actors, especially through its evaluation activities. There is no doubt
that the evaluations of the WR with regard to the big science institutes and Blue List Institutes
have contributed to the process of reform, though not always exactly according to the recom-
mendations of the WR, though these were already compromises between policy-makers and
scientists. It seems that the WR has more difficulties to intervene in matters of the organisa-
tion of universities and in the domain of competence of the DFG and the MPG. This is easy
to explain: big science institutes and Blue List Institutes depend directly on policy-makers
while the other three institutions are well protected in their domains of competence. If policy-
makers are therefore willing, they can easily use the recommendations for change within their
own confines but not so easily within the confines of basic research.
It seems that here international and “neutral” evaluations have an advantage because reviewers
are not part of the national system and profit therefore from a relatively high trust in their
competent judgment. The reforms of the PPR in Switzerland and of the DFG and MPG were
                                                
25 For example the land Banden-Württemberg  has set up the “Landesforschungsbeirat” and the “Innovationsbei-
rat” (Winnes and Schimank 1999 : 123).
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based on such international evaluations and obliged scientific institutions to accept reforms.
This demonstrates that national reflexive institutions have their limits independent of its form
as a cooperative-integrative or expert body: The interweaving of these institutions with inter-
est groups in the research system, even if there is a claim of independent analysis, can always
give rise to protest and resistance if there are losers in the system because of these recommen-
dations. The expert body might more easily resolve this problem because one could easily
integrate international experts or attempt to find outstanding persons that are beyond any
partiality.
6.1.3 France 
In France, the first reflexive institution that was set up was the CCRST (“Comité consultatif
de la recherche scientifique et technique”) created in 1958. Its main function was to prepare
discussions in government. The name “comité des sages” had been given to it as it was com-
posed exclusively of scientists.
The genesis of this committee is representative for the actor constellation of the French pub-
lic-funded research system at this time. The first project that intended to organise research at
the ministerial level, presented by state minister André Malraux in 1958, proposed the crea-
tion of a  “Commissariat general à la recherche”, which would have been above all other minis-
tries, only directly linked to the prime minister, with its own budget, and a permanent staff.
This project was supported by the trade union of scientists but was contested by cabinet’s
director Pompidou, who argued that no minister would accept to submit his budget to a con-
trol of such an institution. In consequence, the ambition of the project was reduced to a mere
coordination structure. The “haut commissaire” was replaced by a “Comité consultative”
composed of twelve “wise men”, who were in charge of counselling the interdepartmental
commission “CIRST”, presided by the prime minister. The last feature was the creation of a
secretariat for the CIRST, namely the DGRST. This project was adopted on the 29th Novem-
ber 1958. However weak the new institutions seemed to be, they began to fulfil a quite impor-
tant place in the setting up of a modern research policy (Picard 1990).
The CCRST proved to be able to propose concrete measures. Problems arose when it sug-
gested the creation of an “Office des instituts nationaux de recherche”, dependent on the prime
minister. Those reforms – proposed on April 1959 – were ambitious and challenged the central
place of CNRS (dismantling of the Centre and separation of its funding and research func-
tions). This implied strong reaction from both the education ministry and the scientific com-
munity. The trade union of scientists reacted vividly and was heard by the cabinet. Neverthe-
less, it became clear that the creation of the CCRST and the DGRST challenged the former
sole competence in research policy-making of the CNRS with future conflicts to come.
There was another reflexive institution in the French public-funded research system before
1981: The “Comité National de la recherche scientifique” within the CNRS. This committee,
already mentioned several times, has, among others, also reflexive tasks. From 1959 onwards,
it has been in charge of a “rapport de conjoncture” in order to inform political decision-making
in matters of research. The first report was, however, not satisfactory given the hope placed in
the Comité National. In fact, it never proved able to fulfil this reflexive function. It has there-
122
fore often been accused of being a conservative institution in the hands of the scientific com-
munity. Without taking a normative stance, it is obvious that the Comité National based its
analyses exclusively on the criterion of scientific excellence and on disciplinary considerations
instead of a more global and encompassing point of view.
The election of Mitterrand as president of the French republic in 1981 set the start for a deep
reorganization of French public-funded research system, and implied a differentiation of its
structure, introducing reflexivity as one of the central tasks in the public-funded research sys-
tem.
The preparation of the new research law itself was the outcome of a reflexive effort repre-
sented by the organisation of the national “Colloque” on research and technology (see chapter
4). The first institutional change was the transformation of the CCRST into the CSRT (“Con-
seil supérieur de la recherché et de la technologie”), following the dissolution of DGRST,
which was replaced by a research ministry. The CSRT, divided in two colleges, is composed
equally of representatives of scientific and technical communities and of research partners
(representatives of the world of work, of the productive, social and cultural sectors, and also
of the regions). They are chosen by the ministry of research and are mandated for two years.26
The CSRT is placed under the responsibility of the research minister and chaired by him. Its
tasks are to give its opinion on the budget plans, to establish diagnosis and giving propositions
on all the issues regarding the national system of research: funding, human resources, industry,
regional and international aspects, socio-economic challenges and the institutional organisation.
It is responsible for strategic evaluation (Barré 1994). Apart from these reunions, the day-to-
day working of the CSRT is assumed by ad hoc working commissions, which are composed
by people outside the CSRT. This evolution from CCRST to CSRT marked a will to gain
more political influence. Indeed, the CSRT appears to be less connected to the performance
level than the former CCRST, notably because of its composition. Moreover, it takes a place
in the general movement towards the institutionalisation of science policy that occurred in
1982, and it represents the reflexive component of this movement.
Then, one of the most significant features of the research law of 1982 was the introduction of
an independent evaluation. Evaluation is in our view, both an instrument of governance, as it
allows a better knowledge of the system for policy makers, and of reflexivity because it is
clearly a part of a self-reflection of the public-funded research system. In this case, we want to
focus on the second, reflexive role of evaluation. The will of implementing evaluation was
demonstrated in the setting up of the CNE (1985) and the CNER (1989), which were the out-
comes of the decision to strengthen evaluation in the 1982’s and 1985’s Law on research. .
Other creations were the  OPECST (1983) (“Office parlementaire d’évaluation des choix
scientifiques et technologiques”) and the OST (“Observatoire des sciences et des techniques”)
created in 1990.
The CNE and the CNER are independent agencies that are linked to the political level. The
CNER consists of ten members, nominated for six years by the French president. It is the
national institution in charge of evaluating research bodies, research programmes and proce-
dures. It evaluates also the accuracy of the priority chosen by the science policies (strategic
ex-post evaluation); the good use and proportion of the funding allocated to programmes.
                                                
26 Members could make a maximum of two mandates.
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Around 1992-1993, a “second push” of reflexivity took place in the French public-funded
research system. The evaluations undertaken by the CNE, the CNER and the CSRT led to the
same conclusions with regard to the general problems affecting research. We will not describe
those evaluations as it is not our focal point here. However, it must be underlined that one of
the effects of those evaluations was the setting up of the contract system from 1994 onwards,
arriving in the CNRS in 2002. The contract system has a reflexive component as it obliges
research institutions – similar to the Netherlands – to elaborate an “establishment project”
where it must integrate the guidelines elaborated at the national level, and where it must posi-
tion itself as part of the public-funded research system in relation to other organisations. This
movement towards contracts induced the creation or the reinforcement of reflexive compo-
nents inside research organisations like CNRS.
The nomination of Allègre as minister in charge of research implied the creation, in 1998, of
new reflexive institutions: the CNS (“National science council”) and the “Conseil national
pour un nouveau développement des sciences humaines et sociales”. The task of those coun-
cils is to give advice to the research minister concerning the “hard sciences” (CNS) and regard-
ing humanities and social sciences (the latter council). The CNS is supposed to inform the
government about major scientific developments, present general priorities and ideas about
balancing the research system.27 Based on these recommendations, the government develop its
policies on a rational base, in considering the interests of science and economy.
The CNS is composed of scientists (one third of them from other countries). It diverges from
the CSRT as its members are not selected as representatives of institutions or socio-economic
groups but as « eminent scientists » and experts. The CNS appears clearly as an instrument of
the research ministry.
Next to those two institutions are a number of coordination and concertation institutions
which flourished between 1998 and 2000 .
Every EPST has also a scientific council. If we take the example of the CNRS and the reform
of its statutes that occurred in October 2000, there is an attempt to give more autonomy to the
scientific council as a reflexive institution. Before, this reform, the scientific council was con-
sidered as a “ratification organ” for the direction of. In the new configuration, the Administra-
tion Council is no more represented inside the Scientific council and the General Director of
the CNRS no longer presides the Scientific council. This organisation is conceived to give more
room for manoeuvre to the scientific council28. Its tasks are: “veiller à la cohérence de la
politique scientifique du centre en liaison avec l'ensemble des instances scientifiques
consultatives du Comité National de la Recherche Scientifique. Il donne également son avis sur
la création ou la suppression de programmes intéressant plusieurs départements, d'instituts
nationaux, ou d'unités de recherche et sur les propositions de nomination aux grades de
directeur et de maître de recherche pour les personnels qui restent régis par les dispositions du
décret du 17 janvier 1980 susvisé. » In addition, the General director of the Centre have to give
the scientific council a feedback about the implementations of its recommendations, and the
                                                
27 Décret no 98-938 du 20 octobre 1998 portant création du Conseil national de la science.
28 The members of the scientific council are: eleven members elected by the CNRS workers, 11 members desig-
nated by the research ministry on the CNRS proposal (3 from the economic world) and 8 foreign scientists des-
ignated by the ministry on proposal from the elected members of the scientific council.
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president of the scientific council – elected by its members – has a consultative voice in the
Administration council.
There is also a trend toward reflexivity at the operational level that is stimulated by the con-
tractualisation procedures that, from 1994 on, became the frame for the relation between min-
istry and research bodies. Indeed, the contract implies an effort of reflexivity from the research
bodies in order to situate themselves inside the public-funded research system, which one of
the conditions of the contract. Reflexivity become therefore a central question of reproduction
of the research bodies inside the system, because they have to “prove” their relevance for the
public-funded research system in order to fulfil the contract.
In sum, France is characterised by a large number of reflexive institutions, which are not really
connected to each other. The large panel reflects the desire of different ministers (at different
periods) to reform the public-funded research system.
How did the public-funded research system use the reflexive institutions in order to adapt to
new challenges and implement policy design change and ultimately policy-regime change?
Concerning the “oldest” reflexive institution of French public-funded research system, the
Comité National, it is unwilling to adapt itself to the new challenges, it remains firmly commit-
ted to strictly scientific evaluation criteria, which include disciplinary division of scientific
labour.
For the rest of the reflexive institutions, we find something like a paradox when we investigate
the influence of reflexive institutions. The following statement of the OECD resumes very
well the situation in France
“La difficulté n’est pas tant définir des priorités, ni même d’obtenir un consensus suffisant sur
ces priorités, que d’évaluer les résultats pour mesurer le chemin parcouru et de tirer de cette
évaluation des enseignements pour la poursuite de l’action. La France est dotée de suffisam-
ment d’organes de contrôle et d’évaluation pour disposer en principe de toute l’information
nécessaire. Force est cependant de reconnaître que la complexité du champ à évaluer et la
multiplicité même des opérateurs et des niveaux de l’évaluation rend la chose malaisée”
(OCDE 2001)
Despite, then, of a lot of reflexive potential, France has difficulties to use this potential effec-
tively because of the complexity and fragmentation of its landscape. This appears more clearly
if we take the main reflexive institutions: First, the CSRT appears not to be a key player be-
cause its means are not proportional to its duties. If we compare the CSRT with the German
Science Council, it is far from having the reputation of its German alter ego. It produces ad-
vices and recommendations but they do not have the same standing as the analyses of the WR.
The other reflexive institution, the CNS, did only come into existence because of a political
act. After the departure of the minister, it plays no role in the priority-setting of the system.
The CNE and the CNER also lack means and influence, partly because of their advisory role,
with the result that their advice is taken into account only when it can be easily implemented
(Callon 1995).
Moreover, it seems that the French reflexive institutions are not strong enough to influence by
their own strength science policy. The use of ad hoc commissions and “Colloques” becomes
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necessary to make the system evolve. The process that led to the implementation of contracts
from 1994 onwards is more complex as it has been favoured by a convergence in analysis of all
relevant institutions plus the influential Commisssariat Général du Plan in 1992-1993.
The process of reform of the CNRS at the end of the 1990s illustrates this weakness of insti-
tutional reflexivity as the reform has been prepared by ad hoc working groups (“CNRS-
AVENIR” and the “Réflexion stratégique” du CNRS) and not by the usual reflexive institu-
tions. This process is also representative of another problem that reflexivity has to face in the
French PFRS, namely the specificity of the political stream. The first reflexive exercise
(CNRS-Avenir) has been set up in order to meet up to the interventionist challenge by minis-
ter Allègre. The changing at the head of the ministry and at the head of the CNRS implied that
all the recommendatins made within the framework of the CNRS-Avenir were abandoned and
a new ad hoc working group “CNRS-Réflexion stratégique” was set up.
We could say that, despite of its weaknesses, the reflexive boundaries of French PFRS have
been partly able to implement the new policy design. Concerning the ability to change the
overall policy-regime, the French public-funded research systems is actually facing a major
challenge as the legal structure of the public-funded research systems is not adapted to con-
tractualisation (Iribarne (d') 1999). The reflexive institutions have not yet proved able to con-
tribute to a convincing solution until now.
6.1.4 Netherlands
Reflexive institutions are well developed in the Dutch public-funded research system. To start
with, it must be underlined that the Netherlands have a long tradition of using (quantitative)
information. It is perhaps not astonishing that this tradition has been transferred to scientific
developments. Not only do we find the creation of an advisory council RAWB in 1967 but
also the setting up of a new scientific discipline “wetenschapsdynamica” (the dynamics of
science) at universities with a few active researchers at the beginning of the 1980s. They had a
considerable influence on the reports and discussions taking place and a number of influential
analyses have been undertaken by these researchers ((Dijk, Frankfort et al. 1993: 153). Later,
in the mid-1980s, a special funding programme was used to develop more knowledge about
evaluation studies. In addition, the Netherlands have developed in an impressive way the use
of science and technology indicators (Berwert, Reuter et al. 1999: 57). They serve the function
to improve joint actions between enterprises and the state by coordinating research and devel-
opment. There are further attempts to develop the scientific base for the use of this informa-
tion in the policy process by founding new disciplines and attracting researchers into these
areas.
There are two areas where the reflexivity in the Dutch public-funded research system was
developed.
(1) The first step was the institutionalisation of evaluation: this already started in the 1970’s
and continued in the 1980’s.  The rise of evaluation procedures in the Netherlands follows
three reasons: First of all, it was inspired by austerity considerations and the aim to reduce
state expenditures. Second, it was stimulated by the cabinet in order to have a more “rational
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policy-making”. Third, evaluation was part of a project to bring about the strategic turn in the
public-funded research system.
We can differentiate four levels of evaluation in the Dutch public-funded research system.
First, universities started with evaluation in 1982, with the obligation to submit research pro-
jects in order to receive “conditional financing”. As a result of the agreements made in 1992 by
the Minister of Education and Science and the 13 universities, the Association of Universities
in the Netherlands (VSNU) was asked to set up a system for external research evaluation
(quality control for university research) as a complement to the internal efforts with regard to
quality control (Eiffinger 1997: 32). Since then, the VSNU has set up a national system for
external quality assurance in education and research (van der Meulen and Rip 1997: 10). Re-
search programs of the universities are assessed on a four years schedule (van der Meulen and
Rip 1997: 10). This system is intended primarily to be used as an instrument for research
management by the universities themselves. It seeks to underpin decision-making at the vari-
ous levels within the universities up to the level of the executive board (Eiffinger 1997: 32).
Secondly, since the 1980’s, an increasing number of what Rip and van der Meulen call “free-
floating evaluation committees” arises ((Rip and Meulen 1995). These committees produce ad-
hoc and decentralized studies about disciplinary and research area developments.
Thirdly, the setting-up of the IOP was the beginning of the development of more regular and
systematic evaluation procedures of government-financed funding programs (see also Eiffinger
1997: 27).
Finally, one of the most important developments is the establishment of regular evaluation
procedures for research institutes, which have taken place within the “new governance struc-
ture”. These evaluations are not used to allocate funds or to redistribute funds. Evaluations are
there to be sure that research institutes are respecting the general confines of strategic research
and what has been negotiated in contracts and statutes of these organisations (Eiffinger 1997:
30). On the same way the research institutions have integrated the evaluation as a normal pro-
cedures in the research field, being also aware of its possible negative outcomes. So, the typical
model for such evaluations is one of external evaluations usually undertaken by independent
peers, is often preceded by internal or self-evaluations (see also (Braun 2001). In this way,
evaluations have gradually become an input for discussions of research organisations with the
minister of Education, Culture and Science on the implementation of their strategic plans.
Evaluation is also a means and increasingly used so to see if newly created institutions hold
what they promise. Almost no institution today can be sure to exist forever. At least, there is
always the risk of serious reorganisations. NWO had to accept an evaluation after seven years,
the AWT has been evaluated after a four-year time-span, and so are other organisations. In
principle, research organisations in the Netherlands are now only founded for a limited time-
span, before they are controlled and perhaps continued, reformed or dissolved. Evaluations
serve to judge on these questions. This, of course, can raise the efficiency of the system ac-
cording to the criteria developed for the evaluation. In addition, it introduces an “evaluation
culture” in the system, where organisations cannot be sure that they will survive.
(2) The second area of reflexivity is foresight. Foresight received political attention after the
publication of Irvine and Martin study in 1984 (Irvine 1984). Thinking in terms of foresight
seemed to be the adequate answer for a small country with a limited potential and the need to
concentrate forces. And it fitted into the general administrative tradition of planning and pro-
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jection. The social-democratic minister Ritzen, who came into office in 1989, commanded an
additional study by the authors. This should become a new foundation for the education min-
istry OCW to push forward the ability of the government for priority-setting. OCW was
known until then for its lack of vision and priorities.
The study led to the creation of the Consultative Committee for Exploratory Studies (Overleg
Commissie Verkenningen; OCV), which had the task to organise a broad process of foresight
studies and to give possible solutions for problems. The minister promised to base his policy
on the work of this committee and present it to the parliament. The basic structure of the pol-
der-model was respected: First, the ministry delegated priority-setting to an independent, in-
termediary committee; second, this committee should coordinate all the different foresight
activities that were emerging, like evaluation studies, in quite a number of institutions and on
several levels. The OCV issued its final report in May 1996 (OECD 1998: 116).  The govern-
ment took over the themes outlined in the final report of the OCV and presented them as pri-
orities in its Science Budget. After its report, OCV was dissolved because it had done its task
(1996). A new organization was created that had the task to unite both the advisory function
of the former RAWB and of the foresight aggregating task of OCV. This became the Advisory
Commission for Science and Technology (AWT; “Advieskommissie voor Wetenschap en
Technologie”).
The OCV “consists of influential figures from scientific and business communities. (…). Ex-
ploratory studies present the longer-term opportunities offered by research and define social
and private sector demand for research. Using scenario analysis, the OCV develops options
for science and technology policy, on the basis of which priorities can be set. It is not up to
the OCV to select these options; that is, the responsibility of the government, the various
interested parties (…). To increase the chances of implementation, the major research organi-
sations are represented in the OCV. Companies and other social agents are closely involved in
the survey to ensure a wide basis of support for its results.” The integrative concept is there-
fore clearly visible in the composition of the OCV. A firm anchoring in the scientific commu-
nity was respected (Rip and Meulen 1998: 759-61). Members were chosen with an eye on
their double functions and disciplinary background. Without a formal representation relation,
they were seen as consultative representatives of these organisations, and, as a consequence,
were expected to function as an ambassador for the Committee within these organisations and
disciplines.
There were two reasons to create the AWT: First, the Government White Paper of 1995 had
united the forces of ministries, especially of EZ and OCW, and both institutions wanted a
common council that could take into account science and technology policy developments.
Both ministries are paying half of the costs for this institution. Second, the RAWB was re-
garded as an institution with too many affiliations with the different organised interests in the
research system. There was a feeling that this hampered innovative propositions of the advi-
sory council. As with the “Wagner Committee” in 1981, the ministries chose therefore a more
independent organisation consisting of non-affiliated, independent persons. It was explicitly
said that members should not represent organised interests. For its composition: half of the
members of the AWT are appointed by OCW, the other half by EZ. The reunions are pre-
sided in turn by these ministries.
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The tasks were, as indicated in the beginning, defined as: advising government and parliament
in all matter of science and technology policy. OCW (but not EZ) can ask the AWT to do
foresight studies in science and technology. The AWT is focusing on the knowledge and inno-
vation trajectory. As in the case of OCV, the government obliged itself to integrate the recom-
mendations of the AWT in its policies.
However, a first evaluation in 2001 demonstrated that the body did not meet up to expecta-
tions. The reports delivered by the AWT were not of sufficient quality because members of
AWT were not used to do the kind of foresight studies required. In the background, another
discussion played a role leading to a reformulation of the role of the AWT: There were con-
flicts with other organisations feeling more capable of doing the foresight studies necessary
like, for example, the sector councils (see below). It was criticised that the mix of foresight
studies and advisory function was not a good idea and that one should differentiate these two
functions. The evaluation recommended in the end to indeed concentrate strategic foresight
studies at the level of sector councils and to let the KNAW do all scientific foresight studies.
The AWT is still advising the government today, but, first the government is not any longer
obliged to follow the advice of the body and the AWT is now dealing with the more general
and systemic topics in science and technology while the other organisations are dealing with
basic and strategic research.
The Royal Dutch Academy of Science (KNAW) is responsible for the organisation of discipli-
nary and scientific foresight studies. To this end, it has its “disciplinary councils” that can
implement such foresight studies. Its specific task is to analyse how one can promote certain
developments in disciplines.
The KNAW is a reflexive organisation that is close to the scientific community. Its modes of
choosing foresight areas is representative of its anchoring in scientific community as it is often
not OCW that is asking for a certain expertise, but the scientists in the KNAW themselves
that take the initiative, even if the project must be later approved by the OCW. With the in-
troduction of the global budget, this situation has somewhat changed because the governing
board can alone decide what kind of foresight studies it wants to do. The interview partner
maintained that the KNAW has quite a high legitimacy and independent status, and that OCW
has not too much influence on these decisions.
The last element of reflexivity is represented by the four sector councils, which are a Dutch
peculiarity. Indeed, while priority setting and the recent foresight exercises can be found in
almost all countries, the sector councils,29 focussing on specific domains like agriculture, health
or energy (= sectors), are unique (van der Meulen and Rip 2000: 12).30 Their composition is
manifold comprising researchers, users, administrators, and government officials) (van der
Meulen and Rip 1997: 5). Their creation was inspired by, and modelled after, the already ex-
isting National Council for Agricultural Research (NRLO), which had already been created in
the 1940s. Though the precise function is changing in the course of time, from the organisation
                                                
29 They were given a legal basis under the Law on Sector Councils in 1987 (van der Meulen and Rip 2000: 12).
The Dutch name “sectorraden” means sector councils but the official translation (since the middle 1980s) is
“Advisory Councils on Research” (van der Meulen 1997). We nevertheless stick to the Dutch term sector coun-
cils.
30 The sector councils were defined in terms of problem domains and relevant research, rather than according to
departmental boundaries, which was innovative (van der Meulen and Rip 1997: 5).
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of coordination among producers in sectors like agriculture or health and the government to the
fostering of innovation today, reflexivity was always thought of as a main task of these or-
ganisations. The almost corporatist composition of these bodies lend itself to gather informa-
tion from producers, clients, and scientists and discuss this information with the government.
The sector councils can, in addition, mandate experts to elaborate certain problems and find
solutions.
Their statute differs. In principle, they are financed by one or several ministries and they are
responsible to these ministries. The ministers have the right to create and dissolve these bod-
ies. Nevertheless, they have a relatively independent status most of the time in terms of op-
erational freedom. A commission, the “Sector Councils Consultative Committee” (COS), is
defending the interests of all councils. In fact, sector councils try to avoid being treated as a
part of a ministry because this would jeopardise their broker function they envisage to fulfil.
In terms of reflexivity, they see themselves as the legitimate organisations within their research
area – that is not disciplinary, but sector-bound – to deliver all necessary information for the
government and to do the necessary foresight studies in order to let the government decide on
future policies. In contrast to the KNAW, sector councils insist on strategic and not on basic
research.
Sector councils have to prepare reports every four years on the overall policy and research
direction in the sector in question, but their main impact is through a variety of reports pub-
lished in the meantime, and the interactions and networking that are part of the preparation
and dissemination of the reports (van der Meulen and Rip 2000: 14). The sector councils are
also involved in processes, which monitor and stimulate research programming by others, like
foresight and evaluation (van der Meulen and Rip 2000: 12). They can also initiate evalua-
tions.
How did the public-funded research system use the reflexive institutions in order to adapt to
new challenges and implement policy design change and ultimately policy-regime change?
One should evoke one major problem of the “reflexive structure” in the Netherlands: Though
the Netherlands have developed a very elaborated and fine-tuned reflexive intelligence struc-
ture, a lot depends on how this structure is connected to implementation. The connection be-
tween the “reflexive field” and the “funding field” is one of the major keys to success. And it
seems that this connection has not always functioned satisfactorily. This is mentioned with
regard to the relationship between sector councils and the NWO, which should work closely
together. For a long time this has not been the case because foundations and Area Councils
were using their own evaluation procedures to base their actions on. Though NWO was sup-
posed to work strategically, there were no institutionalised settings for bringing the recom-
mendations of the sector council over to NWO policies. Only recently we find a positive ex-
ample which might very well present the key to future success: A former foundation, financed
by the health ministry, ZON, responsible for health care, has been united within NWO with
the medical area council and became ZONMW. Under its roof, all different activities of health
research are united. ZONMW is therefore both basic and applied oriented in its activities. A
close connection is set up between RGO, the ministry and ZONMW: RGO is there to advise
the ministry on long-term developments by integrating the advice of all kind of different activi-
ties. The ministry is integrating this advice in its policy guidelines and ZONMW becomes the
executing agency for these guidelines. To overcome misunderstandings and resistance all actors
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are participating in the reunions of other actors so that there is a constant flow of information
and early consensus-building. Another encouraging development is the working together of
KNAW and the RGO in some of the foresight studies. In addition, with the reformulation of
the tasks of AWT, the more general foresight studies and analyses are serving as general in-
formation in the work of the RGO.
The justification to speak of the poldermodel in the use of “reflexive knowledge” in the Dutch
context is justified. The tradition of “controlled delegation” of raising reflexive knowledge to
the intermediary level and the bottom-up aggregation procedures demonstrate that priority-
setting is a process of interaction in which it is more important to build a consensus on what
to do in research policies rather than to find objective measures of foresight measurement.31
The foundation of the AWT attempted to break with this tradition, but this approach was
abandoned after only four years. Today, the network approach seems to be a promising alter-
native to the existing poldermodel which is more based on the “thematic approach” of a gov-
ernment which is finally responsible to make its choice and impose its choice on all actors in
the system. The network approach is “postmodern” in that it delegates authority to networks
that are much freer as “agents” than the individual intermediary or operational organisations.
The network approach is therefore a new mode of steering which is different from the polder-
model approach. At the moment this is only a confrontation of two different discourses but
the “innovation networks” have shown that institutionalisations are already taken place and
several studies attempt already to introduce this new discourse in political action.
Up to now, the poldermodel remains the main structural principle. This is why we find the
“densely populated intermediary layer” (Rip and Meulen 1998: 758). This “reflexive” layer
has developed since the 1970s in a rapid fashion, first to realise austerity measures and to in-
troduce strategic research into the system and later to rationalise political priority-setting.
This proliferation of the reflexive system has known frequent changes in a top-down fashion
and rapid self-organisation at the operational level. Evaluation has become an element of daily
“housekeeping” and foresight studies are needed also to gain legitimacy for policy proposals.
The foundation of the OCV was clearly the attempt of a minister to introduce a corporatist
and Bernal-like foresight system of priority-setting in research. The foundation of the AWT
has abandoned this approach and wanted a more autonomous and neutral expert system. The
lack of anchoring in the existing layer has made it impossible to continue into this direction.
Instead, a clearer differentiation of functions in reflexivity has been institutionalised guaran-
teeing to each institution the survival but also making the system more effective. There is a
clear labour division in foresight studies and there seems to be more cooperation between these
different institutions than before. The traditional lack of coordination between policy formula-
tion and implementation seems to become less important than before so this is a very prelimi-
nary impression.
                                                
31 (Veld, Bruijn et al. 2002) discusses several case studies about the use of knowledge for policy making. In one
case study they conclude about the poldermodel: there are many actors and a strong network between political
arena and knowledge arena. There is a lot of deliberation and the opinions of others are taken into account. To
find a “draagvlak”, a common ground, is most important. This is done by deliberation with a lot of actors. No
need to impose decisions.
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Overall, the Netherlands demonstrate progress in the development of their “reflexive system”.
There have been periods of trial-and-error and there are still contrasting approaches today.
However, the emerging system seems to overcome retrenchment and ancient hostilities and
become much more flexible than before.
6.2 Comparison
We can deduce from the description above that reflexive institutions have had an important
role in the development of research systems everywhere. It seems that they are a necessary
instrument for government to develop ideas on future reforms, propositions for priorities, and,
often, for consensus-building in the public-funded research system. These functions can best
be fulfilled when reflexive institutions are really boundary institutions, i.e. delicately balancing
the different forces. Reflexivity can be a means to solve “puzzling” but one should never for-
get that knowledge is also a power resource that can be instrumentalised by actors. Any sus-
picion that the reports of reflexive institutions may be biased in favour of one side or other
will reduce the legitimacy of recommendations. We will come back to this point below.
In systematising our findings we can, in the first instance, see differences in the “density” of
reflexive institutions public-funded research systems have applied. Density might be pertinent
in order to see if a higher density of these kinds of institutions fosters a higher degree of “ra-
tionality” in the public-funded research system.
We observe that until the 1990s, the Swiss public-funded research system was characterised
by a low degree of density in term of reflexive institutions. The SSC was the only reflexive
institution. On the other hand, since the 1990s, a couple of new reflexive institutions were set
up, such as the GRIPS, the Brain Trust, and the CASS. The Swiss structure of reflexivity has,
therefore, been flat but is differentiating and becomes more complex. This effect is exacerbated
because of the transformation of the SSC into a scientific advisory council that may become
one voice next to others instead of building a consensus around new propositions.
As in the Swiss case, the German public-funded research system is characterised until today
by a flat structure of reflexive institutions. Set up earlier than the SSC, the WR is, until today,
the only reflexive institution in Germany. Moreover, it has not changed its organisational stat-
utes or structures like the SSC in Switzerland has done. However, Germany is following the
tendency in the 1990s to increase the complexity of its structure by setting up bodies attached
to the BMBF and the cabinet. Their role is, however, reduced and seems to be temporary.
Recently, there is the proposition of setting up a forum of all funders in order to develop a
common strategy in research policy-making. Even with the introduction of such a forum,
Germany’s structure would remain flat.  
In France, the degree of density was low before 1981, as the articulation and “rationalisation”
of the public-funded research system was not the central preoccupation of research policy-
makers. The reflexive components of the system were either weak, like the CCRST, which
suffered from the weakness of its “secretariat”, the DGRST, during the 1970s, or “unable”
(unwilling) to fulfil their reflexive tasks like the Comité National.
From 1981 onwards, the density increased, because of the political will to integrate the “bal-
kanised” public-funded research system. The “Colloque” has been a profound reflexive exer-
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cise that gave birth to the further institutionalisation of reflexivity. In 1989, the density of
reflexive institutions has become much higher as the CNE is dedicated to evaluate the universi-
ties, the CNER to evaluate research, and the OST is on the way of being set up. If we look at
the situation in the year 2000, we notice that more reflexive institutions have been added. The
system nowadays is a complex one.
The Netherlands clearly have the highest density of reflexive institutions among the four coun-
tries. Though being the latest with the creation of a reflexive body, they started in the 1970s to
be preoccupied by their capacity to reflect. The development of evaluation capacities and then
foresight capacities are consequential steps. In contrast to France, one can say that these ca-
pacities are used within the political decision-making process and form a base for decisions.
This seems to be much less the case in France. The 1990s are, again as in the other countries, a
period of rapid changes in the landscape of reflexive institutions: the establishment of the “co-
operative-integrative” OCV, the transformation of the RAWB and the OCV in the independ-
ent expert body AWT and the demarcation between the different reflexive institutions in the
beginning of the new century.
What can we learn from this?
First, that the creation or transformation of reflexive institutions has been more rapid in the
1990s than in the former periods. There is a tendency in all countries to use reflexive institu-
tions more intensively since the 1990s and, with the notable exception of Germany, also a
proliferation of reflexivity to non-specialised bodies within the research system.
One should be aware that in the 1990s the term reflexivity has two connotations: one is the
traditional reflexivity “for science policy”, an exercise of thought with the objective to over-
come problems of and develop perspectives for the research system as a whole. The second
one is a reflexivity that individual organisations need to survive in a more complex environ-
ment that, in addition, is demanding specialisation and strategic thinking. Reflexivity is here a
means of these institutions to develop their view with regard to research development and
their (future) positions in the research system in comparison to other systems. Such a reflex-
ivity must not – but can – seek for solutions in terms of the system but only in terms of indi-
vidual survival. The studies and analysis developed in this context can, however, be used in
the general discourse on the future of the system. They then become a mix of general and indi-
vidual reflexivity, and they can compete with the analyses presented by the specialised sci-
ence councils. The spill-over of reflexivity to other actors within the system is, therefore, a
blessing and a curse: More strategic thinking can help to overcome problems but “opportunis-
tic” advice may favour solutions that will not be in favour of the overall system.
The example of France and the Netherlands demonstrates that proliferation does not onlyy
mean that non-specialised actors develop reflexive capacities, but also that specialised institu-
tions proliferate. In the case of France, one wonders if this was the case because of the eager of
politicians to have more reflexive capacities or if these institutions were needed as a kind of
“symbolic capital” that could be used to further political interests, or if the higher complexity
is a result of the already complex operational structure of the research system as such. In ei-
ther case, more reflexive institutions would not necessarily mean more reflexivity, and cer-
tainly not more effective policy-making.
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Whether proliferation of science councils or of reflexivity in other institutions, proliferation is
subject to another problem that the cases of Switzerland, France, and the Netherlands re-
vealed:  this is that more reflexive institutions can only function effectively if their compe-
tences are clearly delimited and if they are well connected. As soon as the first point is not the
case, conflicts for predominance in reform discourses begin that affect seriously the advice of
all organisations. Here, the monopoly of one institution as in Germany can be an advantage.
The second point, connectedness, is important to avoid fragmentation, inconsistent advice and
lack of information about other areas. The bad example is France in this respect given its com-
petition between political nominated reflexive institutions and the CNRS and the large number
of different and fragmented institutions, while the Netherlands seem to have found a way out
recently to delimit the competencies of their multitude of reflexive institutions and to find
mechanisms to aggregate the advice of these institutions.  
The problem of connectedness brings us to another point. It turns out that reflexive institu-
tions that are not able to play the boundary role but that give the impression that they are too
closely linked to either the political or the scientific side, have extreme difficulties in making
their voice heard at the other side. Examples are the discussion on the SSC in Switzerland at
the end of the 1980s and the CNS in France on the one hand and on the Comité National in
France and, we would add, though the discussion is not opened yet, the SSTC in Switzerland,
on the other hand. The CNS was a political creation despite of the scientists were making up
the body. This reduced seriously the legitimacy of the CNS in the scientific community. This
does not mean – and this is all the reason for the political creation of reflexive institutions –
that these institutions have no influence on the priority-setting and on the policy-design in
general. They do as the example of the SSC demonstrates. The problem is implementation.
Recommendations that are not supported by the scientific community will have extreme diffi-
culties to be accepted, even after policy-makers have decided to implement them. The other
example has the same difficulty: Recommendations of the Comité National, -and this may also
hold for the SSTC in Switzerland because of its firm anchoring within the scientific commu-
nity, even its representative function of scientific views – are not heard by policy-makers. A
biased position destroys the credibility of recommendations. Reflexive institutions have there-
fore an interest in gaining the position of a boundary organisation that can keep both sides at a
distance. The SSTC may have a hard time in this respect: Though it is officially recognised by
policy-makers, it now represents the view of scientists and does not appear as an “independ-
ent” expert body. It is hard to see, how, in this case, it can fulfil a general function of reflexiv-
ity.
Connectedness means also a third dimension, next to the coordination of reflexive institutions
and the link to either the political and scientific system, i.e. the connection of reflexive institu-
tions with implementation: Normally, reflexive institutions have a more direct link with the
“political stream” in order to prepare political decisions while the link to the intermediary
agencies on the productive boundary are lacking. That this can have negative consequences has
been shown in the case of the Netherlands where implementation was often failing because of
the lack of this direct link. This will become an even bigger problem if there is a profound dis-
tinction between independent scientific institutions on the one hand and policy-makers on the
other hand as is the case in Germany and France. In both countries the divide between the
political system and the scientific system is evidently larger than in the small countries making
the role for reflexive institutions more difficult. One of the few means to overcome this divide
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has been the use of “colloques” in France that can mobilise the country as a whole. Such a
“colloque” could be an interesting idea for Germany to overcome its apparent divisions be-
tween the scientific and political institutions. Reflexive institutions have an interest in devel-
oping good contacts with implementing agencies – already in advance – to be sure that they
will be heard. This confirms one more time that a biased position of reflexive institution is
detrimental to the reflexivity in the system. While we see new mechanisms in the Netherlands
to increase direct relationships between for example sector councils and the NWO, reflexive
institutions in Switzerland and Germany use personal relationships to connect reflexive insti-
tutions with funding agencies. There are representatives of the DFG in the WR and the SSTC
has influence in the SNSF. France has the major problem of having a reflexive institution at the
level of the CNRS, the major body of the scientific community, and that relationships with the
CNRS and the research ministry are often conflictual. This reduces the influence of “politi-
cally initiated reflexive institutions on the CNRS.
The third point we want to raise concerns the organisation of reflexive institutions. We can
induce from the examples based on the four countries that there are two models to organise
reflexive institutions: the one is the “cooperative-integrative” type, the other is the “independ-
ent expert” type.
Germany and Switzerland, for example,  have, at least until 1999, implemented the coopera-
tive-integrative type. They are “cooperative-integrative” in that they integrate all major forces
in the research system. The German type can even be called corporatist as it organises coop-
eration in the form of formal chambers within the WR while cooperation was organised more
informally in the SSC. Since 1999, both systems deviate from one another, as Switzerland is
giving up the cooperative-integrative organisation of its reflexive body. Instead, it introduces
the independent expert model of the “scientific advisory body” that has been the predominant
form in France and, most of the time, with the notable exception of the OCV, also in the Neth-
erlands. The Netherlands use, however, sector councils as permanent reflexive institutions that
integrate users, producers, scientists, and policy-makers. One distinction one can add is the
composition of these independent expert bodies: They can be, and most of the time are, com-
posed of scientists nominated by the government (or the president, the queen). Recently, es-
pecially in the Netherlands, stakeholders from industry and other sectors are included.
The rationale of these two models is different:
(1) The cooperative-integrative model not only envisages to give well-found advice, it seeks at
the same time to build up a consensus among the main actors in order to be sure that the ad-
vice will be heard. In this way, the problem of a failing implementation or a failing decision-
making can be reduced. The problems this model encounters is above all the “joint-decision
trap”: especially in a corporatist construction like in Germany, recommendations are negoti-
ated and often the smallest denominator will be the outcome of these negotiations. Reflexivity
is, therefore, the looser in this game, but the system is more stable and develops the capacity –
if a consensus has been found – to gradually turn around the system. Radical changes are ex-
cluded, except in extraordinary circumstances or profound paradigm changes as we see them in
the 1990s: The role of the WR has been more influential because strategic thinking has infil-
trated in all organisations. This was the time when more radical – but still not revolutionary –
reforms like the one with regard to the big science institutes could be realised. One should be
clear, however, that in this model, the creation of consensus is more important than the quality
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of the advice. The advantage is the apparent high legitimacy of the advice, if not there is the
impression that one side has been more influential in the negotiation process than the other.
This is difficult in Germany because of the decision-making formula. It was easier in Switzer-
land because decision processes were more informal in the SSC.
(2) The independent expert model, by contrast, does not confuse functions, but focuses on
advice. The idea is to give a number of independent experts, who are considered competent,
the possibility to formulate their point of view. Seldom are these institutions equipped with a
real decision-making power. A recent example where this is the case, is Austria. The problems
of this model are also evident: all depends on the possibility to build up a high legitimacy
among actors on both sides, political and scientific. As such a committee is freer than the co-
operative model to formulate more radical advice, it can be the case that recommendations are
quite unfavourable for some actors in the system – something which is very rarely the case in
the other model – and that recommendations will meet harsh resistance. Implementation may,
therefore, be the main problem. There are indications that the reverse case, namely a very
strong affiliation with one side, can also be found, not only in the case of the Comité National
or the KNAW, but also in the case of institutions set up by the government as the CCRST in
France. In this case the credibility of the institution is decreasing.
This problem leads to the recommendation that one should use “international expert commit-
tees” instead to develop an unbiased view of the situation in a country. We have seen, in fact,
that this plays a role. International experts can be chosen for their competence and only for
their competence and they are supposed to have no connections and interests linked to the
system. Though there are question marks here as, often, international experts have their net-
works, otherwise they would not know and understand the system, the use of these experts
could help to overcome capture of these independent expert institutions. One could imagine
that such international experts also participate in national reflexive institutions. This would
raise the credibility of these institutions, at least in the case of the “independent expert
model”. It would less make sense to integrate these experts in a cooperative-integrative model.
Two last remarks should complete our findings:
There are differences in the way reflexive institutions are proceeding to prepare their recom-
mendations (and there are, of course, different instruments to do so, not only by reflexive in-
stitutions but also by ad-hoc committees and “colloques”): one way is to delegate the task to a
special expert committee that prepares the report that is then discussed within the reflexive
institution. The other is a more elaborate procedure, the Netherlands often use, i.e. attempt to
integrate most actors in the development of recommendations. The example here is the OCV.
This corresponds to the process of “induced aggregation” where consensus-building is of great
importance. It is, therefore, not absolutely necessary that the reflexive institutions itself is
organised in the form of a cooperative-integrative body. It can use an aggregation process in
order to prepare its recommendations. This, however, is rarely done in the context of one re-
port because of the high transaction costs this needs. The Netherlands are, nevertheless, the
country that, without any doubt, is the most inclined to use such aggregation procedures.
They are also found in Switzerland in the preparation of priority themes and in Germany in
the 1990s, when a Delphi study was used to develop priorities. The “colloque” in France is
another example. Most of the time, though, such extensive procedures are not used.
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Finally, it is important to mention that the use of evaluation and foresight procedures – as an
important form of reflexivity – have not been used in an equal fashion in the countries. Again,
the Netherlands spring out because of their early efforts to build up a scientific base for
evaluation and foresight and because of their efforts to integrate such procedures in the prior-
ity-setting and strategy-building of the country. It seems to us that the integration of evalua-
tion, in particular, as a routine process of all research institutions in the system is a very im-
portant point to raise the overall reflexivity of the system. The Netherlands are the best ex-
ample for this and France has started in 1994 to go into the same direction. The use of new
public management methods, i.e. contracts, has been most important for the integration of
evaluation and, hence, strategic thinking in the public-funded research system. This demon-
strates that reflexivity needs also a research base that is prepared to react: The introduction of
evaluation raises in general the capacities of research institutions to act, it contributes to the
general discussion on problems of the system and it makes it easier to implement priorities
and reforms once decided on the political level. Strategic thinking of research institutions,
which is very much influenced by regular evaluation, is a conditio sine qua non for the effec-
tive use of reflexivity.
We think that the Netherlands are, in this respect, far ahead of the other three countries, that
France is following neatly, but has considerable difficulties to rebuilt its structures to make
them conducive to such an effort, that Switzerland has started at the level of universities to
introduce more strategic thinking, while Germany has started at the level of the big science
institutes with first experiments in this direction. The message is clear here: if these three
countries will not be able to introduce strategic management as a routine process in their re-
search institutions (and this means at the operational, intermediary, and political level), even
perfect solutions and recommendations developed in the reflexive process will have difficulties
to be implemented. In addition, it lacks an important input for reflexivity in the system.
7 ADDIN SUMMARY
7.1 Summary about objectives and finding
One of the first findings in our project was that research policies in all OECD-countries were
and still are subject to a profound paradigmatic change in research policies. The period we
investigated was therefore, clearly, not “normal policy change” but a more profound change in
policy ideas and the “policy core” (cf. Sabatier). The focus of our attention became therefore
not to describe country differences in the different modes of policy-learning, as for example
developed by Peter Hall (Hall 1993), but to show how countries have learnt to cope with this
paradigmatic change, how they adapted or resisted the implications of the new “ideas” into
their policy-design and ultimately how they learnt to reform existing policy-regimes. Learning
meant, therefore, the capacities of countries to develop new and innovative ways of reform, of
creating a consensus on reform and of using their “reflexive capacities” in implementing re-
forms. More in particular, we concentrated on one main point of reference in the new para-
digm, i.e. social and economic “responsiveness” of public-funded research systems and how it
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was institutionalised in the causal beliefs of research policy institutions and implemented
within regulatory and operational structures of the public-funded research systems.
While paradigmatic changes in the way how to organise research for purposes of innovation
and societal problems are widely discussed in the literature of the sociology of science, we
could show in our research that there is a confluence of paradigmatic changes at two levels: at
the level of the “référentiel sectoriel”, i.e. the way how to organise public-funded research in
order to improve its effectiveness and efficiency given a change in the causal beliefs on the
functioning of science and technological innovation, and at the level of the “référentiel global”,
i.e. the way how the state organises its relationship with society. Recent changes and the kind
of learning processes can only be understood if one discerns both paradigmatic changes that
are interlinked in their consequences but not in their origins.
If one looks in more detail into these changes in ideas on research policy-making, one can fur-
ther disentangle the working of “ideas”: “Responsiveness” as a policy aim started in the 1970s
as the outflow of a social-democratic “conjoncture” (cf. Poulantzas) and economic crisis. It
was the social-democratic notion of responsiveness, i.e. the introduction of social responsibil-
ity and sustainability, which encouraged the institutionalisation of research policies at that
moment. Only at the end of the 1970s do we see the more fundamental paradigm shift in tech-
nological innovation (“new growth theory”), followed by “mode-2” thinking and “strategic
research” in the 1980s and 1990s with concomitant shifts in the use of instruments. Finally,
the “référentiel global” changes in most countries in the 1990s. This is the moment of the
“second push”, when all countries were changing their institutions into the direction of “stra-
tegic” and “programmatic” action.
A major finding of our study is that while we expected large variation between countries in
coping with the “ideational change”, we found a large convergence, though the points of intro-
ducing changes and the process of change differed. We could demonstrate that on the three
levels of investigation in our study – the use of instruments for technological innovation, the
reform of research institutes at the operational level, and the change of “regulatory” institu-
tions like funding agencies – the contents concerning what to do were very similar. On the base
of empirical knowledge we developed “ideal models” on each level that were in the end found
(with modifications) in each country. Once again, there were large differences between coun-
tries when reforms had been introduced but the contents of the change were found at least in
nucleo in each country.
As our research design had been based on divergence (of learning), we were not prepared to
tackle the question how causal beliefs have spread to such an astonishing amount and rapidity
among our countries? The answer to this question would have needed a similar research design
as Peter Hall has used it for explaining “social learning” in economic policy. From our inter-
views and the literature we have, nevertheless, drawn some preliminary lessons concerning
this question. It seemed to us that research policy is a policy field, which, for a long time, has
not been highly contested and lacks therefore the polarisation in the party system that could
make a rapid diffusion of ideas difficult. In the absence of political polarisation, the adminis-
trative logic of higher effectiveness by means of “lesson-drawing” (Rose 1993) can become
prevalent. The prevalence of this logic in the research policy field explains perhaps also the
relative density and intensity of international administrative networks, another favourable
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factor for the diffusion of knowledge. The role of supranational organisations like the one of
the OECD cannot be underestimated in matters of research. This has been proven for the de-
velopment of research policies in the 1960s. Given the various reports published by the
OECD in our period, as well as the indications we have for example on the link between
OECD recommendations and policy change in Switzerland. We presume that the OECD has
remained a nodal point in the diffusion process. The role of “reference countries” does play a
role in most policy fields but in particular in research policies. One can discern different peri-
ods where different countries have in sequential order played a role for imitation of countries.
Most recently, Japan and the USA belong to the group of reference countries. Japan made the
blueprint for most technological innovation instruments in the 1980s, transferred to the UK
and from there to most of the other European countries. “Mode-2” strategies, the “triple he-
lix” etc. are modes of organising science that are above all and foremost developed in the USA
and diffused from there to the other countries. The diffusion of the “référentiel global” is quite
another story, which does not concern us here but which is studied in various contributions
(Ferlie, Pettigrew et al. 1996; Bogumil 1997; Braun and Merrien 1999; Kettl 2000). It would
need, however, another study – and this will be our next project (see the summary of “Die
Transformation von Forschungssystemen: Konvergenz und Divergenz in der For-
schungspolitik von OECD-Ländern” attached to the report) to confirm the importance of each
dimension and the precise processes of diffusion of policy knowledge.
Instead of analysing how exactly new policy ideas are diffused, we endeavoured to look into
the process how the new paradigms have set through, how they have changed the policy-
design and the policy-regime that is linked to this design. There is a clear sequential order in
this process: First, causal beliefs change with implications for the use of future policy instru-
ments and, later, structures and institutions on the operational level and the boundary are at-
tacked in order to bring the structure in accordance with the policy-design. We endeavoured to
describe this process of change and reforms that were the outcomes of new causal beliefs
rather than to explain the process of acceptance of new causal beliefs, as we originally in-
tended, at least for Switzerland. In this way we were able to demonstrate how this change
happened in each country, reveal the learning processes behind these processes, and under-
stand differences in a more rapid or a more slow spreading of ideas. We consider it as a contri-
bution to existing knowledge to have shown that the paradigm change is a deeply political
process, something often underestimated in studies of the sociology of science which are fo-
cussing on the operational level of research. Our study demonstrates the political dimension in
the transformation from “mode-1” to “mode-2” research.
Before we present our results more in particular we would like to come back to one point we
mentioned in the introduction of our report and which figured prominently in the outset of our
study: we intended to show the importance of “puzzling” in policy-making but without for-
getting “power” as the central category in political science. We think we have stuck to this
intention: It clearly emerged, as our previous remark on convergence has shown, that “ideas
matter”. Their force, the causal beliefs behind the ideas, can be at the source of profound po-
litical change. Ideas can gain such a momentum that no actor can stay outside their orbit. Even
the DFG had to made concessions at the very last with regard to the notion of “strategic sci-
ence” and “responsiveness” and even the CNRS had to agree to a contract system in 2002.
Ideas have, however, material force, i.e. they often determine who are the losers and winners
of the political process emerging from these ideas. Our analysis, turning to the implementation
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of instruments and the reforms of institutions, has revealed the role of “power”, of veto-
points, of domain struggle of actors and the results for learning. Actor constellations explain to
a large extent the learning capacities of countries. This is why we invested considerable time to
describe these constellations.
Another introductory remark concerns what we have called “reflexivity” and “reflexive institu-
tions”. Self-reflexive capacities of research systems have until now very seldom been the ob-
ject of research, and they have not been our object of study at the outset of the study. Evi-
dence has shown that they are important for learning capacities. We refer in the first instance
to organisations like science councils and advisory committees but also to a more general
knowledge produced by evaluation and foresight. According to us, reflexive institutions and
reflexive mechanisms form an important part of the learning capacities of the system because
they can instruct and “rationalise” action. This is why we have dedicated a chapter in the
comparative report as well as case studies in each country to the role of reflexivity in coun-
tries. Our findings demonstrate the proliferation of reflexivity in most countries and the im-
portant role reflexive institutions can play in policy regime change. At the same time, they are
embedded in actor constellations and therefore in domain struggle of actors. In this sense,
“puzzling” and “power” is again, but this time within one organisation, the subject of our
study, revealing by the way the inseparable unity of both sides of policy-making. As in the
case of convergence, we know, however, that our findings are preliminary and that further
investigation is needed. This would be the second follow-up project we have not yet devel-
oped: analyse in more detail the internal functioning of reflexive institutions in different coun-
tries and their connection with the level of decision-making and implementation.
The role of boundary organisations has, in particular drawn our attention. We have found
evidence on several levels (implementation of instruments; reflexive institutions; funding agen-
cies) that institutions that are built to link different functionally differentiated systems with-
out bowing to either system have a special positive importance for learning processes (see
(Braun 2003). We believe that the functioning of these boundary organisations is still not suf-
ficiently known and further research would be needed to improve our knowledge in this re-
spect.
We think that we have found a number of interesting conclusions concerning systemic learning
capacities in research systems. More in particular we could induce from our empirical observa-
tions which kinds of structures are conducive in the knowledge generation, accumulation, and
diffusion. The model that emerges is based on decentralised and inclusive organisation, bound-
ary and reflexive organisations, flat structures, a low degree of competitiveness, and endoge-
nous learning.
In the next sections we would like to summarise our main finding. The following section
7.2.1.1 highlights some of the main points of the chapters on policy-design (chapter 3), in-
struments (chapter 4.1), research institutes (chapter 4.2), funding agencies (chapter 5) and
reflexive institutions (chapter 6).  Section 7.2.1.2 treats the two variables we have used as a
framework for choosing our case studies, the federal-unitary structure, and the size of the
country, which is synonym to the kind of political culture we find in countries. The “em-
beddedness” of countries within such structures might be an intervening explanatory variable
in order to explain variations in learning capacities. Section 7.2.1.3 treats the governance ca-
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pacities of governments in the four countries and in the final section 7.2.1.4 we will present
some general hypotheses on the learning capacities of research systems that might be used in
further studies for confirmation.
7.2 Results
7.2.1 Changing the policy-design and the policy-regime
The change of the policy-design in the 1970s
We started our analysis with the 1970s because it turned out that this moment was decisive
for a first fundamental change in the policy-design of research policy and we wanted to know
how this change came about. In addition, one can see that the change in policy-design gener-
ated already a first change in institutional structures of the public-funded research system. In
the Netherlands and Switzerland it was the impetus to set up a research policy at all.
It turned out that this change was not yet the paradigm change, which developed later on in
the 1980s and 1990s, but a change inspired by political ideas about the role of state interven-
tion (active, interventionist, planning) and the role of science had to play in society (problem-
solving; contribute to sustainability of resources and nature). The public-funded research sys-
tem was subject to these ideas launched by social-democratic parties that were in most gov-
ernments at that moment. The pressure behind these political ideas was not only an aspiration
for social-democratic hegemony but also the economic crisis and the disquieting report of the
Club of Rome warning against the consequences of the “scientific-industrial-political” growth
complex for nature.
Two remarks can be made here:
One, it becomes visible, and this is confirmed later on in the case of the neo-liberal turn at the
end of the 1970s, that “party-control” and “conjoncture” matter in order to change the policy
design of the “référentiel sectoriel”. Neoliberal governments have easily grasped at the message
of the “new growth theory” and the political consequences in terms of political action (facilita-
tion and not intervention) and initiated new research policy instruments and a different stance
of government in policy-making. The general ideas of the “référentiel global” change by party-
control and “conjoncture”. In due consequence they become part of the design of policy-
makers in the different public policy areas and the “référentiel sectoriel” has to be adapted.
Second, it is shown that in this way “responsiveness” becomes a main objective in the re-
search policies of countries but it is not yet the responsiveness defended later on in the con-
text of economic interests and technological innovation. Nevertheless, the social-democratic
policies started to change the public-funded research systems into the direction of more re-
sponsiveness, which made it easier later on to continue the reforms in the context of “systems
of innovation”. One should stress that the change in the 1980s would perhaps not have been
possible without the first reforms in the 1970s though they are not directly linked. The impor-
tant point is that the policy-design and also some of the regulatory and operational structures
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start to change and that responsiveness becomes for the first time a “point of reference” in the
policy-design.
The more detailed country reports demonstrate that “institutional legacy” mattered within this
transformation process: Germany had advantages because of conducive structures for respon-
siveness already developed; France shut down its conducive structures at that moment and
had to wait until 1982 before it could change its policy-design; the small countries had to re-
form more fundamentally their structures that did not correspond to the demands of the new
policy-design. While the Netherlands declared a “big bang” change they, in fact had some diffi-
culties to reform their structures but started seriously so in the 1980s. Interesting is the case
of Switzerland, which was in fact quick to react and which found a solution that, for a long
time, installed an equilibrium in relationships of research and between conflicting demands of
responsiveness and autonomy of science. We contend that the cooperative-integrative struc-
tures Switzerland had built within its science council and its main funding agency contributed
considerably to this formulation of a consensus. The solution – to confer to the semi-
autonomous funding agency the task of managing oriented research – was such a balance be-
cause it prevented a stronger centralisation of funding at the level of the federal government
which was favourable for both the member states and scientific representatives; the participa-
tion of the federal government within the funding agency guaranteed “voice” and influence, and
the funding agency could maintain its monopoly position in the domain of funding though it
had to accept more influence by policy-makers. This equilibrium and the avoidance of a more
complex regulatory structure (by, for example, using other funding agencies or a research min-
istry) had lasting positive effects in terms of learning and did not change much even after the
federal government set up a special unit for research policy. The institutional solution found in
1974 was path-structuring until today. It was advantageous in terms of learning because do-
main conflicts could most of the time (not always as the struggle concerning the “priority pro-
grammes” in the beginning of the 1990s demonstrates) been avoided and the cooperative-
integrative institutions created the necessary links for consensus-building.
Instruments and responsiveness
There are two points we want to raise concerning the chapter on instruments and responsive-
ness.
The first one concerns a learning device that seemed to be particular promising and that we
found above all in the Dutch case of implementing the innovative-oriented programmes in the
beginning of the 1980s. The responsible ministry delegated the execution of the programme,
decisions on the concrete financing of projects and daily management to an independent com-
mission where the ministry was represented but could not dominate. The position of this
committee Rip and Nederhof labelled as a “fixer” (Rip 1986) and in our terminology, we
would use the term “boundary organisation” for this committee. The transfer of the right to
decide and act gave this commission a considerable independence in dealing with the affairs of
funding and the scientific and industrial side was well integrated or connected to the commis-
sion. This gave the commission an unique position as a “go-between” (see also (Nooteboom
1999) between science, politics, and industry. The preparedness of policy-makers to grant
such a considerable independence made it at the same time possible to develop learning proc-
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esses within the commission that resulted in frequent adaptations of its functioning.
There is no need to elaborate the functioning of this institution in detail here. We believe, nev-
ertheless, that such a position as a boundary organisation is particularly conducive to social
learning as it is inclusive and integrating and because it attempts to balance the different ration-
ales of systems (Braun 2003).
The second point is the difference we found between the small and consociational countries
and the big countries in their mode of learning concerning the innovation of policy instruments.
We contend that both the Netherlands and Switzerland – despite of differences  - have a more
inclusive and decentralised way of organising learning processes than Germany and France.
There are striking similarities in this respect between the two small countries. The inclusion of
all major actors, bottom-up aggregation processes, “fixers”, and often a rather remote stance of
government32 make learning an encompassing communication process. The effect is indeed
“systemic learning” as inclusion fosters also the diffusion of learning and results. We have
labelled this type of learning “deliberative learning”.
Germany’s position can be characterized as “in between”: There are inclusive elements in
Germany, which even take a corporatist character but this concerns industry and not the inte-
gration of basic research institutions. The dualist character of the German system – with  a
strong research ministry and a strong scientific community, represented by the DFG and the
MPG – makes learning processes exclusive and, in part, competitive. Germany uses no “fix-
ers”. The project agencies of the research ministry cannot be regarded as such.
The same holds for France where we find a similar and even more conflictive structure because
of unclear domain competences between the research ministry and the CNRS. Learning proc-
esses seem to be even more exclusive than in Germany where the Wissenschaftsrat dampens
somewhat the effect of the dualist structure. In France, intermediary organisations are lacking.
This makes it that there is no balancing of forces in the French system. Instead, we see a
shifting of balances to one side or the other which prevents systemic learning. “Competitive
learning” seems to be the right term for learning processes in France.
Extra-university research institutions and responsiveness
There is also considerable convergence in the new model of how to organise research structures
in a more responsive way but terms and points of time differ. The general tendency is to
change research institutes which for a long time have functioned according to the “anarchic”
university model into “strategic” actors in the research system. A shift from global, institu-
tional funds to programmatic and competitive funding as well as evaluation as an integral part
of the functioning of organisations are the components of reforms.
Again, we found differences between small and big countries. This time, however, neither the
structure nor the policy of the small countries was similar. A first interesting observation in
                                                
32 This does not mean that government would always remain outside. In Switzerland, the federal government has
several veto-positions it can use but it remains a rather weak actor. In the Netherlands, especially the education
ministry can be quite interventionist. We will come back to this below.
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terms of learning is the case of Switzerland: When the research law was adopted in 1983, the
federal government could have used its authority to create extra-university research institu-
tions on a more extensive scale than before. It did not do so. Several reasons might have played
a role: the (bad) experiences from other countries, the considerable long-term costs this would
have meant and the long predominance of universities in the system. Path-dependency won
and led to the introduction of a rather flat and flexible structure of financing extra-university
research institutions. This avoided the problem of the other three countries in the 1990s how
to reform their extra-university research institutions. At the same time, Switzerland could not
in the same way profit from the assets of such institutions in terms of stock of knowledge and
specialisation in applied research or in different research topics. In this way, the Swiss main-
tained their flat operational structure, but since the 1990s they are reforming their universities
quite according to the model the other countries are using for their institutional reforms.
The Netherlands has a similar complex extra-university research structure as Germany and
France.  We found that, nevertheless, they were able to start profound reforms already in the
1980s, while Germany waited until the end of the 1990s, and France initiated a big bang in
1982 but had considerable difficulties in implementing the new policy lines. Only now, France
is starting like Germany to make business and introduce more fundamental changes. At the
same time, it seems like the Netherlands have already achieved their objectives and that their
system is coming the nearest to the “responsive model” of institutions.
Without going into detail, we consider that a number of factors explain the success of the
Netherlands: the harsh austerity policy; a central government, which introduced a “controlled
autonomy” for the institutions in the public-funded research system; the “voice” for a large
number of actors; the existence of economic models that were congruent with the later models
of new public management, a long tradition of “functional” or “corporatist” autonomy in dif-
ferent sectors of society, which offered an “isomorphous” and conducive structure to the re-
forms; finally the frequent use of evaluations and advisory committees. It took, nevertheless, a
considerable amount of time before these reforms were concluded. This demonstrates how
difficult it is to change institutions, which have a considerable potential of resistance.
France and Germany had even more difficulties. Several reform attempts failed, among others
because the extra-university research institutions in both countries were particularly large and
important. Radical reforms would have meant considerable “sunk costs” for the government.
This protected these institutions for a long time until a “second push” in the 1990s brought a
radical turn in both countries. In France, the turn can be attributed to the confluence of several
critical analyses from quite different institutions concerning the functioning of the research
system. This initiated a new reflection process that ended in the introduction of the contract
system in the CNRS and, already before, for other research institutions.
Germany needed several impulses in order to arrive at a more fundamental reform of its big
science institutes and, gradually, also of other institutions. Learning based on the creation of
new big science institutes after reunification, a considerable budget stress and, most remarka-
bly, the rise of a thinking based on “systems of innovation” in political circles and boundary
institutions. These different influences resulted in the demand from policy-makers to have all
institutions evaluated in their functioning within the system. The most visible result is the
introduction of programme funds for the big science institutes and the reduction of institu-
tional global funds to a maximum of 20% of resources. The rationale is, of course, to integrate
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strategic thinking within these organisations.
We have, therefore, a quite varied picture: Switzerland, which had learnt how to avoid rigidi-
ties in the public-funded research system; the Netherlands which, gradually but steadily, re-
formed its public-funded research system completely and both France and Germany that have
only started with serious reforms developing a stronger responsiveness of research institutions
in the system. The impression of the somewhat quicker sailing boats represented by the small
countries and the big tankers France and Germany seems to be confirmed.
Funding agencies and responsiveness
Though funding agencies are part of the boundary and therefore of the regulatory structures,
the main features of the reform we presented above for the extra-university research institu-
tions – with the exception of Switzerland – is also valid in the case of funding agencies. For
France, this is evident as the CNRS represents both a research and a funding organisation.
We see, again, a general shift in the kind of model that is applied with regard to the funding
agencies: This time it is a shift from institutions that are deeply anchored in the scientific
community to institutions that serve as boundary organisations, i.e. that integrate the twofold
rationale of responsiveness and scientific quality while maintaining their independence.
It seems to us that, once again, the small countries have better solved this transformation
process. The Swiss developed early, as shown, a balanced model of a funding agency, where
the relevant actors of the research system were represented. Policy-makers felt evidently that
they were well represented within the Swiss National Science Foundation and scientists had
their protected domains in the departments of fundamental research. When the balance seemed
to have been toppled in favour of policy-makers, reforms attempted to rebuilt the delicate
balance. Today, there is a clear division of labour between the research council managed by
scientists and the foundation council where policy-makers and stakeholders are well repre-
sented and decide on the more strategic question of the organisation. The funding agency has
for a long time clearly functioned as an arena where the interests of actors were such balanced
that major conflict were absorbed. The major changes, the introduction of new programme
funds, passed without major conflicts. In addition, the SNSF was prepared to evaluate its own
functioning two times in the 1990s, which gave sufficient opportunity to adapt the organisa-
tional structure.
The story of the Dutch NWO is longer and much more complicated. We can repeat what we
already stated in the case of Dutch extra-university research institutions: there were a number
of factors – in part unique in the case of the Netherlands – that contributed to the gradual
transformation of research and funding institutions. In the case of the NWO, additional factors
were the important role of the management, the case of a permanent political pressure, the
change of the constitution in 1988, and – as in Switzerland – frequent evaluations. Today,
NWO is defining itself as an intermediary agency serving two masters, the political and the
scientific, being eager to build bridges in this sense. Basic and applied research belong to the
fundamental tasks of this organisation.
The French government was  - after the change of the “constitution” of the CNRS in 1982 –
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frequently attempting to reform the internal organisation of the CNRS but failed to do so until
2002. We attributed this failure to the more conflictive stance of the CNRS vis-à-vis the re-
search ministry and above all, to the “political discontinuity of power”. Learning processes
need stability and a long time. Lessons are built on experiences that are built on lessons etc.
France failed to make sure that lessons were constantly drawn from former experiences and
lessons. It “re-invented” the wheel too often. Nevertheless, one sees that nowadays, France is
trying to re-build the CNRS in terms of a boundary organisation but must still prove that it
will be capable to do so.
A very different case is Germany. One can surely state that Germany is the only case where
the main funding agency, the DFG, has not been transformed into a boundary organisation.
This is the result of the dualist structure. In contrast to France, which has a similar dualist
structure, the DFG is, however, well protected in its freedom by the constitution and has
never accepted a fundamental reform of its own statutes. It has remained the “agent” of the
scientific community while the CNRS was, since the beginning in 1939, a boundary organisa-
tion, even when it developed into an organisation representing above all the scientific commu-
nity. There have been some minor reform attempts recently that have led to the introduction
of a strategic group within the organisation and the set up of a new funding instrument but this
does not change the unwillingness of the DFG to become a boundary organisation.
Germany is, according to us, the country with the most serious problems in introducing “stra-
tegic science” into the public-funded research system. It lacks a boundary organisation but is
built on a dualist and often conflictive structure (the research ministry and the DFG). The
dualist structure forecomes an encompassing coordination process like we find it in Switzer-
land and the Netherlands; it has not introduced yet a contract system that could be used for
the introduction of strategic thinking in research institutions and, hence, the dispersion of stra-
tegic science is still lacking. The DFG might be right in defending the basic research area as a
domain of the scientific community, a boundary position would, however, help to connect
different parts of the system and raise the overall learning capacity of the system. The capac-
ity of one organisation to link basic and applied funding is, without any doubt, today an ad-
vantage when the time between invention and application becomes ever shorter. We think that
the Dutch NWO has gone the farthest in this sense, as are, by the way, the British Research
Councils. The Swiss have strengthened in the meantime their technological agency, which cre-
ates new coordination problems. The CNRS in France must still find its role in applied re-
search and is encircled by a large number of more applied-oriented extra-university research
institutions.
Reflexive Institutions
The creation of reflexive institutions took place in the early days of research policy-making,
i.e. at the end of the 1950s and during the 1960s. Most of the time this meant the establish-
ment of a scientific council. The next period of reform and institutionalisation have been the
1990s, which can thus be seen as the most active period of institutional reforms in all four
countries, though Germany failed to change its reflexive structures in this period. It is charac-
terised by different activities: an intensified use of existing science councils, a creation of new
scientific councils and a proliferation of reflexivity to other institutions of the public-funded
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research system. We made the distinction, though, between “reflexivity for science policy”
and “reflexivity for survival”. The proliferation of reflexivity meant above all that more insti-
tutions are developing a “strategic sense” and “strategic activities” to maintain their positions
within the research system. This has positive and negative corollaries: As a positive effect can
be seen that the diffusion of reflexivity contributes to a higher level of reflexivity of the sys-
tem while the negative effect, the individual rationale behind this reflexivity, fosters “oppor-
tunistic behaviour” which is detrimental to a rational development of the public-funded re-
search system.
We contend, in addition, that a strong proliferation of reflexive institutions increases the dan-
ger of conflicting and contradictory advice and of malevolent competition because these insti-
tutions become entangled in a struggle for domain competence. A clear demarcation of compe-
tencies, intelligent links between the different institutions, and an organised aggregation proc-
ess of reflexive studies are needed to forestall this negative effect.
We discerned two general models in countries: the “cooperative-integrative model”, which
integrates stakeholders in the organisation and formulates recommendations on the base of
informal or formal compromise; the “independent expert model”, which looks for well-known
scientific (or other) experts who are directly advising the government.
We considered that both models have their advantages and disadvantages: The first model links
consensus-building and advice which makes it easier to implement the recommendations af-
terwards but, often, recommendations are the “lowest denominator” of different interests and
not the “rational solution” at hand, which reduces the legitimacy of these recommendations as
well as their effectiveness. The second model has the advantage of a stronger independence of
experts from external influence and a high legitimacy of their recommendations. Recommenda-
tions can be more radical as they are not required to take into account the different interests in
the public-funded research systems. The disadvantages are, first, that radical recommenda-
tions, which almost always mean winners and losers, risk to remain in the drawers of the re-
flexive institution and, second, that these institutions are, nevertheless, drawn in the direction
of scientific or political interests.
We believe that the best solution to organise the reflexive process are reflexive institutions
which are best situated when they keep their distance to both sides, science and government
and are considered independent in their judgment. The creation of international expert bodies,
increasingly used in countries, seems to go into the right direction and one can imagine to inte-
grate such international experts also in national independent expert committees.
This does not yet solve the problem of connecting such independent bodies with the scientific
community and government. Here, different models can be imagined. It seems favourable to
have a broad bottom-up aggregation process that could be organised by this independent ex-
pert body and that could be the base of the recommendations. Bottom-up means, of course,
also propositions and interests of the government.
No reflexive action can, however, have positive effects when the research and regulatory struc-
ture is not conducive to strategic thinking. Only if the different institutions in the system are
used to think in terms of their strategic position in the system and to think in terms of welfare
effects for the system, can we expect to have a successful spread of “rational ideas” within the
system. The introduction of regular evaluations of institutions and programmes linked to the
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development of strategic plans seems to us a conditio sine qua non for successful reflexivity.
7.2.2 Does centralisation of power and consociationalism matter?
At the outset of our research, we contended that the concentration or dispersion of powers
among political units (i.e. federal or unitary states) and the size of the country mattered as
intervening variables in the explanation of variations in learning capacities. The size of the
country meant differences in the political culture prevalent in countries: Small countries usu-
ally have dense networks of elites and a habit of consensus-building (consociationalism) while
big countries are more prone to centrifugal and conflictive forces. What can we say about these
two variables at the end of our study?
Federalism matters
Without any doubt the difference between federal and unitary states matters in learning but
one has to specify the relationship. Federalism structures above all institution-building in the
public-funded research systems. This was in particular visible in Switzerland. The extremely
flat structure, the weak political actors and the strong and cooperative-integrative funding
agency must be explained by the conflicts between cantons and the federal government and the
predominance of decentralised federalism in this country (see in general (Braun 2003). Feder-
alism has contributed, but was not the only factor, to the “diffused powers” in the public-
funded research systems that are at the base of the “deliberative learning” type in Switzerland.
In Germany, federalism is working in a different way because of a stronger “harmonisation”
culture (see also: (Braun 2001). This is most obvious when we compare the role of political
actors: Germany has established a quite strong research ministry, which is a central actor in
the public-funded research system while Switzerland has lacked such a strong actor. In the
management of public-funded research structures, however, the working of federal structures
is comparable: The “power-sharing” in the “Bund-Länder-Kommission” and the “Wissen-
schaftsrat” between the Länder and the federal government is well known. Several analyses
demonstrate that the federal relations allow to science the position of a “tertius gaudens”
(Hohn 1990; Stucke 1993; Braun 1997). More concrete examples in our study were the diffi-
culties of the research ministry to reform the big science institutes in the 1970s because,
among other factors, of a distributive coalition between the Länder and their big science insti-
tute; the lack of direct access of the research ministry to universities and therefore the neces-
sity to cooperate with the DFG to develop programmed research. The result is clearly, as in
Switzerland, a weaker position of federal government. Federalism is, therefore, a constraint for
the institutionalisation and for the reform of institutions. In Germany this becomes even more
obvious in the case of the beginning fundamental reforms in the 1990s: This time the big sci-
ence institutes were the first victims of reform because in this case the federal government has
the predominant position in comparison to the Länder which is not the case with regard to the
other public-funded research institutions. The stronger reform drive in the 1990s overcame the
power of distributive coalitions.
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Having an unitary state does not yet mean unlimited freedom for the central government to do
what it likes and to impose learning processes on the system. The government and their minis-
tries have, of course, a stronger position than in federal countries but this position is often
limited by other features. In the case of France, we have demonstrated, that political influence
suffered from “shifting centres of power” that are – a structural homology – comparable to the
shifting power centres in the case of “semi-presidentialism”. France suffers from path depend-
ency: The creation of the CNRS as a corporatist institution with delegated political powers
has weakened the political influence ever since and contributes to the contestation of powers
from both sides today. France is therefore also suffering from “divided government” though
not caused by the territorial structure. The research ministry has considerable powers that are
nevertheless most of the time counterbalanced by the CNRS. There is a strong centrifugal ten-
dency in the country contributing to the “competitive learning” in the country. The “divided
government” explains the considerable slack in learning in France.
In the Netherlands, the other unitary country, we find a strong concentration of powers in the
education ministry that is only limited by the division of labour with the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs introduced in the beginning of the 1980s, and the traditional “functional corpo-
ratism”, i.e. the habit of delegating powers to semi-public bodies, that acts as a self-restraint of
the ministry. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has never used its powers in a hierarchical
way. As it had to develop competencies and knowledge and because it had a long tradition of
cooperation with industry, the stance of the Ministry was at a “distance” to actors, which
explains the role of the programme committee as a “fixer”. The education ministry had a strong
interventionist culture but often lacked vision to use it in a more offensive way. We think,
nevertheless, that the central position of the education ministry and its continuing and coher-
ent role in fulfilling the role as a political actor in research policy, has very much contributed
to the continuing reform élan of the Netherlands. The negative corollary of a strong ministry is
that persons are becoming important. One can demonstrate both for Germany and the Neth-
erlands that different ministers can have a considerable influence on the policy style of the
ministry (more interventionist, more liberal). Persons become more important in concentrated
powersystems.
Culture matters
We found differences between small and big countries as expected. While the big countries
were more divisive and conflictive in the organisation of their public-funded research system,
the small countries established institutions for consensus-building. The “art of coalition-
building” belongs to the strong requirements in the “diffused power system” of Switzerland
and in the “polder-model” of the Netherlands. Switzerland has institutionalised consensus-
building both in the science council (until 1999) and in the SNSF. Both institutions have been
main arena’s for developing research policies. As in the Netherlands, one finds, however, a
general effort of actors to avoid the veto of other actors by early integration in the policy for-
mulation. This is facilitated by the “double functions” of research policy elites in different
organisations. The Netherlands have developed elaborate bottom-up procedures in their com-
plex “mediation system”.
As all public-funded research systems have multiple actors with veto-positions, we consider
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the consensus culture as an advantage for social learning. It makes it easier to find a consensus
on reform projects. This is, however, no guarantee for immediate implementation as the exam-
ple of the Netherlands has demonstrated. Despite an elaborate bottom-up procedure, there
was a considerable resistance by research actors in the system before, finally, the great trans-
formation could take place.
If the big countries need a consensus they need either corporatist bodies like the Wissen-
schaftsrat in Germany, with the danger of “joint decision traps”, or they must mobilise a na-
tional consensus in the form of “colloques” as in France. Outside these institutions or forums
learning is subject to conflictive attitudes or indifference of actors. Even when big countries
have constructed a corporatist body for consensus-building, it is not comparable to the more
encompassing attempts of small countries to create a consensus among actors.
7.2.3 Governance capacities
In this last section we would like to summarise the governance qualities of each country and
its implication for learning capacities. The following table we developed in the context of our
study gives an overview:
Tab. 1: Actor Constellations and Policy-Innovation Capacity
Actor Constellations Policy-Innovation Ca-
pacity
Switzerland A large number of actors in problem and policy
stream; no clear centre; no real veto-players; diffused
powers; parliament important in political stream;
Inclusion; Art of coalition-building; the system learns
not just one institution
Innovation can be quick
if there is a general basic
consensus; good chances
for implementation; this
is independent of “para-
digmatic” and “normal”
policy-making
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France In-built schism in the system between political agen-
cies and intermediary organisations responsible for
regulation and research; no division of labour between
political and scientific funding; high fragmentation of
institutions; lack of continuity of political agencies;
polarisation if there is a strong research ministry; lack
of centre if there is no strong research ministry >
delegation; Research ministry is a veto-player, so is
the CNRS; “thrust and riposte” instead of long-term
cooperation; experiments possible because of delega-
tion and fragmentation; research ministry predominant
in problem stream; no regular participants in policy
stream, ad-hoc inclusion; cabinet decides in political
stream
Policy-Innovation can be
quick; but implementa-
tion may fail;
Germany Labour division between political and scientific fund-
ing; multiple veto-players; Research ministry pre-
dominant in all streams, learning within one organisa-
tion; “corporatist” inclusion in policy stream of bene-
ficiaries; “voice” for scientific organisations; Strong
pressures from outside needed to change organisa-
tional routines
Profound innovation
takes quite long as they
meet organisational
resistance; pressure from
outside important;
“normal policy-making”
by contrast easy and
quick
Netherlands “Divided government” > two ministries with impor-
tant potential in research; ministries play important
role in all streams; “experts” – but also given other
examples of policy innovation all other actors (“bot-
tom-up aggregation”) – integrated in problem stream;
policy stream includes most actors; ministries and
parliament decide in political stream; ministries are
veto-players, other actors have veto-potential if they
build up coalitions; no thrust and riposte but com-
promise-building or hierarchical decision by ministry;
Innovation takes some
time because of expertise
and compromise-
building process. This
even holds for normal
policy-making.
Switzerland can be characterised as a “diffused power system” where a central and predomi-
nating political actor is lacking. There are no real-veto players and a low potential for exclu-
sion. Such a system creates the need for a search for consensus, even independent of the al-
ready existing consociational culture. Solution-finding is a rather informal process where major
confrontations between actors are avoided. An important condition for success is the use of
“double functions” and close networks. Revolutionary steps ahead are seldom possible in such
a system but it is not excluded that radical reforms are taken. In such a system, new ideas can
come from anywhere but they must fall on fertile grounds. If a paradigm change has suffi-
ciently been diffused among actors and been accepted as such, then a quick reaction and policy
turn is feasible in such a system. If this is not the case, it needs a long time to build up the
consensus among actors.
France has a dualist structure with shifting power centres and a varying interest of the gov-
ernment and the public administration in research policy-making. The “discontinuity of politi-
cal interest” seemed to us a major disadvantage of the system. This discontinuity is also found
in the leading positions within the CNRS. The Netherlands demonstrated, by contrast, that
only a stable and continuous exercise of political power can institutionalise a permanent
learning and reform process. It is astonishing that under these circumstances France has, never-
theless, started in the mid-1990s a more fundamental reform process by introducing the con-
tract system though one may doubt if this system will function as it should given the incom-
151
patibility of existing structures with the new public management system. The turn was ex-
plained above all by the confluence of several reflexive analyses and a general sense of crisis in
the public-funded research systems at this time.
The dualist structure is the main problem of France as it is in Germany: the divide between
political funding and scientific funding of research provokes either unilateral and uncoordinated
action or needs large transaction costs (and often failures) to install a consensus on joint ac-
tion. The conflicts about domain competence between the CNRS and the research ministry
aggravate the situation and make it very difficult to find such a consensus. Germany has even
bigger problems in building up joint action between the scientific and political funding organi-
sations as the scientific organisations are not yet formally boundary organisation as the EPST
in France. Only voluntary participation or financial pressure can be used to convince the DFG
to participate in oriented research. The dualist structure provokes in France the pattern of
“thrust and riposte” or of a decentralised and uncoordinated behaviour in research policy-
making. Both ways are not conducive to institutional innovation and the introduction of more
responsiveness in the system. Systematic inclusion strategies are lacking in France. The high
degree of polarisation makes learning competitive and erratic.
Germany is subject to similar problems. It is confronted with very strong veto-positions of
actors at the operational and boundary level while it has, at the same time, the strongest re-
search ministry of the four countries. Federalism curbs, however, this power and strengthens
the veto-power of scientific institutions. In such a situation, the research ministry can learn
within its own confines and reform its structures and instruments, though we found also con-
siderable problems in this capacity to reform its own structures. The point here is to demon-
strate that learning is confined to separated areas, to scientific institutions or to the research
ministry. The Wissenschaftsrat cannot until now be used as a more powerful and uniting stra-
tegic actor given its corporatist features that induce joint decision traps. Other institutions to
make all actors of the system cooperate are lacking. Any encompassing reform of the system
remains tricky and difficult. The division of powers becomes therefore a major problem for
Germany now basic and technological research are growing together. The conflict will be
sharpened in the near future.
Finally, the Netherlands, are, according to our study the country that has learnt the best to
reorganise its features. The combination of continuous political power, an elaborate and com-
plex reflexive system that now is connecting well the different institutions and which is, at
last, avoiding overlap of competencies; the polder-model which expresses the traditional con-
sociational political culture; the tradition of “functional corporatism”, the diffusion of evalua-
tion and foresight; the development of reflexive resources at the level of universities; and the
diffusion of strategic science throughout the public-funded research system are components of
successful learning.
7.2.4 What can we learn about learning capacities?
It was our intention to use the comparison of research systems as empirical grounds for a
more general reflection on “systemic learning”. Since the beginning it was obvious to us learn-
ing capacities of, let us say, political institutions alone would not suffice to introduce change
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or innovate research systems. It needs learning at all levels of the public-funded research sys-
tem – i.e. on the political level, the boundary, and the operational level – to be successful in
this sense. Our notions of “software” and “hardware” comprised in a way this systemic di-
mension: the change of the “software”, i.e. norms, scripts, and causal beliefs (the policy-
design), takes place at the political level, while the change of the “policy-regime” needs also a
diffusion of the software to regulatory and operational structures. The change of a policy-
regime is, therefore, a systemic event.
If we think in these terms learning capacities of systems become a function of knowledge gen-
eration, knowledge accumulation, and knowledge diffusion. We would like to summarise
briefly our findings in these terms.
Knowledge generation
The first point that makes a difference for learning capacities is the question to what extent
research systems learn in an endogenous or exogenous way. Endogenous learning means, as we
stipulated in the first chapter, reflexive capacities of systems to organise learning on the base
of internal structures and procedures. The best example is the proliferation of evaluation pro-
cedures or foresight studies. One can also think of reflexive institutions that are specialised in
knowledge generation and communicating them to decision-makers on the regulatory level.
Systems that are able to use a number of such reflexive institutions and which have institu-
tionalised evaluation and foresight throughout the system will have a far-reaching capacity to
learn endogenously. Systems that do not possess such institutions depend on exogenous
learning. That means concretely that it needs an impetus outside the system like an economic
crisis, a change in party-control, particular events like the reunification in Germany, or simply
pressure from industry to embark on a road of change. We have seen that such exogenous
events have been at the beginning of reforms in all countries but that countries are, since the
1990s, building on their reflexive capacities to strengthen endogenous learning. This would be a
major step ahead in terms of learning capacities. Exogenous events remain erratic and contin-
gent.
The second point concerns the way knowledge generation is organised within the system.
There are two possibilities: a bottom-up or a top-down organisation (and, of course, we find
in-between ways of organising). It is our contention – and we follow neatly von Hayek in this
respect – that a decentralised and inclusive system with diffused powers has better learning
capacities than a system where knowledge generation is monopolised by one or a few central
organisations. It is important that innovation can come from all parts of the system – as we
described it for Switzerland – and that this knowledge is aggregated – like it happens in the
Netherlands. Reflexivity must be an activity of all parts of the system, while specialised re-
flexive institutions are there to aggregate this knowledge and not the other way around.
A low level of conflict seems to be pertinent for a decentralised and inclusive knowledge gen-
eration. In case of overlapping domains of competence or conflictive domains of competence,
knowledge generation becomes subject to “opportunistic” behaviour and competition. Compe-
tition might be well for the purposes of a market, it is not for systemic learning capacities.
Finally, we think that boundary organisations as mediators between different systemic levels
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can have an important function in knowledge generation. They usually have the antennae and
sensors developed for listening to the “field” and they also possess direct access to the centres
of political power. They can, therefore, fulfil a function of early warning and information in
the system in knowledge generation.
Knowledge accumulation
Knowledge generation is important but it would be in vain if generated knowledge becomes
forgotten and must be generated time and again. This is what we called “re-inventing the
wheel” in the French case. Two structures seem important to us to avoid such a fruitless repe-
tition of knowledge generation.
The first one is the continuity of political power and leading positions in regulatory institu-
tions. The frequent shift in party-control and personalities at the top of a research ministry as
well as the frequently changing directors and presidents in the CNRS have been detrimental to
learning because new interests negated old reports. It is clear that one cannot avoid that re-
flexive action is embedded in an environment where power is a major driving force. It is better
though to have a constant and coherent power that allows accumulating knowledge than to
have permanently changing interests. A policy of the “calm hand” is conducive to learning in
this sense.
Reflexive institutions are, without any doubt, the second necessary structure a system needs
to accumulate knowledge. To fulfil this function, it needs, however, a standing secretariat or
persons with a long-term commitment that can build on existing knowledge already produced
within the organisation. An advisory body the composition of which changes at each occasion
or that is dissolved after one report cannot guarantee such continuity. On the other hand, it is
clear that only such specialised institutions can and will have an interest in accumulating
knowledge. They must be the watchmen in the system paying attention that the system does
not forget, mostly because of political considerations but also because of complexity. We need
specialised institutions in order to meet up to the growing flood of knowledge that is gener-
ated.
Knowledge diffusion
There a large number of structures needed for a high degree of learning capacities.
Public-funded research systems are differentiated. It is therefore of utmost importance to de-
velop functioning connections between the different parts of the system. Again, the degree of
conflict and competition between the entities plays a role. A “divide” within the system as we
find it in the big countries Germany and France is detrimental to the fine-tuning of communica-
tion. Small countries evidently have an advantage because of more frequent contacts, a smaller
number of actors, and in general a stronger urge to play a co-operative game. The personal
contacts might, however, not suffice. An intelligent management of connecting the different
parts of the system is indispensable.
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The difficulties to do so are in part dependent on the degree of system differentiation. The
more complex a system, the more difficult it becomes to clearly delimit functions and to con-
nect the parts. Complexity is not necessarily a function of the size of a country as the Neth-
erlands have shown. Here the institutional dynamics of research seem to play a role and politi-
cal structures like federalism can have a positive role in preventing a strong differentiation like
we have found in Switzerland. We believe that a flat structure has advantages because of the
lower degree of complexity. Knowledge diffusion becomes easier in this way.
Boundary activities are once again a necessary part: This time it concerns not the generation
but the diffusion of knowledge. Boundary organisations with their links to both sides and their
ability of handling “boundary objects” can be a transmitter of knowledge in the system.
Finally, we are convinced – given our findings – that the proliferation of “strategic think”
throughout the system and in particular on the operational level is necessary for a rapid diffu-
sion of knowledge. Organisations must be prepared to “hear” and have developed the neces-
sary utilities to “listen” in order to integrate new knowledge into their organisational strategies
and, finally, into their organisational routines.
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8 ANNOTATIONS
A
ACI : Actions concertées incitatives
ANVAR: Agence nationale pour la
valorisation de la recherche
ATP: Actions thématiques programmées
B
BLK: Bund-Länder Kommission
Blue List : Blaue Liste Institut
BMBF: Bundesministerium für Bildung
Wissenschaft Forschung und
Technologie
BMFT: Bundesministerium für Forschung
und technologie
C
CCRST : Comité Consultatif de la
Recherche Scientifique et technique
CEA  : Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique
CNRS: Centre National de laRecherche
Scientifique
CNS: Conseil National de la Science
COMES: Commissariat à l'énérgie solaire
Comité National: Comité National de la
recherche scientifique
CRUS: Conférence des Recteurs des
Universités Suisses - Rectors Conference
of the swiss Universities
CTI : Commission pour la Technologie et
l'Innovation - Commission for
technology and innovation
CUS: Conférence Universitaire Suisse - Swiss
University Conference
D
DFG: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft  22
DGRST: Délégation générale à la recherche
scientifique et technique
E
EPST: Etablissements publics à caractère
scientifique et technologique
EZ: Ekonomische Zaken - Ministry of
Economic Affairs
F
FhG: Fraunhofer Institutes
G
GFE: GrossForschung Einrichtungen - Big
Science Institutes
GSR: Groupement de la Science et de la
Recherche
Grands Organismes: French extra-univerity
research institutions
H
HGF: Hermann-von-Helmholtz
Gemeinschaft Deutscher
Großforschungseinrichtungen
I
IOP: Innovatiegerichte
Onderzoeksprogrammes - innovation-
orientated research programmes
K
L
LTI : large technological projects
M
MPG: Max-Plannck Gesellschaft
N
NWO: Nederlandse Organisatie voor
Wettenschappelijk Onderzoek -
Netherlands organisation for scientific
research
NCCR: National Center of Competence in
Research
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O
OCW: Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur
en Wttenschappen - Ministry of
education, cultur and science
OFES: Office fédéral de l'éducation et de la
science - Federal office for education and
science
OFFT: Office Fédéral de la Formation
Professionnelle et de la Technologie -
Federal Office for professional education
and technology
ONERA: Office NAtional d'études et de
recherche aéronautique
P
PNR: Programmes nationaux de recherche -
Narional research programmes
PPR: Programmes Prioritaires de Recherche
- Priority Programmes
PRN: see NCCR
Project agencies” (“Projektträger”)
R
RAWB:  Raad van Advies voor
wetenschapsbeleid - Advisory council
for science policy
S
SFB: Sonderforschungsbereiche - Special
research domains
SME: Small and Medium Entreprises
SSC: Swiss Science Council
SNSF: Swiss National Science Foundation
T
TNO: Nederlandse Organisatie voor
toegepast-naturweteschappelijk
onderzoek - Nederlands Organisation for
applied scientific research
V
Verbundforschung
VLSI: Very Large Scale Integration
W
WRR : Wetenschappelijke Raad voor
Regeringsbeleid - Scientific council for
public policy
Z
ZBO: Zelfstandige bestuursorganen -
Autonomous administrative units
ZWO: Organisatie voor zuier
Wetenschappeljijk Onderzoek -
Organisation fro pure scientific research
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10 ANNEXE: FOLLOW-UP PROJECT
Skizze Dietmar Braun
Die Transformation von Forschungssystemen: Konvergenz und Divergenz in der
Forschungspolitik von OECD-Ländern
Die Forschungspolitik33 der OECD-Länder steht seit den 90er Jahren vor weitreichenden
Herausforderungen, was die Organisation der Forschung, den Modus politisch bindender
Entscheidungen und die Einbettung des Forschungssystems in die Gesellschaft betrifft. Kein
Land kann sich diesen Herausforderungen entziehen.
Zu nennen sind hier in aller Kürze:
(1) „Ent-Grenzung“
Der Aspekt der Ent-Grenzung zeigt sich in vielen Hinsichten: die Globalisierung und
europäische Integration hinterfragt zunehmend den Stellenwert einer eigenen nationalen Politik;
viele Ziele der Forschungspolitik – insbesondere die Finanzierung teurer Forschungsprojekte
und Forschungsinfrastruktur – scheinen nur noch in Kooperation zwischen Staaten möglich zu
sein; Forschung vollzieht sich mehr und mehr über die Grenzen hinweg; die Mobilität der
Forscher nimmt zu; die Bedeutung des benchmarking und von „best practices“ wächst
angesichts grenzüberschreitender Kontakte und Informationen; Politikentscheidungen werden
vernetzter und interdependenter, unter anderem durch internationale und supranationale
Organisationen.
(2) Austerität
Seit den 80er Jahren ist die Forschung, insbesondere an den Universitäten mit einer Politik der
Austerität konfrontiert, die zu einer Verknappung von finanziellen Mitteln und hohen
Anforderungen an Effizienz geführt hat. Hierdurch bedingt sind Diskussionen über
Umstrukturierungen und ein neues Management in der Organisation der Forschung.
(3) Veränderungen im „Regieren“ von Forschungssystemen (Governance)
Neue Orientierungen und Paradigmen bilden sich in der Forschungspolitik heraus:
- Das Prinzip „value for money“ avanciert zu einem dominanten Bezugspunkt
politischer Forschungsfinanzierung und damit des Forschungshandelns. Dieses Prinzip
hat es immer schon gegeben, es durchdringt aber jetzt praktisch jeden Sektor des
Forschungssystems. Damit findet ein Wechsel von Selbstreferenz zu Fremdreferenz im
Forschungshandeln statt.
                                                
33 Darunter sollen hier Entscheidungen auf der politischen Ebene sowie Entscheidungen auf der intermediären
Ebene von Forschungsförderorganisationen über Prioritäten, Ziele, Finanzierung und Organisation der Forschung
verstanden werden (siehe zu der Unterscheidung von politisch – intermediär und schließlich “operational”
(OECD 1991)
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- Gleichzeitig vollzieht sich in vielen Ländern ein Wechsel in der Staatsintervention. In
der Art der Steuerung haben sich die Forschungssysteme immer schon stark
unterschieden. Heute aber scheint eine alle Länder umfassende Neuorientierung in der
Staatsintervention zu bestehen, die durch mehr Zurückhaltung, stärkere ex post
Kontrolle von Forschungsleistungen, die professionellere Entwicklung von politisch
definierten mittel- und langfristigen Forschungszielen und durch einen Anreiz zur
„Selbstorganisation“ in der Forschung charakterisiert ist. Die Beziehungen zwischen
Staat und Wissenschaft sollen dabei auf eine neue, vertraglich definierte Basis gestellt
werden
(3) Veränderungen in der Forschungstätigkeit
Mit der wachsenden Bedeutung von Querschnittstechnologien und der zunehmenden
Akzeptanz der die Bedeutung von technologischen Innovationen unterstreichenden „new
growth theory“ (Romer 1994), entsteht die Notwendigkeit, die häufig unterschiedlich
institutionalisierte Grundlagenforschung, angewandte Forschung und technologische
Entwicklung direkt aneinander zu schalten. Die Schaffung von Interaktionsräumen zwischen
den Forschungsphasen (siehe auch Stokes 1997), wird zur Priorität in der
Forschungsförderung. Gleichzeitig beginnt ein Hinterfragen der bisherigen Politik zu den
„Eigentumsrechten“ in der staatlich finanzierten Forschung.
Diesen latenten und manifesten Veränderungen in Orientierung und Organisation von
Forschungspolitik und Forschung vermag sich kaum ein System zu entziehen. Die Aufgabe
besteht darin zu ergründen, wie die nationale Anpassung an diese Herausforderungen über
forschungspolitische Entscheidungen verläuft, ob wir auf dem Weg zu einem „integrierten“,
globalisierten Forschungssystem sind und welche Folgen dies für die Produktivität von
Forschungssystemen hat.
Der Schwerpunkt dieses Themenbereiches ist nicht – obwohl dies dargestellt werden muss –,
einfach die nationalen forschungspolitischen Entscheidungen nebeneinander zu legen und zu
systematisieren. Gerade das Thema der „Ent-Grenzung“ weist noch einmal eindrucksvoll
darauf hin, dass die nationalen forschungspolitischen Entscheidungen nicht isoliert vollzogen
werden, sondern möglicherweise in zunehmender Weise aufeinander Bezug nehmen, imitiert
werden, auf inter- oder supranationaler Ebene entschieden werden usw. Gleichzeitig gibt es
eine Reihe von Studien in der vergleichenden Politikforschung, die darauf hinweisen, dass auf
diese Weise zwar die Konvergenz der nationalen politischen Entscheidungen zunehmen kann,
gleichzeitig aber genügende Gründe bestehen anzunehmen, dass Divergenz weiterhin die
nationalen Forschungssysteme charakterisieren wird (siehe zum Beispiel Dyson 2000; Jordan,
Wurzel et al. 2000; Kohler-Koch 1999). Wiederum andere Studien betonen die Möglichkeit
von parallel ablaufenden Konvergenz- und Divergenzprozessen.
Seit langem ist bekannt, dass die Forschungspolitik in vielen Ländern von außen beeinflusst
wird. Es gab immer „Vorzeigeländer“ (wie Deutschland in der Hochschulpolitik zu Ende des
19. Jahrhunderts; die USA nach dem 2. Weltkrieg; Japan in der Technologiepolitik ab den 70er
Jahren), die als „Modelle“ dienten. Außerdem kann man nachweisen, dass gewisse „Diskurse“,
„implizite Theorien“ (Hofmann 1993) und Paradigmen in der Forschungspolitik in allen
Ländern in ähnlicher Weise Einfluss auf die Forschungssysteme und ihre Steuerung gehabt
haben. Dies wird auch dadurch belegt, dass ähnliche Steuerungsinstrumente und
Institutionalisierungsformen in der Forschung in den meisten Ländern in etwa gleichen
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Perioden eingeführt wurden. Trotzdem ist nach wie vor genügend Varianz geblieben, die durch
die nationalen Bedingungen beim Aufbau eines Forschungssystems erklärt werden müssen.
Gerade hierüber gibt es aber nach wie vor nichts Systematisches. Eine Rolle spielen könnte
zum Beispiel die Größe eines Landes, sein politisches Regime, die Höhe des
Bruttosozialprodukts, der Stellenwert der Bildungspolitik, die (politische) Kultur und andere
Faktoren. Und selbstverständlich spielen die jeweils spezifischen Akteurskonstellationen,
historische Ereignisse, die für die Wahl eines bestimmten Pfades verantwortlich sind usw. in
jedem Land eine Rolle. Kurzum: Konvergenz und Divergenz haben sicherlich in der
Forschungspolitik und der Organisation der Forschung immer dicht nebeneinander gelegen. Wir
wissen aber immer noch nicht, welche Faktoren für das eine oder andere eine Rolle spielen, wie
vor allem Konvergenz möglich ist und zustande kommt. Gerade dies wird heute zunehmend
aktuell, weil mit der Ent-Grenzung der Politik möglicherweise Divergenzen, nationale
Sonderentwicklungen und die Bedeutung der Pfadabhängigkeit obsolet werden und sich
Konvergenz zunehmend durchsetzen kann. „As we move into increasingly global waters we
are confronted with increasing complexity and thus nationally specific factors will no longer
sufficiently explain many of these developments. How national systems interact with the rest
of the world is becoming increasingly important” (Lundvall und Tomlinson 2000: 10).
Bei der Erörterung dieser Forschungsthematik soll also herausgearbeitet werden, inwiefern die
Anpassungsprozesse in den Ländern im Austausch einerseits mit anderen Ländern und
Erfahrungen vonstatten gehen, „Lernen“, „feedback“-Prozesse, „best practices“, „lesson-
drawing“, „internationale Regime und Organisationen“ oder schlicht Vorzeigemodelle in der
Forschungspolitik eine Rolle spielen oder/und inwiefern andererseits Pfadabhängigkeit,
unterschiedliche Regierungs- und Interventionsstile, unterschiedliche Kulturen und
Akteurskonstellationen in der Forschungspolitik nach wie vor ihre Bedeutung bei der
Erklärung von Anpassung von Forschungssystemen haben. Von besonderem Interesse ist auch
zu verstehen, inwiefern forschungspolitische Entscheidungen heute über mehrere politische
Ebenen verlaufen und eben nicht nur im nationalen Kontext.
Die Transformation von Forschungssystemen aufgrund forschungspolitischer Entscheidungen
– und nur um diesen Aspekt soll es hier gehen, also nicht etwa um die lokale Anpassung von
Forschungsorganisationen oder Forscherinnen – muss also als ein dialektischer Schritt von
Konvergenz und Divergenz verstanden werden und es kommt darauf an herauszufinden,
wieviel Divergenz und wieviel Konvergenz wir unter welchen Umständen in der zukünftigen
Forschungspolitik erwarten können. Erst dann kann festgestellt werden, ob wir tatsächlich auf
dem Weg zu einem über Globalisierung, Ent-Grenzung und Europäisierung entfachten
integrierten, forschungspolitischem System sind.
Bedeutung der Fragestellung
Die Ent-Grenzung (insbesondere die Rolle der Europäischen Union in Europa) wird enorme
Konsequenzen auf die nationale Forschungspolitik haben. Es ist deswegen von Bedeutung zu
erfahren, mit welchen Konflikten die Transformation vonstatten geht und inwiefern wir
künftig mit einer „globalisierten Forschungspolitik“ und homogenen Forschungssystemen
rechnen können oder inwiefern wir weiterhin auf die nationale Forschungspolitik zählen
können und Vielfalt die Forschungssysteme charakterisieren wird. Was ist der zu erwartende
Spielraum nationaler Forschungspolitik? Inwiefern wird die Produktivität der
Forschungssysteme durch Konvergenz und Divergenz beeinflusst?
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Wir lernen bei der Analyse, was möglicherweise „best practices“ in der Anpassung sind. Dabei
geht es nicht darum, in ein „naives benchmarking“ bei der Empfehlung von „best practices“ zu
verfallen (Lundvall und Tomlinson 2000: 6), sondern gerade vom Systembegriff auszugehen
und jedes Land als Konfiguration mit typischen Eigenschaften zu verstehen. Die relevanten
Variablen dieser Konfigurationen gilt es zu enthüllen, um zu verstehen, wie sich optimale
Anpassung über Konvergenz oder Divergenz vollzieht.
Um Konvergenz und Divergenz festzustellen, bedarf es erst einmal einer systematischen
Erhebung der Forschungspolitik und der historischen Entwicklungspfade in den verschiedenen
Ländern. Dies ist bis heute nie systematisch geleistet worden, obwohl die OECD sporadisch
einige vergleichende Analysen anbietet (OECD 1972, 1973, 1974, 1991, 2001). Dabei müssen
erst noch die relevanten erklärenden Variablen entwickelt und getestet werden, die die
bisherigen forschungspolitischen Wege und Leistungen erklären. Hiermit kann also eine
eklatante Lücke in unserem Wissen über die Forschungspolitik geschlossen werden.
Die Mehrebenenpolitik ist angesichts der Bedeutung der Europäischen Union eine der
dominanten Themen in der heutigen europäischen Politikwissenschaft. Zu erfahren, wie
Nationalstaaten ihre forschungspolitischen Entscheidungen angesichts der zunehmenden
Bedeutung supranationaler und internationaler Organisationen organisieren, ob sie dies mit
Rücksicht auf die anderen Ebenen tun oder nicht und welche systematischen Unterschiede
hierbei zwischen den Staaten bestehen, erscheint von großem Interesse.
1.1 Theorien
Als theoretische Zugänge eignen sich hier vor allem neo-institutionalistische Theorien zur
Pfadabhängigkeit (Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2000); Theorien, die sich mit dem Lernen von
politischen Systemen beschäftigen (Olsen und Peters 1996; Bennett und Howlett 1992;
Kingdon 1984; die Literatur zur „begrenzten Rationalität“ (March und Olsen 1989); Ansätze,
die „Ideen“ und „Paradigmen“ in der Politik behandeln (Hall 1993; Braun und Busch 1999);
Theorien zur Konvergenz und Divergenz von Strukturentwicklungen wie z.B. der Ansatz zu
„lesson-drawing“ (Rose 1993; Conzelmann 1998) und Policy Transfers (als Übersicht
Dolowitz und Marsh 1996), aber auch die ökonomischen Ansätze, die zumeist im
Zusammenhang mit Studien zu nationalen Innovationssystemen verwendet werden (Lundvall
und Tomlinson 2000; Fagerberg 1995; (Venables, 1999)
Mögliche Schwerpunkte dieser Forschungsthematik:
1. Systematisierung von Polity, Politics und Policies der OECD-Forschungssysteme
2. Die historischen Entwicklungslinien der OECD-Forschungssysteme (Institutionen;
Regierungsstile; Rolle von Ideen und Paradigmen)
3. Ermittlung von Erklärungsfaktoren zur Herausbildung unterschiedlicher Gruppen von
Forschungssystemen (wie große/kleine Länder; Vorreiter/Nachzügler; Bruttosozialprodukt;
Regierungsstile; Verhältnis Staat – Gesellschaft; Kultur; Spezialisierung in Industrie,
Forschung usw.)
4. Verlauf und Erklärung von Diffusionsprozessen von forschungspolitischem Wissen
5. Nationale Verarbeitungsprozesse von Herausforderungen und die Rolle von Wissen und
Lernen hierbei
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7. Die Rolle von internationalen Organisationen wie der OECD und der Europäischen Union
als Integrationsmotor als Erklärungsfaktor für die Konvergenz von Forschungspolitik und die
Organisierung der nationalen Forschungspolitik unter dem Gesichtspunkt der
Mehrebenenpolitik
9. Erklärungsmuster für Konvergenz und Divergenz
1.2 Vorhandene Forschungserkenntnisse und Defizite
Bis auf die OECD finden sich wenige vergleichende Publikationen zur Forschungspolitik der
OECD-Länder. Die OECD hat immer wieder sporadisch versucht, die nationalen
Forschungssysteme nebeneinander zu stellen oder aber bestimmte Aspekte der
Forschungssysteme und der Forschungspolitik zu erörtern. Immer geht es dabei aber um
praktisches Wissen zur Verbesserung der bestehenden Forschungspolitik und weniger um
systematisches Grundlagenwissen in bezug auf die Forschungspolitik. Es gibt zwar, vor allem
über die USA, eine ganze Reihe von Einzelfallstudien, sie werden aber – bis auf die OECD-
Studien – selten systematisch nebeneinander gelegt. Themen wie die Schaffung von
forschungspolitischen Institutionen, die Entscheidung über Forschungsausgaben, die Rolle von
Förderorganisationen und die Prioritätenbildung oder Reformen lieben weitgehend brach. Es
besteht bisher noch kein systematischer Vergleich, der dazu dient, historische
Entwicklungsmuster zu erkennen, vergleichende Daten zu erheben und zu nutzen und für alle
OECD-Länder einmal Hypothesen i.b.a. die Erklärung von Unterschieden in der
Forschungspolitik zu entwickeln Es fehlt an Wissen z.B. über den Einfluss von politischen
Regimen, föderalen und unitarischen Ländern, großen und kleinen Ländern, politischen
Kulturen usw. In den wenigen politikwissenschaftlichen Studien etwa des Science Policy
Research Unit an der University of Sussex werden vor allem Finanzierungsströme und
institutionelle Strukturen diskutiert, während der Bereich der Entscheidungsprozesse, vor
allem auch innerhalb des politischen Systems, vernachlässigt wird.
Über Konvergenz und Divergenz wird dagegen häufiger im Zusammenhang mit
Innovationssystemen nachgedacht (als neuere Übersicht (Larédo und Mustar 2001). Die
Forschung über nationale Innovationssysteme beschäftigt sich ja mit der Einbettung von
Technologiepolitik in die sozialen, politischen und kulturellen Strukturen und versucht somit
in ähnlicher Weise zu ermitteln, wie sich nationale Systeme in bezug auf Innovationsleistungen
anpassen können. Hier ist zum Teil Material zusammengetragen worden, das zumindest bei
der Systematisierung nationaler Forschungssysteme helfen kann. Es kann aber nicht genügen,
da es in einem anderen Diskussionszusammenhang entwickelt wurde und zum Teil stark von
ökonomischen Theorien beeinflusst ist. Außerdem hat die Forschung über Innovationssysteme
kaum die Forschungspolitik selbst analysiert. Sie denkt eher auf der Ebene von Strukturen und
Institutionen.
Genutzt werden können auch Erkenntnisse, die im Zusammenhang mit einem
Forschungsschwerpunkt der DFG „Regieren in der Europäischen Union“ erzielt wurden,
wobei allgemein auf die Problematik von Mehrebenenpolitik, Divergenz und Konvergenz von
Staatstätigkeit eingegangen wurde (siehe Kohler-Koch und Eising 1999).
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